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This thesis argues that a theological articulation of panpsychism, within the bounds 
of a broadly conceived Christian orthodoxy, would be of benefit to the doctrine of 
creation. Panpsychism is a family of theories within philosophy of mind, which seek 
to explain the existence of consciousness in the human person by positing mentality 
(“psyche”) as fundamental and ubiquitous to the natural world (“pan”). In recent 
decades, emergence theory has become a popular via media between eliminative 
physicalism and substance dualism. However, in lieu of the inability (or refusal) of 
emergence theorists to provide an account of how matter gives rise to the mind, a 
significant group of contemporary analytic philosophers are returning to the 
historical concept of panpsychism as a more satisfactory alternative. Should this 
revival of panpsychism continue, what will the implications be for Christian 
theologians engaged in constructive and interdisciplinary articulations of the doctrine 
of creation? This is the driving question that this thesis sets out to answer.  
In addition to various scientific and philosophical ambiguities, theologies built upon 
the theory of emergence contain unrecognised tensions. As such, theologians should 
investigate alternative ontologies, which may serve Christianity better. The recent 
revival of panpsychism within contemporary philosophy of mind needs to be 
evaluated both for its coherence and conduciveness to theistic beliefs. To counteract 
any appearance that this project is merely chasing the winds of fashion, a brief 
historical interlude considering the panpsychism of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz is 
given to exhibit the historical pedigree of employing panpsychism for theological 
ends.  
Philosophical rigour and historical pedigree, although important, are not enough to 
justify favouring one ontology above all others within the doctrine of creation. An 
ontology must also ‘earn its keep’, so to speak, through interaction and integration 
with other theological commitments. Panpsychism is so tested in the context of 
contemporary debates surrounding divine action and eco-theological ethics. These 
chapters reveal the possibility that panpsychism may not only be resourced from 
without but may also arise from within the Christian community’s Scriptural and 
liturgical reflection. Panpsychism facilitates a robust and realistic account of God’s 
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active presence within creation and the response of all created beings in praise. If 
nothing more, the revival of panpsychism within analytic philosophy of mind should 





The doctrine of creation in Christian theology is not primarily a statement about how 
or when the universe began, but it is an articulation of how everything that is not 
God (the creation) relates to God (the Creator), and how different creatures should 
then relate to one another. Questions regarding the human soul or mind, have always 
been a central part of these discussions. However, the Christian tradition puts forth 
no one single view regarding the mind such that a variety of possibilities continue to 
be explored and weighed today. In keeping with this tradition of debate, this thesis 
evaluates the benefit of one theory of mind, called panpsychism, for Christian 
articulations of how creation relates to the Triune God. 
The doctrine of creation, because it is about this universe which is shared by a 
diversity of creatures and human cultures, is always in dialogue with the natural 
sciences and philosophy. How this universe relates to God depends, in part, upon 
what type of universe this is, and that is something that natural scientists and 
philosophers specialise in discovering. Within these disciplines there is a growing 
consensus that recent attempts to describe reality in exhaustively physical categories 
is insufficient for explaining minds, consciousness, morality, free-will, and other 
important aspects of human life. What other options are there?  
There are two new approaches which scientists and philosophers are currently 
employing in the wake of this challenge: emergence theory and panpsychism. Put 
simply, emergence theory argues that when physical processes become complicated 
in exactly the right way, such as in the human brain, the mind emerges. By contrast, 
panpsychism argues that in order for human beings to be conscious, the basic 
ingredients of mentality have to exist throughout the universe as a fundamental 
feature of reality.  
In recent decades, emergence theory has been somewhat embraced by contemporary 
theologians, whereas few theologians (the one group known as Process theologians 
being the exception) have seriously considered panpsychism. This thesis argues that 
the preference for emergence theory over panpsychism is misplaced. Instead, it 
explores the benefits of adopting panpsychism within Christianity for depicting a 
universe most likely to be created intentionally and with purpose, for articulating 
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God’s active presence within the world, and for a theologically rich view of ecology, 









Is the soul solid, like iron? 
Or is it tender and breakable, like 
the wings of a moth in the beak of the owl? 
Who has it, and who doesn’t? 
I keep looking around me. 
The face of the moose is as sad 
as the face of Jesus. 
The swan opens her white wings slowly. 
In the fall, the black bear carries leaves into the darkness. 
One question leads to another. 
Does it have a shape? Like an iceberg? 
Like the eye of a hummingbird? 
Does it have one lung, like the snake and the scallop? 
Why should I have it, and not the anteater 
who loves her children? 
Why should I have it, and not the camel? 
Come to think of it, what about the maple trees? 
What about the blue iris? 
What about all the little stones, sitting alone in the 
moonlight? 
What about roses, and lemons, and their shining leaves? 
What about the grass?  
 






The doctrine of creation can easily vacillate between too narrow a focus, often reduced to a 
treatise on the first few chapters of Genesis and the ex nihilo formula, or suffer from inflation, 
whereby the things of God are considered under the aspect of nature, rather than the reverse.  
The mantle of providing an account of all that is not-God, in relation to both the Triune 
Creator and other fields of human enquiry, can be an unwieldy task to undertake. Moreover, 
the doctrine of creation will always stand at the interdisciplinary edge of Christian thought, 
evaluating and employing the best theories of contemporary scholarship in light of the 
revelation of Jesus Christ made known through the indwelling of the Spirit. This thesis 
operates within the doctrinal locus of creation as an evaluation of how a particular ontology, 
currently undergoing renewed attention within philosophy of mind, may be useful for 
theological reflection about the universe as it stands in relation to God and humanity’s place 
within it.   
The ontology focused upon is panpsychism; the claim that consciousness (‘psyche’) is a 
fundamental feature of reality found throughout creation, such that some degree of mentality 
exists within all things (‘pan’). To say that psyche is fundamental is to say that mental 
phenomena can neither be explained in terms of, nor reduced to, anything non-mental. This 
differentiates panpsychism from various types of physicalism and emergentism, which both 
claim that physicality alone is fundamental to reality. Since emergence theory is 
panpsychism’s main competitor, the first chapter of this thesis argues that emergence 
contains more problems for a Christian doctrine of creation than has been previously realised. 
Theologians should be open to looking elsewhere for an ontology more compatible with the 
central claims of the Christian faith.  
What is often overlooked in contemporary philosophical literature is that if one were to only 
define panpsychism as the claim that mentality is fundamental, then this panpsychism has not 
yet been demarcated from traditional substance dualism.1 Traditional substance dualists will 
also describe the mind as fundamental, because minds are neither derived from, nor explained 
in terms of, any other created substance but given to a particular organism upon conception or 
embryonic development by God. That is why the definition above describes panpsychism as 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Joshua R. Farris for this insight.  
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stating that psyche is fundamental throughout this created reality. For most panpsychists, 
whatever is taken as fundamental for the physical is also taken as fundamental for mentality; 
in this sense a panpsychist might say that ‘mind matters’! As such, any theological 
uniqueness that we might want to attribute to the human person cannot be grounded in a 
different ontology to other creatures. In Karl Popper’s and John Eccles’s words, “Everything 
has a soul. . . or a rudiment of a soul”.2 On panpsychism, everything that is necessary for the 
future complexity and diversity of the universe exists from the first moment of creation, and 
no later substantive, ontological, created additions are required.3 All divisions within the 
created world pale in comparison to this first act of creation ex nihilo and the utter distinction 
established between Creator and created.  
A panpsychist could still be a substance dualist, if she so chose, in the qualified sense of 
claiming that the two created substances are always conjoined. This would be a substance 
dualism ‘all the way down’, so to speak. Timothy L.S. Sprigge (although no substance dualist 
himself) gave a definition of panpsychism that sought to capture the reality of both the 
physical and the mental, when he wrote, “Physical nature is composed of individuals, each of 
which is to some degree sentient … [They may be said to have] sentience, experience, or in a 
broad sense, consciousness.”4 Most contemporary panpsychists follow this kind of definition 
but claim to be monists, of either a property dualist, neutral monist, or idealist type. Susan 
Schneider has recently argued that any form of idealism would entail panpsychism, and 
although panpsychism does not entail idealism it is “something near enough”.5 If she is 
correct, then a broader sweep of the Christian tradition than is considered in this thesis might 
be considered panpsychist. However, traditional categorisations of monism, dualism and 
idealism may turn out to be rather unhelpful. For whilst denying the reality of neither the 
mental nor the material, panpsychism often eschews traditional typologies by underlining that 
what we call ‘material’ and ‘mental’ always come together and cannot be separated.  
                                                 
2 Karl R. Popper and John C. Eccles, The Self and Its Brain (Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer, 1977), 15. 
3 I say ‘substantive, ontological, created additions’ to leave room for the possibility of new properties, of 
describing the incarnation as a substantial addition (but not a created one), and to be clear that I am not ruling 
out divine activity after the act of creation.  
4 Sprigge, T.L.S. “Panpsychism,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, 1998, accessed 
August 8, 2018, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/panpsychism/v-1. 
doi:10.4324/9780415249126-N079-1 
5 Susan Schneider, “Idealism, or Something Near Enough,” in Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics, eds. Tyron 
Goldschmidt and Kenneth L. Peace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 275-289.  
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When one compares panpsychism to neighbouring positions within philosophy of mind, its 
closest relative seems to be hylomorphism.6 Hylomorphism is a position deriving from 
Aristotelian philosophy, which sees all actual being as a combination of matter (hyle) and 
form (morphe). Matter without form exists only in potentiality and is known as prime matter, 
whereas actual matter, which has form, is a corporeal substance. The form of a thing, which 
makes it the kind of substance that it is, is also referred to by Aristotle as a soul (psyche); the 
form of human beings is a rational soul, the form of animals is an animal (irrational) soul, the 
form of plants a vegetative soul, and so on. In this sense, hylomorphism and panpsychism 
both uncomfortably straddle the categories of monism and dualism, and both extend the 
duality of nature to include all of reality, animate and inanimate alike. Moreover, like the 
indwelling powers of panpsychism, the form in hylomorphism determines the passive and 
active powers and dispositions of any given thing, such that causation arises from the 
inherent capacities within formed-matter. In both panpsychism and hylomorphism this 
provides the basis for retaining teleology or final causes within the natural world.  
In order to differentiate their position from panpsychism, a hylomorphist will most likely 
stress that psyche/form does not entail the capacity or even the proto-capacity for experience. 
However, in this case the capacity of experience will have to be sourced externally from the 
corporeal substance rather than be an inherent power, but this is something hylomorphists do 
not typically wish to do.7 Instead, the demarcation between hylomorphism and panpsychism, 
I suggest, is that on hylomorphism each substance is fundamental such that “there are 
metaphysically fundamental entities at multiples levels of scale.”8 This is contrast to 
panpsychism, where fundamentality is found at one level of reality, of which all other entities 
are aggregates, combinations, or individuations.9  
                                                 
6 This is not the place for a detailed outline of hylomorphism, but given the difficulty of differentiating 
hylomorphism from panpsychism, some discussion is warranted.  
7 This is because of the inherent powers view of properties, capacities and dispositions which hylomorphism 
entails. If hylomorphism is taken to mean that matter contains the potentiality for consciousness, such that when 
the matter has the correct form it manifests as a conscious corporeal substance, then this, as far as I can tell, is a 
type of panpsychism. 
8 Robert C. Koons, “Knowing Nature: Aristotle, God, and the Quantum”, in Knowing Creation: Perspectives 
from Theology, Philosophy, and Science, eds. Andrew B. Torrance and Thomas H. McCall (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Zondervan, 2018), 216. Later, Koon clarifies this further in writing, “in the Aristotelian image of nature, 
substances (metaphysically fundamental things) exist at many levels of scape and composition.” Koons, 
“Knowing Nature,” 220.  
9 If fundamentality is found at every level of reality, then it seems that hylomorphism restricts the extent to 
which corporeal substances can combine or individuate at different levels. However, depending upon a 
hylomorphists account of mereology and the possibility of different corporeal substances combining into a new, 
single unified corporeal substance such that the form of a thing changes, this difference may quickly disappear. I 




Chapter two examines the resurgence of interest in panpsychism from prominent analytic 
philosophers of mind. Thomas Nagel, David J. Chalmers, and Galen Strawson are the knights 
of this tale, although they do not stand alone. Their ‘campaign’, although it was never 
planned as such, is the culminative effect of a growing dissatisfaction with both physicalism 
and emergentism, in addition to the refusal to return too quickly to a substance dualism 
reliant on theism for coherence, within secular philosophy of mind. After the central 
arguments for panpsychism have been narrated, this chapter turns to evaluate how well 
panpsychism fares in philosophic combat. The largest section of this chapter considers the 
objections levelled against panpsychism, the response offered by panpsychists, and the shape 
of panpsychism when the dust has cleared from the battlefield. When all have counted their 
wounded, philosophy of mind is left in a stalemate, but it is a stalemate where panpsychism 
has earnt her seat at the table. The remaining question is, whom will panpsychism choose as 
an ally? The final section of this chapter brokers an accord between theism and panpsychism 
and argues that if the logic within contemporary panpsychism is consistently held then it 
leads to theism. There is a natural alliance between panpsychism and theism. 
The alliance between panpsychism and Christian theology is not as new and surprising as it 
might seem from the present literature, instead there is a very old friendship here that can be 
built upon. Therefore, this thesis provides a historical interlude, which forefronts how the 
panpsychism of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz arose out of theological concerns and was 
employed to serve theological argumentation. The theological arguments focused upon are, 
(i) the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, (ii) a view of creation as a single, comprehensive order, 
and (iii) a sacramental ontology. These arguments are the seeds for the more constructive 
proposals found within chapters four and five. By highlighting how Leibniz employed 
panpsychism, not only in conjunction but, in defence of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, this 
interlude disentangles panpsychism from the rejections of this doctrine put forth by Process 
theology and feminist theologies (which often contain panpsychist tendencies). Panpsychism 
does not entail or commit one to any specific doctrine of God.10 
Chapters four and five assess the fecundity of panpsychism, one might say the potential 
growth of the three seeds gathered from Leibniz’s theology, in two contentious areas of 
theological debate today; models of divine action and Christian responses to the ecological 
                                                 
10 This chapter, therefore, is a response to dismissals of panpsychism on the grounds that it entails some form of 




crisis. In addition to being two of the most pressing concerns for the contemporary 
articulation of creation, these two chapters use panpsychism to build a call-and-response 
structure to a panpsychist doctrine of creation. The God who spoke creation into being and 
whose indwelling presence calls all creatures into union, receives the praises (and the 
groanings) of created beings.  
Chapter four evaluates the scientific, ethical and theological challenges summarised by the 
epithet ‘interventionism’, and the responses by Robert J. Russell, David Ray Griffin, and 
Kathryn Tanner. These are significantly different theological projects, and not directly 
compatible with one another. Yet, the flexibility of panpsychism as an ontology is shown in 
that a panpsychist ontology would strengthen each of these models of divine action. Although 
panpsychism does not commit theology to any one doctrine of God, it does make a distinctive 
contribution to the area of divine action. What panpsychism uniquely provides is an 
ontological ‘space’ for the personal and interactive presence of the Holy Spirit indwelling the 
depths of creaturely subjectivity and calling all creatures towards flourishing. 
Whilst chapter five draws attention to panpsychism’s importance within secular eco-
philosophy, it is argued that an account of transcendence is also required such that nature is 
not an end in itself, but a sacrament pointing towards the Creator.  It is then argued that 
central theological metaphors, depicting the relationship between humanity and creation, are 
distorted when human beings alone have the necessary ontology for reciprocal, dialogical 
relationship with God. Panpsychism enables theologians to realistically interpret neglected 
aspects of the biblical witness and Church’s liturgy, such that creation is a vocally responsive 
community made to praise the Triune God.   
At this point, we might pay heed to Austin Farrer’s advice for “a proper distinction of saving 
faith from pious philosophy”, whereby ontological theories are held lightly, in order to ensure 
that a theologian’s “vitals are not being torn away when their philosophy is jettisoned”.11 
Arguments, such as those discussed in this thesis, look at different ways of viewing the finite 
creation in light of theological claims, but the core claims regarding who God is and what 
God has done, are not scrutinised here in the same philosophical method. It is often said that 
primary theology lies in the worship of the church, and the work of theologians is always 
secondary reflection. If so, then the consideration of this thesis might be considered tertiary 
reflection by examining the philosophical frameworks that best facilitate the secondary 
                                                 
11 Austin Farrer, Faith and Speculation: An Essay in Philosophical Theology (London: A&C Black, 1967), 14.  
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articulations of doctrinal theology and allow for greater synthesis between primary and 
secondary theological discourse. Whilst such tertiary reflection is a necessary and helpful aid 
to theology, the conclusions reached are not matters of saving faith.  
To confuse these forms of discourse would be to divinise philosophy or naturalise theology. 
It is one of the central critiques, found repeatedly in this thesis, that theology must resist the 
urge— most often arising in interdisciplinary discourse —to naturalise its claims and thereby 
speak of God as existing in metaphysical continuity, or within the larger category of ‘nature’ 
that humans investigate. As a result of this methodological conviction, it might be noted that 
in this thesis panpsychism alone does not generate new theological insights. Instead, 
panpsychism is tested as an ontological framework, and judged as to its ability to allow 
theologians to speak more clearly and robustly of the distinction between God and creation, 
whilst simultaneously affirming the presence of God and the value of creation.  
One example of naturalising theology by subsuming theological claims under a particular 
ontology is Process theology. Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), Charles Hartshorne 
(1897-2000) and the Process theology movement that they ignited and championed is 
probably the most well-known integration of panpsychism within Christian thought. In many 
ways, this thesis is designed to refute the assumption that Process theology is the only way to 
incorporate panpsychism into Christian theology. As such, a brief exposition of Process 
thought is offered here, such that it may be referenced in contrast to all that follows.  
 
A Brief Exposition of Process Theology 
 
During the metaphysical stage of his career, Whitehead saw that the dualism that Western 
thought had inherited from Descartes had led to the contradictions of scientific materialism.12 
In order to undo this “world-knot”, Western cosmology needed to be radically rethought.13 
Whitehead argued that such a solution would entail “no arbitrary breaks” between mentality 
and nature, such that the mind was at the heart of “the constitution of nature”.14 Whilst 
                                                 
12 See, Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Free Press, 1925/1967).  
13 Arthur Schopenhauer is credited with referring to the mind-body problem as the world-knot, which inspired 
the title of David Ray Griffin’s book on a panexperientialist solution; Unsnarling the World-Knot: 
Consciousness, Freedom, and the Mind-Body Problem (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1998).  
14 Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 73; Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: 




Whitehead’s system is shot through with panpsychism, it is also highly idiosyncratic; Process 
scholarship is neither a norm in panpsychist philosophy, nor the best paradigm for 
panpsychist theology. In preparation for the alternative that is argued for throughout this 
thesis, the remainder of this introduction will show in what sense Process philosophy is 
panpsychist, and second argue that theologians interested in panpsychism can, and should, 
reject Process theology’s doctrine of God.15 
Inspired by William James, Whitehead constructed a new theory of reality upon the 
foundation of experiential events; he called these “occasions of experience” or “actual 
occasions”. 16 These actual occasions are “drops of experience, complex and independent” 
forming an “ocean of feeling”.17 These occasions are “the final real things of which the world 
is made up.”18 Whitehead’s ontology has been labelled “panexperientialist” (a sub-type of 
panpsychism) since all reality is constituted by experiential events.19 In contrast to the 
panpsychism discussed in this thesis, Process philosophy contains no enduring substances or 
subjects beneath these experiences, but only a succession of experiences that form the 
‘becoming’ (but never the ‘being’) of all the apparent substances and subjects in the universe. 
All of the subjects and objects that we encounter in the world are said to be collections of 
these actual occasions, which have achieved some level of unity to form a “nexus” or 
interdependent “society”.20 It is due to this ever becoming, never restful, stream of 
experiential events that Whitehead’s philosophy has birthed the movement known as Process 
philosophy.  
Actual occasions are fleeting moments of experience, which momentarily enjoy “subjective 
immediacy” before being replaced by a successor.21 The predecessor forms part of the 
experience (that is, the reality) of the subsequent occasion, and thus obtains what Whitehead 
                                                 
15Due to the limitations of space, I simply refer readers less accustomed to the complexity and terminology of 
Process philosophy to John B Cobb and David Ray Griffin, Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition 
(Louisville KN and London: Westminster John Knox Press, 1976).  
16 Alfred North Whitehead refers to “actual occasions” in Adventures of Ideas (New York: Free Press, 
1933/1967) and “occasions of experience” in Process and Reality. Corrected edition. eds. David Ray Griffin and 
Donald W. Sherburne (New York: The Free Press, 1928/1978); Whitehead credits William James for giving 
Whitehead the idea that human experience comes in drops; Whitehead Process and Reality, 105-106. 
17 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 18, 166.  
18 Whitehead, 18. 
19 The term ‘panexperientialist’ was first used by John B. Cobb and David Ray Griffin in Mind in Nature: 
Essays on the Interface of Science and Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: University of American Press, 1977). 
Whitehead never used any such terminology, and Charles Hartshorne employed the term “panpsychism” and 
later replaced it with “psychicalism”.  See, Griffin, Reenchantment without Supernaturalism: A Process 
Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 97.  
20 Whitehead, Adventures in Ideas, 258-61.  
21 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 38, 336ff.  
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calls “objective immortality”.22 It is because the relationship between occasions constitutes 
their very essence that occasions are “internally related” (past to present, and simultaneous 
adjacent occasions) and Process philosophy claims to be a “relational ontology”. Herein lies 
Whitehead’s account of efficient causality; an actual occasion carries within it the whole 
history of its predecessors , and this has “causal efficacy” that the occasion “prehends” or 
feels.23 This process of the past being experienced by the present is the “physical pole” of 
existence and gives the impression at the macro-level of temporal duration of objects.24 It is 
worth noting that even this “physical pole” is entirely experiential.  
Whitehead supplements this with the “mental pole” of existence, which introduces novelty 
into how these physical feelings are integrated (“transmuted”) into the next occasion in the 
sequence.25 This is how change may occur in the universe. Novelty is introduced through the 
prehension, not of other actual occasions as at the physical pole, but by the “conceptual 
prehension” of “eternal objects”.26 These eternal objects are possibilities, such as abstract 
relations or qualities, which are only actualised through the mental pole. All the past 
(physical) and abstract (mental) aspects of experience are together synthesised into a single 
present experience, a momentary actual occasion. All this occurs in a fraction of a second and 
it is a moment Whitehead refers to as “satisfaction”.27 The completion of this process is 
referred to as satisfaction because each aspect of experience carries with it, according to 
Whitehead, an emotional tone, called a “subjective form” which is the “sheer it-ness” of 
every experience.28 What level of novelty is introduced into each occasion is governed by the 
“subjective aim” of each occasion, which is its purposeful aspect, striving for “enjoyment” in 
its “satisfaction”; this is meant to account for teleological causation in the world.29  
Where is God within this metaphysical maze? Whitehead famously wrote that “God is not to 
be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is 
their chief exemplification.”30 From this statement alone, it is clear that any notion of creatio 
                                                 
22 Whitehead, 89, 94. The subject-object distinction in Whitehead is therefore purely temporal, the subject is 
present, and the object is past. See, Adventures in Ideas, 227. 
23 Whitehead, Process and Reality 28-29. 
24 Whitehead, 35, 51-52, 66.  
25 Whitehead, 165.  
26 Eternal objects are defined as “any entity whose conceptual recognition does not involve a necessary 
reference to any definite actual entities of the temporal world.” Whitehead, 69-70. 
27 Whitehead, 37, 130.  
28 Whitehead, 394, 398; Whitehead, Adventures in Ideas, 336-338.  
29 Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 250. 




ex nihilo or claims to radical discontinuity between God and creation are ruled out.31 The 
rejection of any separation between a transcendent Being and the world of endless becoming, 
results in a doctrine of God whereby the divine is a part of – bound within – the metaphysical 
system of creation. It is in this sense that Process theologians endorse ‘naturalism’, since the 
Process God is not ‘supernatural’ and cannot interrupt or rewrite the processes of the world.32 
When Whitehead does introduce God-talk into his philosophy he identifies ‘God’ with an 
aspect of his metaphysics; first with the principle of limitation and later as an actual entity.33  
The actual entity of limitation, or God for Whitehead, has three primary functions. First, God 
accounts for the reality and determination of the eternal objects, thereby actualising what 
would otherwise be a boundless indeterminate reality. Thus, it is possible for Whitehead to 
say that without God there could be no concrete world and since the eternal objects enable 
novelty, God’s envisioning and ordering of eternal objects is how God can attempt to act in 
the world.34 Second, God’s determining of eternal objects gives the all-important initial aim 
to each new occasion as it comes into existence, which is its location or initial standpoint on 
the world.35 This is the primary creative task of God, since the standpoint of a new occasion 
influences what past or co-adjacent present occasions it is affected by, and thus impacts what 
it means for each occasion to be ideally satisfied. Third, God accounts for and orders relative 
values, since God is the principle of limitation and “Restriction is the price of value.”36 God’s 
purpose is to bring ideal values into the world, and this is known in Process thought as the 
                                                 
31 See, David Ray Griffin, “Creation out of Nothing, Creation out of Chaos, and the Problem of Evil” in 
Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy, ed. Stephen T. Davis (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2001).  
32 See, David Ray Griffin Reenchantment, 129-168. 
33 Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 257; cf. Process and Reality, 47. Whitehead switches from 
claiming that as the principle of limitation, “God is not concrete” (Science and the Modern World, 137) to 
referring to God as a concrete “actual entity”. See, Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making: Lowell 
Lectures, 1926 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926), 90, 94, 99, 152. Cobb argues that this move is 
motivated by the concern that for the principle of limitation to function it must be concrete, rather than abstract; 
not due to any theological changes per se. See, John B. Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology: Based on the 
thought of Alfred North Whitehead (London: Lutterworth Press, 1966), 147, 157-58.  
34 Whitehead, Religion in the Making, 158-159; Process and Reality, 50. In this sense Process theologians can 
claim that there would be “no-thing” apart from God, but not absolutely nothingness. See, Cobb and Griffin, 
Process theology¸66.  
35 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 104-105.  
36 Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 256; Whitehead, Religion in the Making, 153-57. In identifying 
God with the principle of limitation which determines values, Whitehead chose to characterise God more 
decisively with goodness than with metaphysical ultimacy. This is because he thought the latter would, 
unacceptably, entail seeing God as the source of goodness and evil in equal measure. Whitehead, 258. See, 
Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, 143.  
10 
 
non-coercive “lure” of God.37 All of the above, the timeless envisioning of eternal objects, 
ideal possibilities and values are referred to in Process thought as God’s primordial nature.38  
A more minor theme in Whitehead, but which has become more prominent through the 
influence of Charles Hartshorne, is the idea that God also has a consequent nature; the effect 
that the world has upon God.39 This is God’s becoming, which like all other entities in the 
world is what makes God concrete rather than abstract. An actual occasion is under no 
compulsion to accept the eternal objects and values that God orders and offers, as is explored 
in chapter four, “Process theism. . . cannot provide the assurance that God’s will is always 
done.”40 This acceptance or rejection of God’s lure by each actual occasion limits, or makes 
concrete, what God can offer to the next actual occasion in the sequence. In this way all the 
actual occasions in the universe internally (that is, constitutively) affect who God is; and God 
prehends (feels) them, suffers with them all, just as one actual occasion prehends another. 
The consequent nature of God is often emphasised by Process theologians as a way to 
articulate the intimate, vulnerable and mutually loving relationship between God and the 
world, over and against what is characterised as the tyrannical and indifferent God of 
classical theism. Rather than overcoming the problems of God as an Unmoved mover, 
however, the consequent nature of God leaves Process thought with little more than a “moved 
Unmover”; God’s nature is highly conscribed by the choices of creatures, and God cannot 
guarantee any possible future.41  
Although highly idiosyncratic in many ways, panpsychism lies at the very heart of Process 
metaphysics. Any theological evaluation of panpsychism would be remiss to underplay the 
influence of Process thought for the reception of panpsychism in the twentieth and twenty-
first century. However, when one examines pre-twentieth century examples of theological 
panpsychism and the revival of panpsychism in contemporary analytic philosophy, it 
                                                 
37 A Process account of divine action is discussed further in chapter 4.  
38 In his later writing, most notably Adventures in Ideas, Whitehead replaces the term ‘God’ with ‘Eros’ as the 
power urging the realization of ideals, but the content of his thought remains largely unchanged.  
39 This is in large part due to Charles Hartshorne who wrote, “My sharpest objection to classical theism is its 
making God the giver of everything and recipient of nothing. . . A ‘first’ cause is not enough. . . There is equally 
need of a last effect, or rather an everlasting effect.” Charles Hartshorne, “A Reply to My Critics” in The 
Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn, Library of Living Philosophers, vol. 20. (LaSalle, 
Ill: Open Court, 1991), 672. 
40 Cobb and Griffin, Process Theology, 118.  
41 Colin E. Gunton, Being and Becoming: The Doctrine of God in Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth (London: 
SCM Press, 2001), 41.  
11 
 
becomes clear that a panpsychist theology does not have to be undertaken along the same 
lines as Process theology.  
As a Christian doctrine of God and creation, Process theology falls foul of the same critique 
levelled against emergence theologies in chapter one; the subsumption of God within a 
metaphysical framework of the world such that any dissimilarity between God and the natural 
world is already conditioned and relativised by a more fundamental similarity. What Process 
theologians celebrate as the naturalising of God, Colin E. Gunton has argued, is equally the 
divinising of the world.42 The problem is not, as Gunton implies, that “the primary category 
of the philosophy is found to be something less than personal”, such as experience or 
relations, but that “the attenuation is carried upwards into the concept of God.” 43 It is this 
equivocation of Divine and created categories (personal or impersonal, it matters not at this 
point) that lies at the heart of the Process theologian’s error; not the adoption of panpsychism 
per se. A certain humility is then required as to the scope of one’s claims. Panpsychism will 
not solve all the problems of theology and philosophy, even if it may aid in answering 
recalcitrant philosophical problems and provide new insights for theologians with regard to 
the doctrine of creation, but not to the nature of God. The clearest way to ensure this humility 
and resist the temptation of naturalism is to affirm the importance of creatio ex nihilo.44 
One might echo Keith Ward’s use of Process thought as not a final system, but “a spur to 
thinking in new ways about our complex universe.”45 In advocating his own dual-aspect 
idealism, Ward writes,  
consciousness cannot just arise out of nowhere and be joined onto a brain 
in a completely accidental and unpredictable way. For many scientists it 
makes more sense to see consciousness as a natural development out of 
simpler elements, as an unfolding of potentialities inherent in matter from 
the first . . . We do not have to be committed to the rather elaborate 
edifice of process philosophy to be attracted to this way of seeing 
consciousness as a natural development of simpler properties inherent in 
all material things.46  
It is perfectly possible to be a panpsychist, without committing oneself to the idiosyncrasies 
of Process thought. It is this possibility that is explored in this thesis.  
                                                 
42 Gunton, 223. 
43 Gunton, 221.  
44 See chapters three and four for this affirmation of creation ex nihilo in conjunction with panpsychism in 
discussions of initial creation and ongoing divine action, respectively.   
45 Keith Ward, More than Matter? Is There More to Life than Molecules? (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans, 2010), 61. 
46 Ward, 82.  
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Panpsychism is an ancient theory of consciousness with a cumbersome name, a central claim 
that sounds counterintuitive to modern ears, and its fair share of historical baggage.47 It is 
perhaps for these reasons that, despite the recent resurgence of interest in panpsychism within 
analytic philosophy of mind and eco-philosophy, this ontology has been largely overlooked 
as a potential partner for theological reflection on creation. The gambit of this thesis is that 
panpsychism is worth reconsidering, not least because its recent increase in popularity and 
long historical pedigree enjoins theologians to this task. 
Panpsychism has sufficient congruence with current theories within the natural sciences and 
enough philosophical plausibility to be adopted as a serious ontological option. So long as 
panpsychism is disentangled from the naturalistic frame that has come to burden it in secular 
philosophy and Process metaphysics, then panpsychism offers some significant advantages to 
Christian theology over competing ontologies. Neither panpsychism, nor any other ontology, 
can generate or even arbitrate between the central claims of the Christian faith. Instead, the 
role of this tertiary reflection, this dialogue between philosophy and theology, is to find a 
suitable framework upon which doctrinal claims and biblical exegesis can rest and be most 
clearly articulated. As such a scaffolding, panpsychism looks suitable for constructing a 
doctrine of creation as a cathedral of praise.
                                                 
47 For an exposition for the long historical pedigree of panpsychism with Western philosophy see, David 
Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). It is widely understood that Eastern 
philosophy is almost universally panpsychist although I know of no English-language analysis or argument for 
this claim. Another lacuna in the scholarship on panpsychism within the history of ideas is the recurrent strains 
of panpsychist thinking within Christian theology. Unfortunately, only Francis of Assisi and Peirre Teilhard de 
Chardin feature as explicit theological figures within Skrbina’s informative narrative.  
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Chapter 1: Taking Leave of Emergence Theory 
  
Emergence theory is a philosophical and scientific framework and overarching worldview that 
is being increasingly embraced in Christian theology. Although the general language of 
emergence is almost universal, what I refer to as ‘emergence theology’ (or the ‘emergence 
theologians’ who construct this theology) is the thorough and intentional employment of the 
theory of emergence from the natural sciences and from philosophy of mind to explicate core 
tenets of Christian theology.1 Emergence theologians hail from a variety of denominations and 
countries, and include figures such as Philip Clayton, Arthur Peacocke, Niels Henrik 
Gregersen, Nancey Murphy, Denis Edwards, Elizabeth Johnson, and Amos Yong. The current 
popularity of emergence theory amongst theologians means that before panpsychism, which is 
the main focus of this thesis, can be properly explored reasons for rejecting emergence theory 
need to be given. 
The appeal of emergence theory for theologians is the promise of a scientifically aware view 
of God and creation, which on the one hand denies supernatural interventionism and 
anthropological dualism, and on the other hand avoids physicalism and reductionism.2 In 
contrast to reductionism, where reality is nothing but the determination of microphysical parts, 
emergence theory argues that reality includes “something more from nothing but”.3 For those 
working at the intersection of theology and natural science, the appeal of emergence theory to 
theologians is clear and compelling: Emergence theory offers a framework for articulating an 
anti-reductionist evolutionary theism that places humanity, divine action, and even the 
incarnation of Jesus Christ in congruity with the evolutionary story. Emergent accounts of 
divine action are seen to be profitable because they depict a God who works with nature and 
does not suspend natural processes or violate the law of energy conservation in bestowing 
                                                 
1 Emergence theory is, in the words of foremost emergence theologian Philip Clayton, when, “the new emergent 
picture of the world is used as the organizing principle for systematic theology.” Philip Clayton, Adventures of 
the Spirit: God, World, Divine Action (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2008), 88. 
2 Philip Clayton describes emergent properties as a via media allowing theologians to avoid either “radical 
dualism of mind/soul and body or the physicalism that is widespread among scientists and philosophers today.” 
Philip Clayton, God and Contemporary Science (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), 247.  
3 Terrence Deacon and Ursula Goodenough, “From Biology to Consciousness to Morality,” Zygon: Journal of 
Religion and Science 36, no.1 (2003): 802.   
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humanity with mental and spiritual capacities.4 Thus, for many contemporary theologians the 
philosophical framework of emergence theory is seen as the essential link or the bridge for 
increased dialogue between the natural and theological sciences. 
Despite its current popularity across academia, emergence theory is widely acknowledged to 
nevertheless contain several philosophical conundrums and scientific ambiguities. What has 
not been so widely recognized is that emergence theologies also contain a unique set of 
troublesome tendencies. After exploring the central claims and limitations of emergence theory 
within the natural sciences and philosophy of mind, this chapter argues that when emergence 
is accepted as the conceptual scaffolding for Christian theology, then there is a significant and 
undesirable theological slant given to, in particular, the doctrine of God. It is argued that 
emergence theologies struggle to resist the logical consequence of emergent theism, which 
makes God in some way emergent from the complexity of the natural world. If divinity is 
defined within the framework of emergence, then God cannot be the transcendent Creator of 
this natural process.  
But can emergence theory be employed by Christian theologians in a more constrained way, 
limited, for instance, to theological anthropology? A constrained employment of emergence 
theory as an articulation of the origin of the animal soul inherits some of the philosophical 
conundrums of emergence theory, but largely avoids the theological problems discussed in the 
latter part of this chapter. A dualistic and restricted employment of emergence thus remains 
one possible option within theological anthropology, and there are notable examples of this 
approach.5 Yet, these restricted uses of emergence theory cut against the global and 
interdisciplinary logic of emergentism. In order to provide maximum interdisciplinary revenue 
emergence theory is often taken as an overarching framework that not only redefines 
articulations of creation (including humanity) but also articulations of God. Moreover, as a 
theory that presents the immaterial as secondary to and dependent upon the material, even 
limited employments of emergence present some, hitherto unrecognized, challenges to 
                                                 
4 Paul Davies, “Introduction: Toward an Emergentist Worldview,” in From Complexity to Life: On Emergence 
of Life and Meaning, ed. Niels Henrik Gregersen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 14. See also, Niels 
Henrik Gregersen, “From Anthropic Design to Self-Organized Complexity,” From Complexity to Life, ed. 
Gregersen, 206-231. 
5 For example, Joshua R. Farris who employs William Hasker’s emergent dualism in conjunction with a 
creationist story of the soul in order to construct a new version of supernatural interventionism and 
anthropological dualism. See, Joshua R. Farris, The Soul of Theological Anthropology: A Cartesian Exploration 
(New York and London: Routledge, 2016). William Hasker, The Emergent Self (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1999). Keith Ward also employs a notion of weak emergence within the framework of ‘dual-aspect 
idealism’, rather than reductive or non-reductive physicalism. See, Ward, More than Matter?.  
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traditional Christian theology. This conclusion should leave theologians wondering if there is 
not perhaps a better metaphysical theory available, a more suitable ontology of creation and 
theological anthropology with which Christian theology might partner.  
This chapter will proceed by examining more closely what the claims of emergence theory are 
within different academic disciplines, including various fields within the natural sciences, 
within philosophy of mind, and finally within theology. First, I provide a brief and general 
introduction to emergence theory. Second, I argue that theologians should be aware of the wide 
variety of emergence theories employed within the natural sciences, many of which are 
compatible with reductionism. Third, this is seen to be different again from emergence theory 
within philosophy of mind. Moreover, the strong type of emergence that theologians most 
frequently employ is a highly critiqued concept within a highly contested area of debate. 
Emergence theory does not, at present, appear a secure foundation for Christian theology to 
build upon. Thereafter, this chapter examines the problematic hue with which emergence 
theory colours Christian theology through a Trinitarian structure by analysing the impact of 
emergence theory on the doctrine of God (the Father), the incarnation (the Son), and divine 
action (the Holy Spirit). The conclusion of this chapter is that the cost that emergence theory 
exacts must be carefully counted before one chooses emergence theory as the philosophical 
framework for articulating one’s theology. In light of the concerns presented in this chapter, it 
seems prudent to consider what alternative philosophies might serve contemporary Christian 
theology better. Taking its cue from notable philosophers dissatisfied with emergence theory, 
chapter two evaluates the recent revival of panpsychism within analytic philosophy of mind. 
 
1. What is Emergence Theory? 
 
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), when examining the composite nature of table salt from two 
toxic substances, reaffirmed the Aristotelian principle that “the whole is greater than the sum 
of its parts”.6 Influenced by Mill, George Henry Lewes (1817-1878) distinguished between 
                                                 
6 John Stuart Mill, System of Logic, (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1843), Book III, chapter 6, 
§1. Cf. Terrence Deacon and Tyrone Cashman, “Eliminativism, Complexity and Emergence,” The Routledge 
Companion to Religion and Science, eds. James W. Haag, Gregory Peterson, and Michael L. Spezio (New York: 
Routledge, 2012), 195-6. This oft-cited phrase comes from Aristotle’s The Metaphysics, Book VIII, Part 6, 
where he wrote “The whole is something over and above its parts and not just the sum of them.” Aristotle, The 
Metaphysics, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, eds. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1998). This should not be taken, however, as Aristotle’s explanation of the mind which is altogether more 
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resultants, as additions of things, and emergents, which he described as “a new qualitative class 
of phenomena” which “cannot be reduced to the sum of their difference”.7 This idea was 
developed further by the British emergentists in the 1920s, most notably Samuel Alexander, C. 
Lloyd Morgan and C.D. Broad. They articulated emergence as a naturalistic meta-theory, 
which applied across disciplines on a cosmic scale and affected physical, mental and cultural 
spheres. The interdisciplinary aim of emergence theory is clear from the foundation of this 
movement; all levels of reality and all the academic disciplines that concern these different 
levels are drawn together under the one meta-theory of emergence. One might call this 
emergentism. The naturalistic component of emergence theory, although parsed out in different 
ways by Alexander, Morgan and Broad, is important. All three of the British emergentists’ 
employed emergence theory to remove the need to invoke any mystical or supernatural 
agencies, which only some academic disciplines can claim to have knowledge of (most notably, 
theology), since this presents a barrier to interdisciplinary dialogue and thus cuts against the 
central purpose of emergentism. 
Emergence theory states that reality is fundamentally layered into “hierarchical divisions of 
stuff (...) organized by part-whole relations, in which wholes at one level function as parts at 
the next (and at all higher) levels...”8 These wholes are often referred to as ‘higher levels’ and 
their constituent parts, or base substrates, are ‘lower levels’. Higher levels are not only 
conglomerates of lower levels, but as a result of the increase in complexity of the physical 
parts, new properties are said to emerge. This emergence of genuinely novel properties, from 
which emergence theory derives its name, means that higher level phenomena are not merely 
quantitatively different to their lower level substrates, but that there are qualitative differences 
between levels as well. The qualitative difference and novelty between levels is defended by 
the claim that emergent properties are unpredictable and irreducible from the parts at the lower 
levels.   
The claim that the emergence of higher-level properties cannot be predicted is an 
epistemological claim regarding the limits of human knowledge. Since it remains possible that 
the ontological reality is in fact reducible, this epistemological form of emergence is known as 
                                                 
cosmic and widespread than contemporary emergence theorists. See, John Rist, The Mind of Aristotle (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1989). 
7 Niels Henrik Gregersen, “Emergence and Complexity,” The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, eds. 
Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 768-783, 770; George Henry 
Lewes, Problems in Life and Mind, 1874-9 five volumes, (New York: Houghton, Osgood & Co.) vol. II, 1875, 
412.  
8 William C. Wimsatt, “The Ontology of Complex Systems: Levels of Organization, Perspectives, and Causal 
Thickets,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary 20, (1994): 222. 
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‘weak emergence’. Contrarily, it may be that unpredictability points towards the reality of 
ontological irreducibility in the natural world. The criterion for this inference from 
epistemological unpredictability (weak emergence) to ontological irreducibility (strong 
emergence) is the existence of downward or whole-part causation, whereby the higher 
emergent level starts to exhibit power in some way over the parts. This strong emergentist 
thesis is, typically, what emergence theologies claim. Philip Clayton, the leading proponent of 
emergence theology, even argues that, “for theists who maintain that God as a spiritual being 
exercises some causal influence in the natural world, defending strong emergence may be a 
sine qua non for their position.”9 The hope in emergence theologies is that downward causation 
provides the basis for human freedom and spirituality and an analogy for the God-world 
relationship. 
From this brief description we can see that emergence theory is a way of viewing the whole of 
reality defined by three central criteria:  
(i) All reality is composed of a hierarchy of levels within a physicalist or monist 
framework. 
(ii) The existence of some form of novelty, so that each level is marked by something 
new (properties, entities, causalities, laws, or substances) emerging out of 
organisational complexity. 
(iii) As one moves up the levels either epistemological unpredictability (weak 
emergence) or ontological irreducibility through downward causation (strong 
emergence) can be discerned.10  
Clayton writes, “I would say that emergence is the theory that cosmic evolution repeatedly 
includes unpredictable, irreducible, and novel appearances.”11 Put most simply, emergence is 
the thesis that more can come from less, captured in the well-known slogan that the whole is 
greater than the sum of its parts.  
 
                                                 
9 Philip Clayton, “Conceptual Foundations of Emergence Theory,” in The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The 
Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion, eds. Philip Clayton and Paul Davies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 27. 
10 See, Charbel Nino el-Hani and Antonio Marcos Pereira, “Higher-Level Descriptions: Why Should We 
Preserve Them?” in Peter Bøgh Andersen, Claus Emmeche, Niels Ole Finnemann, and Peder Voetmann 
Christiansen, eds. Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies and Matter (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2000), 
133. Philip Clayton, Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 60-62.  
11 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 39.  
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2. Varieties of Emergence within the Natural Sciences 
 
Beyond this general outline, one encounters a real difficulty in accurately describing emergence 
theory as it has become an umbrella term for a whole range of different processes and 
phenomena. As Mark A. Bedau and Paul Humphreys write in their anthology Emergence, “The 
topic of emergence is fascinating and controversial in part because emergence seems to be 
widespread and yet the very image of emergence seems opaque, and perhaps even 
incoherent.”12 As such, the ingredients of hierarchy, novelty, unpredictability and 
irreducibility, which I take as the working definition of emergence in this chapter, might be 
best described as indicators of possible examples of emergence rather than strict criteria. The 
result is an ongoing chicken-and-egg problem between citing possible examples of emergence 
within different areas of the natural sciences and the continual search for a definition of 
emergence by philosophers of science and philosophers of mind.  
We can see a wide variety of potential examples of emergence from within different scientific 
fields, and indeed from the relationship between scientific disciplines. John Holland writes that 
“Despite its ubiquity and importance, emergence is an enigmatic, recondite topic, more 
wondered at than analyzed. What understanding we do [have] is mostly through a catalog of 
instances”.13 Since emergence theory is a “philosophical elaboration of a series of scientific 
results”, and emergence theologies are built upon these philosophies, understanding something 
of the catalogue of instances cited in the natural sciences is important for theologians interested 
in emergence.14 However, what becomes apparent from the description below is that the 
concept of emergence can function very differently within (and between) different scientific 
disciplines; computational science, physics, chemistry, and biology are each examined in turn. 
Clayton raises the concern that too precise a scientific account of emergence may undermine 
its interdisciplinary potential as a meta-theory. As such, Clayton elects to speak of emergence 
as a general recurring pattern or a “family resemblance” across scientific fields.15 Whether the 
examples offered by scientists are true instances of emergence is, thus, entirely debatable. As 
a result, emergence, as a scientific hypothesis, does not currently provide a stable base for 
analogies of emergence in other areas, such as philosophy of mind and theology. 
                                                 
12 Mark A. Bedau and Paul Humphreys, “Introduction,” Emergence: Contemporary Readings in Philosophy and 
Science, eds. Mark A. Bedau and Paul Humphreys (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 1. 
13 John Holland, Emergence. From Chaos to Order (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1998), 3.  
14 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 1-2. 
15 Clayton, 61.  
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One of the reasons there has been such a rise in interest in complex systems, which form the 
basis of emergence, is because of the advances in computer technology and information 
processors that enable us to model and virtually examine the organisational structures of the 
physical world with increasing precision. The concept of emergence in reference to 
computational complexity proposes that we think of the world as a whole as a computational 
device that contains, transmits, and processes information.16 Computational irreducibility often 
represents an example of diachronic emergence occurring over time as a result of increasing 
complexity.17 The emergence of computational irreducibility amounts to unpredictability; the 
information we gather does not increase our ability to predict further into the future.18 It is 
debatable if this unpredictability warrants computational complexity to be counted as an 
instance of genuine emergence; certainly it is at most a very weak form of emergence. 
Regardless, these are the larger questions: Is it justified to extrapolate emergence in the real 
world based on the apparent and clear cases of emergence that computational models 
exemplify? Is there a true analogy between the information processes of a computer and the 
transmission of information in the physical world? On this issue, scientists remain divided.19  
More importantly, this weak form of emergence is, according to Carl Hempel and Paul 
Oppenheimer, “not an ontological trait inherent in some phenomena: rather it is indicative of 
the scope of our knowledge at a given time . . . what is emergent with respect to the theories of 
today may lose its emergent status tomorrow.”20 The claim of computational emergence is one 
of epistemic limitations, and not ontological or causal novelty. Computational models are 
mathematic and, in that sense, already ontologically reduced.21 The behaviour of the system 
can be derived from the boundary conditions and rules set up within the system, hence it is also 
already causally reduced. As a result, computational sciences provide examples of the closest 
relationship between emergence and reductionism (albeit a ‘dynamic reduction in principle’), 
                                                 
16 Mark A Bedau and Paul Humphreys, “Introduction to Background and Polemics,” eds. Bedau and Humphreys 
Emergence, 342. Perhaps the most famous example of this is John Conway’s program “Life” which simulates 
cellular automata. The program’s algorithm determines if a particular square on a grid light up based on the lit 
or unlit state of neighbouring squares. Complex structures or patterns of lit and unlit square appear in 
unpredictable ways. This has been compared to neural networks for visualisation by John Holland and the 
behaviour of ant colonies by Deborah Gordon. See, Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 69-72.  
17 Bedau and Humphreys, “Introduction to Background and Polemics,” 341.  
18 Paul Humphreys, “Computation and Conceptual Emergence,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 75, no. 5 
(December 2008): 588. 
19 Mark A Bedau and Paul Humphreys, “Introduction to Scientific Perspectives on Emergence,” in Emergence, 
eds. Bedau and Humphreys, 212. 
20 C.G. Hempel and P. Oppenheimer, “Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” Philosophy of Science 15, (1948): 
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which other versions of emergence in other disciplines (including emergence theologies) 
actively seek to distance themselves from.22  
The physical and chemical sciences also cite a variety of potential instances of emergence. 
Some describe electromagnetism as an emergent phenomenon only occurring when a magnet 
is positioned in the direction of other metallic substances. Similarly, the formation of ordered 
structures, such as fluid convention resulting from increased temperatures, or the cone structure 
of a pile of sand, or the formation of ice-crystals are often cited as instances of emergence. The 
most famous and oft-cited example of an emergent phenomenon is the liquidity that is found 
neither in single molecules nor in their parts but emerges from the more complex structure of 
multiple H2O molecules. These instances have been labelled either "first-order emergence" in 
Terrence W. Deacon’s typology, where the physical emergent property is entirely dependent 
on and caused by the physical parts, or “second-order emergence”, where physical (and 
reducible) environmental factors (such as temperature) also play a causal role in giving rise to 
the emergent phenomena. First-order and second-order emergence are both weak forms of 
emergence and, although they provide valuable insights for the natural sciences, they remain 
uncontroversial and un-profound from a theological point of view. In these cases, the emergent 
phenomena are fully reducible (ontologically, causally, explanatorily) to the physical. After all, 
I know of no reductionist who finds the appearance of water deeply troubling to their 
worldview.  
It is due to such instances of first- and second-order emergence that some, such as leading 
emergence theorist and biophysicist Harold J. Morowitz, see “emergence and reduction, not as 
antagonistic approaches, but as complementary aspects of understanding.”23 Similarly, William 
C. Wimsatt argues that “[m]ost scientists in the complex sciences have compatible views of 
reduction and emergence”.24 Philosophers and theologians have to be careful when appealing 
to the fluidity of water or the formation of ice-crystals as analogies for the emergence of 
irreducible properties within human beings or models for divine action, since these physical 
instances of emergent phenomena remain reducible to their material substructures.25 As Mark 
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Bedau and Paul Humphreys write, “Scientific examples of emergent phenomena are sometimes 
epiphenomenal; that is, they are effects that do not themselves cause anything else. This raises 
the question of whether such examples of scientific emergence are objective scientific facts or 
merely exist in the eye of the beholder.”26 If emergence properties are, or even could be, merely 
epiphenomenal then it would appear a great risk to Christian theology to articulate divine action 
or the divinity of Christ through this form of emergence theory.  
Deacon’s category of third-order emergence moves us beyond the threat of epiphenomenalism 
by introducing concepts of causal constraint of the whole upon the parts. Third-order 
emergence is based upon the “memory” of systems as wholes so as to develop autocatalytic 
reactions that function in a non-linear fashion to produce self-ordering structures.27 The 
capacity for cell membranes, for example, to “remember” and share information with their 
offspring is a central mechanism of evolutionary natural selection. That is, the mechanisms 
within evolution, “genetic variation, fitness and genetic transmission are each emergent 
phenomena.”28 Thus, emergence should not be a process independent of or in addition to 
evolution but is “[e]mergence in evolution”.29 Emergence theory, then, becomes the 
philosophical framework underpinning notions to evolution and tying physical, chemical and 
biological narratives of cosmic evolutionary development together.  
The interweaving of emergence within evolution, or even the subsumption of evolution under 
the grand meta-theory of emergence, is an important part of the attraction to emergence for 
some theologians. In the cultural war of creationist versus neo-Darwinian evolutionist 
explanations of why there is such order, beauty and variety in the natural world, many 
theologians working at the intersection between science and theology seek to carve out a 
position known as theistic evolution. Theistic evolution states that God is ultimately responsible 
for the wonders of the universe, but that having set up the original conditions of creation, 
thereafter God only acts through and congruently with evolution to bring out the order and 
variety that we perceive. The role of emergence theory within this debate is to highlight the 
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creativity latent within naturalistic evolution as a possible place for God to act without 
‘intervening’.30 Since the emergence of new phenomena within evolution remains 
unpredictable and beyond human understanding, we cannot rule out divine action at this point. 
Moreover, since strong emergence posits the creation of causally irreducible phenomena, 
God’s action within the process of emergence or within strongly emergent entities need not 
violate any natural laws (such as energy conservation). It is hard not to be caught up in the 
exciting possibility that emergence theory may provide a genuine way forward in the 
inflammatory cultural wars between creationism and neo-Darwinian evolution.  
The emergence of life is a significant point of interdisciplinary contact between biology and 
theology. Since the gift of life is often attributed to the Holy Spirit (‘The Lord the Giver of 
Life’) in Christian theology, it is in such debates that emergence theologies are in full stride. 
However, the emergence of life also provides an apt example of the tension between 
emergentist and theistic explanations. The emergence of life is based on autocells that transmit 
information through semiotic processes to create a sustainable system.31 Life, as an emergent 
phenomenon, is defined as when a system (or an emergent whole) exhibits teleological 
behaviour, which denotes purposeful survival (self-maintains through time) and interaction 
with its environment.32  
It is worth highlighting that (in contrast to panpsychism) this is apparent teleological behaviour 
without experience of any kind; it is understood to be “proto-purposiveness’, or ‘purposiveness 
without purpose”.33 The most significant literature on this topic comes from Alicia Juarrero, 
who shows how wholes constrain their constituent parts without any new causal powers or new 
level of ontology.34 As Deacon explains, “such concepts as information, function, purpose, 
meaning, intention, significance, consciousness, and value are intrinsically defined by their 
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fundamental incompleteness. They exist only in relation to something that they are not.”35 By 
setting boundaries for the activity of the parts, organisms can act in what merely appears to be, 
but is not (so it is argued), a self-interested and purposeful way.  
The idea of emergent teleology has been taken up by, among others, Paul Davies, who writes 
that emergence provides a naturalistic understanding of purpose without evoking God as “a 
force pushing and pulling matter alongside other forces of nature.”36 The emergence of 
purpose, and with it the emergence of life, is possible in a “continually creative universe”, 
which may be sustained by God but which requires no “supernatural tinkering” within natural 
processes.37  
The main use of emergence theory, in debates surrounding the origin of animation, life or 
purpose in the universe, is to remove any need to evoke mysterious or extra-physical forces 
such as Aristotle’s entelecy or Bergson’s élan vital, or the Holy Spirit breathing into the nostrils 
of Adam.38 These narratives “believe in a non-physical drive which brings the emergent form 
[of life] into existence”; they are classified as vitalism.39 Vitalism, which is largely (and 
perhaps prematurely) considered an obsolete philosophy in lieu of emergence, is defined as 
any theory that posits “the existence of a life force that somehow bestowed order on the material 
contents of living systems.”40 Therefore, to introduce God, or the Holy Spirit, or any form of 
divine action as part of the explanatory framework within the emergence of life would be to 
contradict the basic purpose and principle of employing emergence theory. This is the 
naturalistic component of emergence theory, taken by many to be necessary for 
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interdisciplinary dialogue, since appeals to special revelation or non-verifiable (non-physical) 
forces are seen to stand in opposition to scientific progress.41 Despite this, Clayton also writes 
that “[t]here must be a principle of development, something that drives the whole process, if 
there is to be an ongoing process of emergence”, citing Samuel Alexander’s “nisus in Space-
Time” and Alfred North Whitehead’s principle of Creativity as more acceptable notions of 
such a principle.42 It is a thin line, perhaps a distinction without any real difference, between a 
force which gives form to systems (which is excluded by emergentists as vitalism) and positing 
a principle that drives the process as a whole (which is embraced as theistic emergence).43  
In addition to the use of emergence theory as a scientific hypothesis regarding particular 
phenomena, emergence has become a popular way of articulating the relationship between 
scientific disciplines. This is perhaps the clearest example of how emergence is an expansive 
framework for understanding reality, “an overarching rubric”, rather than a verifiable or 
falsifiable scientific theory within any single discipline.44 As mentioned above, the vision of 
reality as constructed into a smooth hierarchy of levels is perceived as having great 
interdisciplinary advantages as the various methods of enquiry exist on a continuum. As 
George Ellis writes, “They [the various academic disciplines] are hierarchical, in that layers of 
emergent order and complexity build up on each other, with physics underlying chemistry, 
chemistry underlying biochemistry, and so on”.45 Robert B. Laughlin and David Pines write 
that “Rather than a Theory of Everything”, which refers to the reductionist dream of explaining 
all of reality at the level of physics and mathematics, “we appear to face a hierarchy of Theories 
of Things, each emerging from its parent and evolving into its children as the energy scale is 
lowered.”46 It is the idea of continuous levels of ontological dependency (bottom to top) with 
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epistemic or causal distinctiveness that forms the core thesis and the central premise for 
interdisciplinary cohesion.  
However, it is this same idea that presents a uniquely difficult challenge for Christian theology. 
Emergence is no less expansive, no less cosmic or totalising a philosophy than reductionism; 
but it is much less prescriptive in its thesis, such that each discipline maintains a level of 
explanatory power and integrity. Despite this flexibility, almost to the point of ambiguity as 
seen above, emergence does have criteria and as we enter the realm of philosophy of mind and 
beyond this into theology, these criteria become stretched beyond recognition. Antje Jackelén 
argues that,  
emergence seems to be yet another example of concepts that absorb 
meaning from different contexts of inquiry, transfer such meaning from 
one context to another, and thus develop the capacity of building 
ideology. Emergence theorists may wish to pay attention to such 
dynamics. They may as well be concerned about the effects of their 
concepts far from their origin.47  
This warning about the effect of translating emergence theory across disciplines is sage advice 
for both philosophers of mind and Christian theologians seeking to build upon the emergentist 
ideology.  
3. The Mystery of Emergence Theory in Philosophy of Mind 
 
The use of emergence across the natural sciences prompts theologians engaged in science and 
religion dialogue to readily employ emergence. However, the type of emergence most often 
employed within theology comes, in fact, from philosophy of mind. In recent decades, 
emergence theory has proven a popular way to approach the mind-body problem and this 
particular discourse of emergence now constitutes the main pillar of emergence theory more 
widely. Terrence Deacon testifies to the centrality of the emergence of mind within emergentist 
thinking when he writes, 
Human consciousness is not merely an emergent phenomenon; it 
epitomizes the logic of emergence in its very form . . . Consciousness 
emerges as an incessant creation of something from nothing, a process 
continually transcending itself. To be human is to know what it feels like 
to be evolution happening.48  
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This suggests that the mind is the next level up on a smooth continuum of nature’s hierarchy. 
The emergence of mind is special because it (supposedly) provides the paradigmatic instance 
of emergence, not because it is a sui generis instance of emergence. However, it is argued 
below that the phenomenon of mind, if taken in a realist fashion, stretches the model of 
emergence beyond any form of explanatory theory and takes it into the realm of mystery. To 
say that the emergence of mind epitomises the theory of emergence more widely is bad news 
for the future prospects of emergence as an explanatory framework.  
Tim Crane names only two basic requirements for an emergentist philosophy of mind; (i) the 
supervenience thesis, which describes a state of ontological dependency such that “mental 
properties are properties of physical objects”; and (ii) the emergence thesis; a sufficient 
distinctness, so that “mental properties are distinct from physical properties” such that we can 
affirm the reality of phenomenal experience (qualia), intentionality, and free will and escape 
the threat of epiphenomenalism. Whether it is possible to hold these two tenets of an 
emergentist philosophy of mind together is widely debated.49 In light of this tension, some 
emergentists end up conceding to their critics (who liken emergentism to “magic”)50 that 
emergence “qualifies as a narrative, but scarcely an explanation. We are left none the wiser as 
to how biological systems actually achieve any sort of mental state, let alone are in a position 
to make claims that it is comprehensible, let alone rational.”51 Similarly, emergence theorist 
Jerry Fodor admits that, “Nobody has the slightest idea how anything material could be 
conscious.”52 Emergence theory restates the mind-body problem in emergentist language, and 
in the end this may prove useful, but it is not the kind of philosophical explanation originally 
intended.  
The range of theories pertaining to the emergence of consciousness can be seen to roughly 
parallel the types of emergence within the natural sciences. On the reductionist end of the 
spectrum, drawing upon computational emergence, is the philosophy of Daniel Dennett. 
Dennett is strongly committed to functional materialism, so that if we talk about a mind we 
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have to do so in a way that does not introduce any new ontology into the world. As a result, he 
seems happy to admit that much of what we perceive about the mind, for example the unity of 
experience arising from billions of individual neurons or the perception of free will, is mere 
appearance or illusion and so not worth defending.53 In reference to David Chalmers’ famous 
thought experiment of whether is possible for a physically identical version of a human being 
to not be conscious (like a zombie), Dennett writes, “Are zombies possible? They’re not just 
possible, they’re actual. We’re all zombies. Nobody is conscious – not in the systematically 
mysterious way that supports such doctrines as epiphenomenalism!”54 Thus, Dennett concludes 
that qualia do not exist (they are “complex dispositional states of the brain”), and that the brain 
functions like a computer with “Multiple Drafts” emerging, forming the appearance of 
consciousness.55 Dennett denies epistemic predictability but he affirms ontological and causal 
reducibility of brain events, which is the thesis of very weak epistemic emergence seen in the 
theories of computational complexity.  
John Searle’s ‘biological naturalism’ draws upon analogies from the chemical form of 
emergence. Searle writes,  
Consciousness is a higher-level or emergent property of the brain in the 
utterly harmless sense of “higher-level” or “emergent” in which solidity 
is a higher-level emergent property of H2O molecules when they are in a 
lattice structure (ice), and liquidity is similarly a higher-level emergent 
property of H2O molecules when they are, roughly speaking, rolling 
around on each other (water). Consciousness is a mental, and therefore 
physical, property of the brain in the sense in which liquidity is a property 
of systems of molecules.56 
In this description, “mind” seems to be a purely semantic term used to describe the physical 
whole or the organised activity of the brain. Searle writes that like any other “emergent 
property”, minds “have to be explained in terms of the causal interactions among the 
elements.”57 As such, Searle uses emergence theory to encourage “materialists [to] cheerfully 
embrace consciousness as just another material property among others.”58 Unlike Dennett, 
Searle also wants to maintain a realistic view of subjectivity and consciousness. However, 
Searle himself admits that there is no current answer to the mechanics of emergence: “How do 
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unconscious bits of matter produce consciousness?”59 The emergentist, as of yet, offers no 
explanation for this process. The problem, as Thomas Nagel rightly argues, is that “however 
great the variety of physical phenomena may be, ontological objectivity is one of their central 
defining characteristics; and as we have seen Searle insists that consciousness is ontologically 
subjective.”60 There is a fundamental clash between Searle’s commitment to realist subjectivity 
and his commitment to naturalism. This is a clash that his employment of emergence theory 
serves to mask but does not alleviate. Instead, Searle stretches the term “physical” in such a 
way that it is emptied of any of its constraining definitions (such as ontological objectivity).61 
Searle acknowledges that his view entails the denial of free will, but admits that this is an 
unsatisfactory outcome. He concludes, as a result, “that in our entire philosophical tradition we 
are making some fundamental mistake” and that the whole approach to the problem of the mind 
may have to be rethought.62  
Neuroscientist Roger Sperry defended an emergentist picture of the mind-brain relationship on 
the basis of biological instances of emergence. His view is called “emergent interactionism” 
because, although he maintains physicalism, his work on mapping neuro-correlation led him 
to posit genuine two-way interaction between the mind and the brain. Sperry writes,  
Mental phenomena are described as primarily supervening rather than 
intervening, in the physiological process . . . Mind is conceived to move 
matter in the brain and to govern, rule, and direct neural and chemical 
events without interacting with the components at the component level, 
just as an organism may move and govern the time-space course of its 
atoms and tissues without interacting with them.63  
Based on an analogy with the emergence of organismic behaviour, the mind is viewed by 
Sperry as being in a whole-part relation to the brain. The mind is seen to have some top-down 
causal powers over the brain as a whole but cannot influence individual parts by interacting 
with them directly. Supervenience is the thesis of ontological dependence, such that the mind 
cannot exist or act without bottom-up causality in the brain. This is described in contrast to a 
pre-existent soul or independent mental substance that intervenes with the material firing of 
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neurons. Unfortunately, this account of whole-part causation does not escape the threat of 
epiphenomenalism since without direct interaction there is no way to discern between 
discussions of the mind as a description of bottom-up causation taken as a single whole, and 
discussions of the mind as exerting top-down causal influence over the whole. Indeed, Sperry 
emphasises that,  
The expectation that downward macrodetermination should thus effect 
reconfigurations . . . in the neuron-to-neuron activity of subjective 
mental states . . . indicates a misunderstanding of what emergent 
interaction is. From the start I have stressed consistently that the 
higher-level phenomena in exerting downward control do not disrupt 
or intervene in the causal relations of the lower-level component 
activity. Instead, they supervene in a way that leaves the micro 
interactions, per se, unaltered.64 
If downward causation does not, in any way, alter the physical behaviour of the parts, in what 
sense can the mind be said to have a causal effect on the brain? Sperry’s description of 
downward causation without interaction remains utterly mysterious, if not epiphenomenal. 
This problem is important for emergence theologies which, as shall be explored below, describe 
the God-world relation or divine action in the same language of supervening upon but not 
intervening in the world.  
Christian theologian Nancey Murphy uses Searle’s “biological naturalism” and Sperry’s 
“emergent interactionism” to argue for what she calls “nonreductive physicalism”, although it 
is “no different from some forms of emergent monism.”65 Murphy describes nonreductive 
physicalism as “the acceptance of ontological reductionism, but the rejection of causal 
reductionism and reductive materialism.”66 To accept ontological reduction means that, 
according to Murphy, “Humans are not hybrids of matter and something else, they are purely 
physical organisms.” 67 But Murphy argues that this does not lead to causal reductionism. 
Murphy emphasises her denial of causal reductionism when she writes,  
If free will is an illusion and the highest of human intellectual and 
cultural achievements can (per impossibile) be counted as the mere 
outworking of the laws of physics, this is utterly devastating to our 
ordinary understanding of ourselves, and of course to theological 
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accounts, as well, which depend not only on a concept of responsibility 
before God, but also on the justification (not merely the causation) of 
our theories about God and God’s will.68 
Murphy is completely correct in outlining the devastating consequences of causal 
reductionism; if all events in the universe – including human actions and thought – could be 
exhaustively explained by physical laws such that there is no free will or rational thought, then 
all academic discussion, religious belief and human endeavour is a futile illusion. What remains 
to be seen is if Murphy’s rejection of causal reductionism can be supported and maintained, 
given her acceptance of ontological reductionism.  
If human beings (and all other complex organisms) are entirely composed of only the particles 
of microphysics, it would seem that the behaviour of those complex organisms will be entirely 
explicable in terms of the behaviour of these micro-particles.69 A higher-level, when one 
accepts ontological reductionism, is only a way of describing complex organisation; it does not 
refer to any newly existing concrete entity. The mind is not a thing for emergent monists; 
instead it can only be the absence of material possibility: “Mind didn’t exactly emerge from 
matter, but from constraints on matter.”70 But, Murphy argues, to avoid causal reductionism 
“what the emergentist needs to show is that as we go up the hierarchy of complex systems we 
find entities that exhibit new causal powers that cannot be reduced to the combined effects of 
the lower-level causal processes.”71 Murphy makes analogies to the flight of a paper plane or 
the re-adjustment of a satellite watch to argue that the environment (the hand that throws the 
plane and air current, or the information received from the satellite to the watch) provides 
causal input from outside the system. Unfortunately, interaction within a larger environment 
does not provide Murphy with the means to resist causal reductionism in the way that she 
hopes.72 All the causal factors remain physical and reducible to micro-determination, and no 
new causal powers can be attributed to the systems themselves (in this case, the paper plane 
and the watch). Murphy uses these examples to suggest that “Mental events are not reducible 
to brain events, because mental events are largely constituted by relations to actions in the 
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environment.”73 However, if the environment remains entirely physical (and micro-
determined), then the reductionist’s way of explaining events may get more difficult, but it is 
not made impossible by the appearance of environmental causes and constraints.74   
Beyond non-reductive physicalism, at the far end of the spectrum of emergence philosophies, 
is William Hasker’s emergent dualism. In light of the continual threat of epiphenomenalism 
facing the physicalist and monist view of emergence, Hasker concludes that in the case of the 
emergence of the human mind,  
it is not enough to say that there are emergent properties here; what is 
needed is an emergent individual, a new individual entity which comes 
into existence as a result of a certain functional configuration of the 
material constituents of the brain and nervous system.75  
On Hasker’s view, the mind that emerges from and out of the complexity of the brain is a 
separate “substance”, an “ontologically distinct entity from the physical brain” (hence, 
emergent dualism).76 This is “very strong” or “hyper-strong” emergence, and very weak 
supervenience. Brian Leftow concludes that Hasker’s emergent individual is no different to the 
Thomist soul with God left out of the picture.77  
Despite its ability to articulate a more robust role for mental properties such as experience and 
free-will, which are necessary for discussion of morality and the endurance of personal identity 
over time, most theologians who have adopted emergence theory in order to talk about the 
mind or the soul do not explicitly discuss Hasker’s emergent dualism. Instead, most theologians 
and scholars in the science-religion dialogue draw upon Clayton’s emergent monism, where 
there is no “soul-substance”, but only “vital dust: the one stuff of the world whose history we 
work to reconstruct, taking on surprising forms.”78 This is because emergent dualism, as a form 
of dualism, posits an ontological jump from the material to the mental. Whilst Hasker’s 
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proposal is able, arguably unlike emergent monism, to sufficiently defend itself against the 
threat of reductionism and epiphenomenalism, it does so at the cost of emergence theory’s 
interdisciplinary appeal. The mind, on Hasker’s account, should no longer be taken to 
exemplify the general philosophy of emergence across reality, but constitutes a sui generis 
instance of emergence.  
Hasker ponders the question, “how far down the scale of biological complexity does 
consciousness go?”79 He seems to remain agnostic on this point but does state that the 
potentiality for consciousness must go all the way down. Hasker acknowledges that some 
critics of emergence consider the jump from material complexity to mental properties to be 
“‘magical’ because the emergent properties appear, as it were, out of the blue.”80 Emergent 
dualism posits anima ex nihilo, repeatedly for every conscious organism. In response to this, 
Hasker posits the emergent power for mentality in the basic constituents, the elementary 
particles, of matter. He writes, “it is an inherent power of ordinary matter that, when combined 
in the right ways, it produces an entity with the characteristics of the emergent mind.”81 Indeed, 
he writes that as Christians, “God has told us that he created us from the dust of the earth— so 
we have no choice, really, but to suppose that he endowed that dust with the powers required 
to enable the rich and various creation that he proposed to fashion from it.”82 This is surprising 
terminology for a self-proclaimed emergentist philosopher since the concept of dust with 
inherent powers for consciousness has been a prominent way to describe panpsychism in 
contrast to strong emergence theory.83  
Hasker goes on to say that, “It may be that in the end only belief in the power of such a creative 
God can make emergent dualism a viable and credible hypothesis.”84 In the end, Hasker seems 
to concede that emergence is either “magic” as its critics argue, or it requires additional theistic 
apparatus to support it. Indeed, philosopher Colin McGinn writes that when faced with the 
challenge of explaining how “sentience sprang from the pulpy matter” of the brain, “[o]ne is 
tempted, however reluctantly, to turn to divine assistance: for only a kind of miracle could 
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produce this from that.”85 If one is comfortable positing minds as a perpetual miracle or an 
intervention by God of new causal powers within the natural order, then Hasker’s account of 
emergence is a viable model. However, many in the science-religion field would find this an 
alarming conclusion, since it seems to undermine the sufficiency of the theory of natural 
selection within evolution. As Charles Darwin himself wrote,  
If I were convinced that I required such additions to the theory of 
natural selection, I reject it as rubbish. . . I would give nothing for the 
theory of Natural selection, if it requires miraculous additions at any 
one stage of descent.86 
If the evolutionary story is governed by purely physical forces, from which emerge mental 
properties, then despite all the advances in evolutionary biology over the last century that 
describe and explain the physical complexity, Darwin’s account would still require a 
miraculous addition in the case of the appearance of the mind. This, as articulated by Darwin 
himself, is unacceptable for the theory of natural selection. As we shall see in the next chapter, 
this concern of the smoothness and sufficiency of evolutionary theory is part of the reason that 
some contemporary philosophers are taking leave of emergence theory and adopting 
panpsychism.  
We have seen that emergentist philosophers often employ analogies to physical emergence to 
give credibility to their theory. Dennett likens the mind to a computational, purely 
epistemological, instance of emergence. Searle compares mental properties to the liquidity of 
water. Murphy compares the mind to a paper aeroplane and a satellite watch. William Hasker 
also uses a magnetic analogy: “As a magnet generates its magnetic field, so an organism 
generates its consciousness”, although he admits that “fields of physics [are not] emergent in 
the strong sense that applies to the conscious mind.”87 These analogies (at best) reveal another 
chicken-and-egg problem for emergence theorists. The theory of emergence, as it exists in 
philosophy of mind, is often described as the exemplar instance of emergence providing clarity 
to other physical instances of emergence. And yet, philosophers of mind universally employ 
examples of physical emergence as analogies to help ground and explain the emergence of 
mind.  
The problem is far worse than a mere chicken-and-egg problem. Appeals to physical 
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emergence by philosophers of mind (and vice versa) are, in fact, a “category mistake of the 
most egregious kind”.88 The assumption that physical properties behave like mental properties, 
that there can be an analogy between the liquidity of water and the mentality of the brain, is 
the thesis that emergence needs to prove. As such, it is question-begging to assume that the 
analogy functions within the argument in this way. Unlike the liquidity of water, the 
supervenience of the mind upon the brain remains brute, merely correlative and not at all causal 
or explanatory as is the case for other physical examples of weak emergence. Nagel’s warning 
that “much obscurity has been shed on the [mind-body] problem by faulty analogies” rings 
especially true in current discussions of emergence.89  
Jaegwon Kim points out that this mysterious correlation, which we call supervenience, between 
the mind and brain is “a ‘phenomenological’ claim, not a theoretical explanation. Mind-body 
supervenience, therefore, does not state a solution to the mind-body problem; rather it states 
the problem itself.”90 As is often quoted, early emergentist Samuel Alexander conceded that 
emergence is “something to be noted, as some would say, under the compulsion of brute 
empirical fact or, as I should prefer to say in less harsh terms, to be accepted with the ‘natural 
piety’ of the investigator. It admits no explanation.”91 The emergentist idea that something 
more arises from something less does not apply in the instance of consciousness; without 
panpsychism this is only something from nothing or emergence ex nihilo. Galen Strawson has 
called such “brute emergence”, a “miracle...every time it occurs.”92 The mystery of emergence 
of mind is not due to a lack of current knowledge in practice, but is “one of principle”.93 This 
is because no physical property (that is, a property of spatial extension that is exhaustively 
known through perception), “seems capable of rendering perspicuous how it is that damp grey 
tissue can be the crucible from which subjective consciousness emerges fully formed.”94 It is 
largely due to the perceived failure of emergence theory that philosophers of mind have turned 
to re-examine the potential of panpsychism. Before evaluating this trend in chapter two, we 
need to consider more explicit theological reasons for being cautious of emergentism and 
taking leave of emergence theologies.   
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4. Problematic Tendencies in Emergence Theology 
 
This chapter has highlighted the wide variety of types of emergence, indicating that emergence 
is more easily understood to be an overarching worldview, or political ideology, rather than a 
testable scientific hypothesis or explanatory philosophy. Moreover, definitions of emergence 
have proven elusive and the logic of emergence appears obscure. This was to show that 
emergence is a less secure foundation for theology, either scientifically or philosophically, than 
is often supposed by emergence theologians. An unstable foundation is troublesome on any 
construction site, and this chapter now explores the problematic slant that emergence theory 
gives to the building of Christian theology.  
The promise of emergence theory for Christian theology has been described in the most 
optimistic and far reaching terms. One emergence philosopher describes how, “Theologians 
are hoping that emergence in one form or another will shed light on the nature and existence 
of God, divine action, the mind-body problem, and free will.”95 Augustine Shuttle writes,  
The idea of evolution and the emergence of new forms of being – not 
simply in the biological sphere but in the cosmos as a whole and in human 
history itself – has in fact provided Christian theology with a new 
paradigm within which to conceptualize such basic elements of faith as 
the notion of creation, the doctrine of God’s incarnation in Jesus, the 
indwelling in us of the Holy Spirit, and the function of the Church in the 
world.96  
However, this new paradigm does not come without a significant cost to Christian theology. 
The leading proponent of emergence theology, Philip Clayton, admits that “emergence is no 
silent ally, and it may require certain modifications to traditional versions of theism and to 
traditional theologies.”97 The section below analyses the extent of the theological modifications 
that emergentism demands. It is argued that when the worldviewof emergence is employed 
within Christian theology, it pulls towards ‘emergent theism’, whereby God is a product of the 
emergent process. Whilst it remains true that “there is in fact a wide variety of ways in which 
a theology can be emergent”, when emergence is applied as a general framework or global 
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ontology then the same theologically problematic tendencies abound.98 These tendencies might 
be characterized as a loss of radical transcendence and naturalisation of the doctrine of God. 
The cost of emergence theory to Christian theology is far greater than previously realised, such 
that Christian theologians should consider viable alternatives before committing themselves to 
emergence theory too heavily. 
 
The Father: A Dipolar Doctrine of God and Emergent Theism 
 
It was seen above that many emergence theorists see emergence as a totalising or expansive 
framework for the whole of reality. Gillett writes, “each of these emergentist views offers a 
plethora of new resources to apply in understanding not only the natural world but also 
ourselves as part of this world, and even our conceptions of the divine.”99 Although this 
expansion from the realm of nature into conceptions of the divine is not an entailment of 
emergence theory, it is in continuity with the appeal of emergence theory as an interdisciplinary 
platform. Thus, whilst it remains possible for theologians to employ emergence as a narrative 
about the physical context in which God creates human souls ex nihilo, emergence theory was 
originally conceived and remains for many an overarching worldview, perhaps even a political 
ideology, that reaches far beyond theological anthropology.  
 
From the earliest days of emergence theory, in the first decades of the twentieth century, 
emergence theorists held differing positions on the relationship between religion and 
emergence. C. Lloyd Morgan seems to have been a theist with regard to the initial act of 
creation. However, like C.D. Broad and Roy Wood Sellars, Morgan saw emergence theory as 
thoroughly naturalistic so that the whole of reality can be framed according to the scientific 
method, without reference to God.100 While not aiming to disprove the existence of God, these 
early British emergentists sought to remove the need to invoke supernatural causation or divine 
action of any sort within the universe after the initial God-given act of genesis. Morgan 
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described emergence theory as, 
a philosophy based on the procedure sanctioned by progress in scientific 
research, the advent of novelty of any kind is loyally to be accepted 
whenever it is found, without invoking any extra-natural Power (Force, 
Entelechy, Élan, or God) through the efficient Activity of which the 
observed facts may be explained.101  
This should not be considered a theologically innocuous position since, as an expression of 
methodological naturalism, it places divine action in opposition, or explanatory competition, 
to emergence theory.102 Ursula Goodenough and Terrence Deacon advocate this position today 
when they write, “The emergence perspective offers us ways to think about creation, and 
creativity, that do not require a creator.”103 However, because Morgan did not seek to use 
emergence to explicate the nature of God the (problematic) impact of this form of emergence 
theory upon theology is, whilst hostile, fairly minimal.  
By contrast, Samuel Alexander’s Gifford Lectures, Space, Time, and Deity, posited God's deity 
to be an emergent phenomenon. Emergence theory, as an overarching metaphysic, was not 
used to remove the need for God-talk, but extended to become the framework of theology, in 
addition to natural science and philosophy of mind. Deity was defined as a property or 
ontological reality further up the hierarchy of emergent phenomena, beyond that of human 
minds. He wrote that,  
God includes the whole universe, but his deity, though infinite, belongs 
to, or is lodged in, only a portion of the universe . . . As being the whole 
universe God is creative, but his distinctive character of deity is not 
creative but created.104  
It seems that, for Alexander, God’s deity is not an essential property of God’s being. Instead, 
deity or God’s transcendence emerges temporally from the increasing complexity of the 
physical universe, which, when taken as a unified whole, is referred to as “the body of God” 
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and accounts for the immanence of God.105 As Niels Henrik Gregersen points out, Alexander’s 
view “places God in the position of the predicate, that is, as the secondary one, while the 
material universe would take the logical place of the subject.”106 This follows the general logic 
of emergence theory as the immaterial property or entity emerges from and remains dependent 
upon the material substrate. Most clearly Alexander writes, “God then, like all things in the 
universe . . . is in the strictest sense not a creator but a creature.”107  
Although widely recognised as undesirable by Christian theologians engaging with emergence 
theory, Alexander’s view of God mixed with an emergent view of divine attributes (deity) 
continues to have a surprisingly strong impact on emergence theologies today.108 Gregersen 
writes that, despite its undesirability for religion, “the general outcome is inevitable if 
emergentist thinking is written large, metaphysically speaking.”109 Philip Clayton rejects 
Alexander’s “radical emergent theism”, but does admit that “the success of the sciences of 
emergence does provide some impetus in the direction of the emergence of deity” and that 
Alexander’s proposal is “a logical extension” of emergence theory.110 Emergence theory gives 
ontological priority to material existence by citing the organisation of matter as the creative 
cause for all immaterial or higher-level properties. Emergence, in and of itself, has no way to 
conceive of an immaterial being or property existing independent of or prior to the material 
world. Therefore, Clayton concludes, “to the extent that divine mind is held to be transcendent 
or to precede the existence of the cosmos, the framework of emergence has been left behind.”111 
Emergence must be left behind then, for God is neither partly transcendent, nor pre-existent 
only to some extent, but wholly so in accordance with Divine unity.  
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A similarly bipolar view of God is seen in Process theologies’ view of the Primordial (akin to 
the emergence process) and Consequent (akin to the emergent resultant) aspects of God.112 
Process thought endorses panexperientialism, and so has been more closely associated with 
panpsychist metaphysics than emergentist ontology. Despite emergence theorists’ rejection of 
panexperientialism, the influence of Process theology upon emergence theology is clear. 
Clayton, on this topic writes,  
Arguably, metaphysics in the tradition of Whitehead should also be 
emergentist, since it is a philosophy of pervasive becoming, even 
including the thesis that at least one ‘pole’ of the divine, the so-called 
consequent nature of God, emerges through the history of its interactions 
with finite occasions of experience.113 
 
In both Process and emergence theologies, the category of ‘becoming’ is emphasised over 
‘being’. In both theologies God is identified simultaneously with this process of emergence 
(immanence) and as emergent (transcendence). What emergence theology and Process 
theology share is a grand and expansive metaphysic of becoming, under which the doctrine of 
God is redefined or subsumed. In Whitehead’s words, “God is not to be treated as an exception 
to the metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief 
exemplification.”114 This suggests that theological concepts are not seen to be above our 
understanding of the natural world but are redefined in light of a meta-theory extrapolated from 
scientific paradigms and philosophical theories. The logical and ontological priority given to 
the universe by emergence and Process theologians entails a redefinition of the concept of 
transcendence. This redefinition moves away from a pre-existent transcendence of all created 
entities and processes to a relative transcendence arising out of created entities and processes. 
This subsumption of the supernatural within the natural, which occurs through the adoption of 
naturalism, is seen throughout this thesis to be a grave theological mistake. Whilst emergence 
of the animal soul is philosophically mysterious it remains theologically permissible.  
  
                                                 
112 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 343-51. 
113 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 167. Further arguments for the compatibility between Process thought and 
emergence theory come from Nancey Frankenberry, ‘The Emergent Paradigm and Divine Causation,’ Process 
Studies 13 (1983): 202-17 and Ian Barbour, “Neuroscience, Artificial Intelligence, and Human Nature: 
Theological and Philosophical Reflections,” in Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine 
Action, eds. Robert J. Russell, Nancey Murphy, Theo Meyering, and Michael Arbib (Vatican City State/ 
Berkeley, CA: Vatican Observatory Publications/ The Centre for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1999), 
249-80. 
114 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 343.  
40 
 
However, the adoption of emergentism as a global ontology or expansive interdisciplinary 
framework is more problematic for Christian theology. 
 
The Emergent Christ: Incarnation through Emergent Evolution 
 
In so far as it is the perpetual charge of theologians “to think out the meaning of the Christian 
conviction that God was incarnate in Jesus, that Jesus is God and Man”, Christology is an 
unavoidable arena for theological metaphysics.115 It is unsurprising then that the doctrine of 
the incarnation has undergone concentrated innovation within emergence theologies. 
Gregersen writes that a central theological question for Christian emergence theologians is, “is 
there a connection between the chemistry of emergence and the emergence of Jesus Christ?”116 
An example of an affirmative response comes from molecular biologist and Anglican priest, 
Arthur Peacocke.117 As one of the leading and most prolific figures of emergence theology, 
Peacocke describes the incarnation as, “[A] new emergent, a new reality, had appeared within 
created humanity.”118 Put another way, “the significance and potentiality of all levels of 
creation may be said to have been unfolded in Jesus the Christ.”119 Thinking through the 
meaning of Jesus Christ as God incarnate within the framework of emergence theory has two 
results. First, since emergence theory envisions reality as a hierarchy of ascending levels of 
complexity, it reconceives the incarnation as creaturely ascent rather than a divine descent into 
the world. Second, because emergence theory, for Peacocke, is the means of evolutionary 
adaptation then his incarnation-through-emergence is a process available to any biological 
creature, and not unique to the person of Jesus Christ. Peacocke embraces both these moves 
and envisions Jesus Christ as the summit of the ladder of emergent phenomena and defines 
‘incarnation’ as a process in continuity with, and taking place through, the natural processes of 
evolution.  
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Jesus Christ, as a new emergent phenomenon, is placed on the scale of emergence theory more 
widely. In so far as what emerges in Jesus Christ is divinity or a divine nature, then this 
Christology tends towards emergent-theism; the emergence of a deity from the complexity of 
the world.120 This logic of ascent, not gracious descent, can be seen in Peacocke’s statement 
that ‘incarnation’,   
does not involve any ‘descent’ of a God, conceived of as ‘above’ man 
. . . but rather as being a unique manifestation of a possibility always 
inherently there for man by his potential nature, i.e. by virtue of what 
man was, or rather might be, in himself (which is, of course, as God 
evolved him). The ‘incarnation’ which occurred ‘in’ Jesus is an 
example of that emergence-from-continuity that we have seen 
characterized the creative process.121 
Peacocke uses emergence theory to define ‘incarnation’ as the ascension of a single human 
being to reach a new evolutionary level, the potential for which was latent within all human 
beings.  
The second result, where incarnation is a universal process, can be seen in Peacocke’s claim 
that, “God has all along been instantiating, ‘incarnating’ God’s own ‘personalness’ in that 
world”.122 This constant ‘incarnating’ is identified with the process of evolutionary emergence 
throughout the natural world, but it is only in Jesus Christ that this process reached its perfect 
summit.123 Peacocke’s emergence-Christology here seems congruent with John Hick’s The 
Metaphor of God Incarnate in that, for both Peacocke and Hick, “The mythic story [of the 
incarnation] expresses the significance of a point in [evolutionary] history where we can see 
human life lived in faithful response to God and see God’s nature reflected in that human 
                                                 
120 I previously argued more strongly that Peacocke’s Christology of ascent in conjunction with emergence 
theory led to an emergent theism, like that of Samuel Alexander. I have since come to doubt whether the 
emergent properties exhibited by Christ are considered by Peacocke to be divine in any realist or ontological 
sense, rather than merely exemplary for humanity. Thus my analysis of Peacocke has changed markedly since, 
Joanna Leidenhag, “Critique of Emergent Theologies,” Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 51, no.4 
(December 2016): 867-882.  
121 Arthur R. Peacocke, Creation and the World of Science (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 241-2. Thus, Philip 
Clayton is wrong to claim that “Emergent thinking links most naturally with kenotic Christology”. Clayton, 
Adventures in the Spirit, 111. Kenoticism refers, fundamentally, to a Divine descent and stripping of divine 
attributes, and emergence refers to an ascent and a filling-up, as oppose to a self-emptying, of divine properties 
within a human being.  
122 Arthur R. Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and Becoming — Natural, Divine, and Human, 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), 305-6. This view of emergent evolution as a kind of ongoing 
‘incarnation’ of God is articulated by Franciscan and Teilhardian expert Ilia Delio. She writes “...incarnation 
does not take place in evolution; Christ does not intervene in creation and then become its goal. Rather, the 
whole evolutionary process is incarnational”. Ilia Delio, The Emergent Christ: Exploring the Meaning of 
Catholic in an Evolutionary Universe (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2011), 53. 
123 Peacocke, Creation and the World of Science, 212-213, 231.  
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response.”124 For Peacocke, the incarnation is part of an ongoing process, indistinguishable 
from the natural processes of evolution, but which all humanity should strive to imitate.125 As 
Oliver Crisp points out, this approach of low-Christology puts “the theological cart before the 
horse: Christian theology proclaims that Christ as God incarnate teaches us how we should 
live.”126 It is not that as an emergent human Christ teaches us how to be God (which is what 
Peacocke suggests), but that as God Christ teaches us how to be truly human.  
Peacocke is also self-consciously employing Geoffrey Lampe’s (to whom Peacocke’s own 
Bampton Lectures are dedicated) ‘inspiration Christology’.127 As such, Peacocke 
acknowledges that he has no desire to support views of a pre-existent Logos, since as we saw 
above immaterial pre-existence contradicts the logic of emergence theory. This denial of 
Christ’s pre-existence allows Peacocke to repeatedly affirm that any human being could 
become ‘incarnate’.128 However, this linking of an evolutionary emergence theology with a 
moral exemplar Christology is problematic. One might ask Peacocke, if emergence is an 
unpredictable event resulting from increased biological complexity, just how does one follow 
Christ’s example and bring about the emergence of a new ontological level within oneself? 
Since mental properties (including those which reveal the nature of God in Jesus Christ) are 
conditioned by, and supervene upon, physical substrates according to emergence theory, it 
would seem that in emulating Christ, disciples would need a material (neurological) change 
before a spiritual change could occur; salvation as an emergent phenomenon becomes a product 
of evolutionary adaptation.  
It is likely that a prior commitment to a low-Christology of exemplarism, is reinforced by 
emergence theory, rather than Peacocke’s commitment to emergence entailing a low-
Christology; but, either way, the adoption of emergence theory and the expression of a low-
Christology appear mutually reinforcing. Where emergence theory makes a distinctive 
contribution, over and above Hick’s and Lampe’s similarly low-Christologies, is in how it 
subsumes his concept of the incarnation specifically within the theory of evolution and the 
                                                 
124 John Hick, The Metaphor of God Incarnate (London: SCM Press, 1993), 105-106.  
125 Although it is not made clear how we consciously convert to Jesus/to evolution and choose to imitate or 
participate more fully in our own evolution/incarnation. It seems that evolution is not something we can choose 
to participate in or not, especially given that the capacity for free will and choice is seen to be an emergent 
property produced by the evolutionary process. 
126 Crisp, “Incarnation,” in The Oxford Handbook of Systematic Theology, eds. John Webster, Kathryn Tanner 
and Iain Torrance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 165.  
127 See, Geoffrey Lampe, God the Spirit: The Bampton Lectures 1976 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977). 
128 Peacocke, Creation and the World of Science, 233, 242. Arthur Peacocke, God and the New Biology, 
(London: Dent., 1986), 132; Peacocke, All That Is, 38. 
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material processes of creation. Emergence theory provides a material-to-mental-to-spiritual 
narrative of linear development, a trajectory which Rowan Williams has described as “the most 
fundamental mistake Christology can make” because it dissolves any “unique and decisive 
contribution of Christological language” to the “logic of creation”.129 
Peacocke remains unclear on what the new emergent level or property that Jesus Christ 
instantiates in the world specifically refers to. It does not seem to be a new emergent self or 
mind, such as William Hasker’s model of emergence (which would be one way to maintain a 
notion of dyothelitism with emergence theology). Instead, the perfect revelation of God that 
emerges in Jesus Christ seems to refer to a distinct set of mental properties. F. LeRon Shults 
follows Peacocke here and defines “The doctrine of incarnation [as] an attempt to clarify this 
question about the coming-to-be of Homo sapiens”, through the evolutionary process of 
emergence, which began the “emergence of the symbolic capacity of our species”.130 
According to Shults, therefore, the new emergent level reached in Christ is a psychological and 
epistemological set of mental properties; the way-of-knowing and being-known that the 
persons of the Trinity share is repeated in Jesus of Nazareth.131 Similarly, Philip Clayton 
describes the new emergent level reached in Jesus Christ as a set of dispositional properties 
such that Jesus’ way of acting and being in the world is God’s way of acting and being in the 
world.132 Whichever set of properties are preferred, as the unique revelation of God within 
these emergence-Christologies, it is a set of properties that arises out of physical complexity 
and remains ontologically dependent upon the material substrate of biological evolution.  
The crux of the problem for emergent Christologies is the limited definition of transcendence 
that emergence theory allows for. Emergence theory is often embraced by theologians for 
having any space for transcendence at all; namely, the transcendence of higher-properties from 
their basis such that (contra reductionism) we can speak of genuine novelty in the universe. It 
is often unclear in emergence theologies if the term ‘transcendence’ is meaningfully different 
from the terminology of ‘irreducibility’. This is insufficient for any notion of divine 
transcendence, which is a transcendence that enters into, draws alongside, and descends, rather 
than a transcendence that emerges out of or ascends. In so far as the uniqueness of Jesus of 
Nazareth, which legitimates this person alone to be the centre of the Church’s worship as the 
Christ, is taken to be an emergent property, then Jesus Christ must either not be fully divine 
                                                 
129 Rowan Williams, Christ The Heart of Creation (London: Bloomsbury, 2018), 235. 
130 F. LeRon Shults, Christology and Science (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2008), 23, 58, 60.  
131 Shults, 60. 
132 Clayton, Adventures in the Spirit, 111. 
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and pre-existent as the Creator of all things, or divinity exists on a scale with physical and 
mental properties and as such remains supervenient and dependent upon the physical 
complexity of the world (emergent theism). Jesus Christ, on emergent Christologies, may 
transcend the psychological and ethical (and even ontological) capacities thus far actualised in 
evolutionary history, but he cannot be considered to manifest the divine transcendence that 
exceeds the universe; an emergent Christ cannot transcend the process of emergence itself.  
 
The Spirit of Emergence: Divine Action as an Emergent Phenomenon 
 
For many emergence theologians there seems to be a natural coherence between the Holy 
Spirit, as the personal activity of God in creation, and emergence theory. Harold J. Morowitz 
notes this connection when he writes, “The transition from mystery to complexity would be, in 
theological terms, the divine spirit.”133 Or again, “the rule of emergence associates more closely 
with what theologians call the Holy Spirit.”134 Why does Morowitz observe this 
correspondence between the Holy Spirit and emergence, and what is the shape of 
pneumatology being proposed here?  
Philip Clayton also articulates the importance of pneumatology for emergence theology when 
he writes that “The understanding of the Spirit is central to emergent theology.”135 However, it 
is clear that the shape of pneumatology within his emergence paradigm is, again, pulled 
towards emergent theism. Clayton writes,  
The divine spirit . . . must also be temporal, the emergent result of a 
long-term process of intimate relationship with beings in the world. In 
this view, then, Spirit is not a fundamental ontological category but an 
emergent form of complexity that living things within the world begin 
to manifest at a certain stage in their development.136  
Clayton explicitly refers to God’s Spirit, not merely human minds or created spirits, as resulting 
from the physical complexity of the world in a parallel fashion to how Alexander described 
God’s deity as an emergent result of the world. It would seem, at this point, that there is no pre-
existent or transcendent Spirit of God on Clayton’s schema. But this would not be entirely 
                                                 
133 Morowitz, “Emergence of Transcendence,” 185. 
134 Harold J. Morowitz, “The ‘Trinitarian’ World of Neo-Pantheism: On Panentheism and Epistemology,” in In 
Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being: Panentheistic Reflections on God’s Presence in a Scientific 
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correct. Clayton goes on to say that,  
A theological corrective must be made to the ‘straight emergence’ view, 
however. The Spirit that emerges corresponds to the Spirit who was 
present from the beginning.137 
In Clayton’s Pneumatology, we have the same duality that was described earlier in reference 
to God the Father. Clayton admits that emergence theory needs a “theological corrective” to 
counterbalance the pull towards emergent theism. However, this corrective is not a minor 
adjustment, but forces Clayton to hold together two forms of logic that stand in tension, if not 
direct opposition, to one another. On the one hand, emergence theory holds that all immaterial, 
spiritual, and higher level entities must be ontologically, logically and temporally preceded by 
material substrates. On the other hand, theism holds that an immaterial, spiritual and 
transcendent Being is the Creator, the ontological and logical ground of all existence. This 
tension causes a confused duality within the doctrine of God for emergence theologies.  
What motivates Clayton, who seems to perceive the tension and resists “a fully emergentist 
theology” of Samuel Alexander,138 to positing the Holy Spirit as (partially) an emergent 
resultant? The motivation seems to come out of the question of divine action. Divine action is 
addressed more fully in chapter four, it is sufficient at present to state that Clayton – like many 
in the science-religion dialogue in recent decades – argues that God cannot be seen to act in a 
way contrary to natural laws. This maxim, almost a rule in recent debates, is termed ‘non-
interventionism’ and has been motivated by scientific, interdisciplinary, pastoral and 
theological concerns. Setting aside questions regarding the validity or need for non-
interventionist divine action for the moment, we can see that what motivates Clayton’s 
emergence theology is the hope that “an emergentist theory of mind thus opens up the 
possibility of a divine influence at the mental or spiritual level that does not require an 
exception to any natural laws.”139 Speaking of the emergent level of personhood, the 
“integrated self or psychophysical agent-in-community”, Clayton writes that, “Here, and 
perhaps here alone, a divine agency could be operative that could exercise downward causal 
influence without being reduced to a manipulator of physical particles or psychotropic 
                                                 
137 Clayton, 110. 
138 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 190. 
139 Philip Clayton and Steven Knapp, The Predicament of Belief: Science, Philosophy and Faith (Oxford, UK; 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), 58. Elsewhere, Clayton writes that “divine action is to be 
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neurotransmitters.”140 The hope of emergence theory, possibly the central motivation for 
Clayton’s whole project of, is the articulation of a non-interventionist account of divine action.  
This emergence-based account for divine action, however, forces Clayton to construe the Holy 
Spirit (the personal agency of God) as the next level in the emergence hierarchy. Positively, 
Clayton celebrates: “It is permissible to construe divine causality as one of these higher levels 
of causality” that has non-deterministic, top-down influence on the world.141 However, Clayton 
notes the cost of his approach: “The resources of emergence theory can help her [the 
theologian] introduce and defend divine action, but only if she construes the divine as the next 
emergent level in the cosmic evolutionary process.”142 Thus, Clayton is compelled to divide 
his doctrine of God; as creator, God pre-exists and transcends the emergence process, as agent 
in the world– as the Holy Spirit in particular – God is an emergent resultant at the next level of 




Emergence theory is often praised for offering an interdisciplinary framework that avoids the 
inadequacies of physicalist reductionism and the mysteries of Cartesian dualism; but such 
celebration appears premature. Emergence theologies seek to reconstruct the core tenets of 
Christianity upon the foundation of emergence theory as it exists within the natural sciences 
and philosophy of mind. This chapter argued, first, that the foundation provided by the natural 
sciences was less secure than emergence theologians often admit because no clear definition 
of emergence is forthcoming, and many scientists view emergence as entirely compatible with 
reductionism. The form of emergence theory employed within theology most often draws upon 
philosophy of mind. This chapter went on to argue that emergence within philosophy of mind 
is an ambiguous concept, in part because the idea that the mind is analogous to physical 
emergence appears to either be a false analogy or entirely mysterious.  
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Emergence theory, as currently construed in either the natural sciences or in philosophy of 
mind, is an unstable foundation for constructive theology avoiding neither the inadequacies of 
reduction nor the mysteries of dualism.   
These are serious challenges, certainly, but the problems that beset emergence theology are far 
more serious still. Emergence theory was originally conceived for two related purposes. First, 
emergence theory was intended to provide a naturalistic explanation for complex and 
mysterious phenomena (such as life and purpose in the natural world) and remove the need to 
evoke supernatural agencies. Second, this commitment to naturalism, at least in part, served an 
interdisciplinary purpose. As such, the adoption of emergence theory as an interdisciplinary 
framework is closely linked to its commitment to naturalism and the hope for a sufficient, 
expansive framework  for understanding all of reality. A theologian, such as William Hasker, 
may adopt an emergentist understanding of the soul (and accept the various philosophical 
problems therein) without adopting the worldview of emergence in toto. However, this is not 
what emergence theologies typically do because it is against the grain of the logic of emergence 
itself as an expansive framework for understanding all of reality.  
Theologians who do accept the logic of emergence in toto accept a significant tension in their 
work. On the one hand, as emergentists they are committed to the idea that the material 
precedes (both temporally and logically) the immaterial. On the other hand, as theists they are 
committed to the idea that an immaterial (or other than material) Creator pre-exists the universe 
(either temporally or logically). The hope placed in strong emergence theory by emergence 
theologians, is the expectation that it can provide a realistic account of irreducible immaterial 
properties or entities (souls, minds, freedom, angels, demons, and even God or God’s action), 
in accordance with the naturalistic and monistic framework of contemporary natural science. 
However, the nature and place of these emergent properties within the world is highly 
constrained by emergence theory, making it less promising for Christian theology than first 
appears. Even if emergence affirms irreducibility, the mental and spiritual aspects of life are 
still subordinated and secondary to the physical and material, thus the threat of disenchantment 
and devaluation looms. 
Emergence theologians claim to remove any dualism within the human person and, instead, to 
place the great divide between God and the universe. Accordingly, God should remain outside 
of the framework of emergence. This intuition about the proper place of dualism within 
Christian theology seems entirely correct. However, the maximising goals of emergence theory 
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and the commitment to interdisciplinary naturalism make this almost impossible for emergence 
theologies to maintain. Instead, emergence theory exhibits a tendency to place the dualism 
inside the doctrine of God. In this duality, God’s immanence is equated with the process of 
emergence and the transcendence of God is redefined to be akin to the self-transcendence that 
creatures can achieve through the process of emergence. In Christian theology, God is seen to 
be in continuous interaction with creatures for the sake of salvation through the incarnation of 
the Son and the indwelling of the Spirit. This makes the possibility of protecting the doctrine 
of God from the distortive effect of emergence theory extremely difficult. In their articulations 
of the incarnation and in discussions of divine action, emergence theologies inadvertently lower 
God the Son and God the Holy Spirit to the level of created realities. If Clayton is worried “that 
too much theological discourse will wreck the theory of emergence”, then I am concerned that 
too much emergence theory will wreck Christian theology.143 Christian theologians searching 
for a metaphysical theory to employ within the doctrine of creation (and theological 
anthropology) need to look elsewhere for a less expansive or inherently naturalistic ontology. 
To that end, the remainder of this thesis evaluates the potential of panpsychism for the doctrine 
of creation. 
                                                 
143 These are Amos Yong’s words, but they are a fair summary of Clayton’s concern. Amos Yong, The Spirit of 
Creation: Modern Science and Divine Action in the Pentecostal-Charismatic Imagination (Grand Rapids, MI: 
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Chapter 2: Welcoming Contemporary Panpsychism 
 
Panpsychism is an umbrella term for a variety of positions within philosophy of mind which 
all hold that psyche is fundamental throughout the universe. In contemporary philosophy, 
panpsychism is undergoing a significant resurgence of interest and seems to be gathering 
momentum.1 This chapter seeks to introduce and critically evaluate the contemporary 
literature on panpsychism within analytic philosophy of mind. If panpsychism becomes 
widely accepted amongst philosophers in the coming decades, what might theology wish to 
critique or affirm in dialogue with this position? This important question, to my knowledge, 
has not yet been asked and explored by theologians.  
This chapter has a narrative structure; it is a story of a campaign, a battle, and the possibility 
of a new alliance. ‘The campaign’ is the story of panpsychism’s resurgence within 
contemporary philosophy of mind, largely (but not always intentionally) through the efforts 
of three notable philosophers: Thomas Nagel, David J. Chalmers, and Galen Strawson. ‘The 
battle’ is found in the second section of this chapter which explores the main objections 
against panpsychism. In outlining the various responses from panpsychists this section also 
surveys the variety of positions currently gathered beneath the panpsychist umbrella. The 
battle resolves into a stalemate; panpsychism is equally as attractive (or unattractive 
depending on one’s disposition) as its main metaphysical rivals within philosophy of mind. 
This is not a total loss for the panpsychist, who is typically viewed as the underdog, barely 
worthy of consideration. Instead, it is concluded that panpsychism is a serious option within 
philosophy of mind that Christian theologians should seriously consider and could 
respectably adopt.  
After times of war come times for making new alliances. The hope is that if two compatible 
theories offer their respective strengths to one another, they might combine to create an 
altogether more satisfactory position. The alliance, brokered in section three, is between 
panpsychism and theism. This chapter points towards an original argument that panpsychism 
is not merely compatible with belief in God, but that the structure of the arguments in favour 
                                                 
1 In 2017 alone major publications such as, William Seager, ed., Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism (New 
York: Routledge, 2017). Godehard Brüntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla, eds., Panpsychism: Contemporary 
Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). David Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017). Philip Goff, Consciousness and Fundamental Reality (Oxford: Oxford 
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of panpsychism invite or imply a theistic stance regarding the origin of the universe. That is, 
if a panpsychist philosopher follows through the logic of her own arguments consistently, she 
should abandon any lingering association with naturalism and instead adopt theism. In 
addition, it is argued that panpsychism should be an attractive option for the theist when she 
is choosing between different theories of the mind. As a result, the resurgence in 
panpsychism is a movement that Christian theologians should welcome and tentatively lend 
their support to.  
 
1. The Campaign: The Revival of Panpsychism within Philosophy of Mind  
 
The revival of interest in panpsychism is a story punctuated by the work of Thomas Nagel 
(1979), David J. Chalmers (1996), Galen Strawson (2006), and Thomas Nagel (2012) again. 
Their arguments stand in continuity with one another, and the cumulative effect is an 
impressive transformation of a very old, fairly counter-intuitive theory of mind into a 
scientifically plausible and analytically precise model of consciousness.   
 
Thomas Nagel: The ‘True Father of Contemporary Panpsychism’2 
 
Throughout most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries panpsychism was a small 
component within elaborate metaphysical schemes such as Absolute Idealism (in the work of 
Gustav Fechner, Rudolf Lotze and more recently Timothy Sprigge) and Process philosophy. 
It wasn’t until Nagel published an essay simply entitled “Panpsychism” in 1979 that 
panpsychism was disentangled from this history and presented as a stand-alone theory within 
philosophy of mind. In this “re-igniting” essay, Nagel defined panpsychism as “the view that 
the basic physical constituents of the universe have mental properties.”3 This still popular 
definition captures that the fact that many panpsychists wish to talk of mental properties 
rather than immaterial substances, and that most seek to keep idealism and Process 
metaphysics at arm’s length. This disassociation of contemporary panpsychism from larger 
                                                 
2 Sam Coleman, “The Evolution of Nagel’s Panpsychism,” Klesis 41 (2018): 180.   
3 Sam Coleman “The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence,” Erkenntnis 
79 (2014): 22. Nagel, “Panpsychism”, 181.  
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metaphysical ideologies should embolden contemporary theologians to seriously consider 
panpsychism without fearing they are inadvertently committing themselves to either of these 
larger frameworks.  
Nagel’s 1979 essay mounted an argument for the plausibility of panpsychism from four 
simple premises:  
a) Ontological Materialism or Monism: Human beings are wholly composed out of 
matter, which in principle can be shared or replaced by any other matter in this great 
universe. This is a denial of substance dualism.  
b) Mental Realism: Consciousness is a real phenomenon, regardless of our current 
difficulty to explain it. Moreover, consciousness is a property of the human organism, 
and hence it is a property of material beings.  
c) No Psycho-Physical Reduction: Conscious experience cannot be explained by 
physical properties alone. Physical properties are the sort of properties that can be 
quantified by scientists, but all quantified explanations will leave out some qualitative 
element.4  
d) Non-Emergence: All properties of any complex physical body can be transparently 
traced to the properties of the constituent parts, including their arrangement and 
interaction.  
Taking these four premises together, the argument commonly runs that if mental properties 
are a real property of material entities, which cannot be reduced to or emerge from the 
organisational complexity of material parts, then the only remaining option (aside from 
employing divine action to inject souls into human subjects) is to posit consciousness as 
fundamental (panpsychism). Put another way, if wholly material creatures have conscious 
states that cannot be explained by their material properties, but which must still be explained 
in terms of the creature’s constituent parts, then the constituent parts (and matter in general) 
must have additional non-material properties that explain the appearance of consciousness. 
As Sam Coleman characterises the argument, “there must be some secret properties of matter 
with a direct connection to consciousness, such that when you put matter together in the right 
way, as a brain (and perhaps a body too), you get a conscious being.”5 These are the initial 
                                                 
4 This would later become known as the “explanatory gap” between scientific explanation and conscious 
experience. J. Levine, “Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 
(1983): 354-61.  
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bones of contemporary arguments for panpsychism. It is sometimes referred to as The 
Genetic Argument for panpsychism.  
Despite giving clear expression to these arguments Nagel’s essay ‘Panpsychism’ concluded 
that panpsychism “appears to follow from a few simple premises, each of which is more 
plausible than its denial, though not perhaps more plausible than the denial of panpsychism.”6 
Nagel had shown, without invoking Process metaphysics, how one might defend 
panpsychism in a wholly rational and logical manner. At this point, Nagel judged 
panpsychism to be too counterintuitive, and placed it among the “hopelessly unacceptable 
solutions to the mind-body problem.” 7 Nevertheless, this essay successfully introduced the 
structure of a panpsychist solution to contemporary analytic philosophers of mind. 
 
David J. Chalmers: The Science of Consciousness  
 
Following Nagel’s 1979 essay, panpsychism remained an intriguing but unattractive position 
for most philosophers of mind. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s psycho-physical 
reduction and/or emergence theory, the rejection of which form two of the core premises for 
Nagel’s argument, remained foundational for most philosophers of mind. However, in 1994 
Chalmers gave a conference paper entitled “Towards a Scientific Basis for Consciousness”, 
which, in addition to the subsequent volume The Conscious Mind, irrevocably altered the 
playing field and added considerable support to the panpsychist position.8 Chalmers’ primary 
contribution to philosophy of mind has been his distinction between so-called ‘easy 
problems’ and ‘the hard problem’ of consciousness.  
The ‘easy problems’ are, according to Chalmers, explaining the mind’s ability to discriminate 
between categories and react to environmental stimuli; the integration of information by a 
cognitive system; the reportability of mental states; the ability of a system to access its own 
internal states; the focus of attention; the deliberate control of behaviour; and the difference 
                                                 
6 Nagel, “Panpsychism,” 181.  
7 Nagel, “Panpsychism,” 193. 
8 This conference paper was later published as “The Puzzle of Conscious Experience,” Scientific American 273 
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between wakefulness and sleep.9 Chalmers acknowledges that explaining these phenomena 
are very difficult puzzles facing neuroscientists and cognitive scientists and that it may take 
“a century or two of difficult empirical work.”10 However, these puzzles can, in principle, be 
solved by such empirical methods. This is because all of the ‘easy problems’ listed above are, 
according to Chalmers, abilities or functions. Chalmers refers to these problems as 
psychological consciousness, and he is content to leave neurological and cognitive scientists 
to struggle with them.  
Chalmers’ argument is that no matter how much progress is made in understanding 
psychological consciousness there will always remain the so-called ‘hard problem of 
consciousness’. The hard problem is characterised by the question: Why are any of these 
functions accompanied by experience? Why are ‘the lights on’ inside the human machine? 
Chalmers’ calls this phenomenal consciousness and it refers to the experience, the feeling of 
what-it-is-like to be a subject that accompanies many of the cognitive functions of the human 
brain. Chalmers gives five compelling arguments, by way of thought experiments, that seek 
to show that phenomenal consciousness will never be explained by reduction to physical 
facts; no matter how much we know about the brain (and body), we will never have 
explained phenomenal consciousness.11 These arguments have turned the tide in favour of 
Nagel’s second premise, No Psycho-Physical Reduction, and lend support to Mental Realism 
and Non-Emergence as well.  
Although Chalmers’ legacy is the success of this negative argument against materialism (and 
other forms of psycho-physical reduction), much of his effort has been spent more positively 
in trying to construct – or at least point the way towards the possible construction of – a 
fundamental theory of consciousness.12 In addition to his desire to “take consciousness 
seriously” as a phenomenon that cannot be reduced to physical function, Chalmers strives to 
“take science seriously”.13 In order to hold to both commitments, Chalmers argues that we 
must make consciousness fundamental to the natural world; we must adopt panpsychism. In 
                                                 
9 This list is taken from, David J. Chalmers, The Character of Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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The Absence of Analysis; See, Chalmers’ The Conscious Mind, 94ff; Frank Jackson, “Materialism and Qualia: 
The Explanatory Gap,” Pacifica Philosophical Quarterly 64 (1983): 354-61; Thomas Nagel, “What is it like to 
be a bat?” in Mortal Questions, 165-180. 
12 Hence the subtitle of his major volume, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory.  
13 Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, xii-xiii.  
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this way, Chalmers presents panpsychism as a middle way between reductionist materialism 
and supernaturalist dualism.14 
Chalmers’ positive argument runs that if consciousness is “a scientific subject matter”, then, 
although it “is not open to investigation by the usual methods”, it can still be explained by the 
usual scientific structure; namely, “a few fundamental entities connected by fundamental 
laws.”15 Consciousness may be irreducible to physical entities and laws, but there need be 
“nothing particularly spiritual or mystical” about fundamental phenomenal entities and 
psychophysical laws.16 These fundamental entities and laws are required to keep the 
explanation of consciousness within the same overall shape as any other scientific 
explanation.17 Chalmers makes the comparison to James Clerk Maxwell’s idea that 
electromagnetic forces had to be taken as fundamental, as well as positing new laws 
governing these forces, in order to explain the apparently spooky effect of electric and 
magnetic phenomena.18 In short, Chalmers argued that panpsychism is not merely a possible 
move in the logical space of metaphysics (as Nagel had demonstrated), but that panpsychism 
might be deemed credible within a scientific framework.19 
As with Nagel, in 1996 Chalmers was still uncomfortable with the label of panpsychism and 
considered association with this historical position a threat. Instead, he preferred to call his 
position “naturalistic dualism”.20 This he defined as the view, simply, that “there are both 
physical and nonphysical features of the world.”21 Chalmers was aware that by advocating 
dualism, he would meet resistance from many of his fellow philosophers, whether 
agnostically secular or adamantly atheistic. As such, Chalmers remains vigilant against any 
spiritual connotations of his position. He writes, “[t]here is nothing especially transcendental 
                                                 
14 David J. Chalmers, “Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism,” in Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives, eds. 
Godehard Brüntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 19-47.  
15 Chalmers, “Facing Up...”, 20; Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, xiv. Thomas Nagel makes a very similar case 
for the scientific status for panpsychism when he writes, “Major scientific advances often require the creation of 
new concepts, postulating unobservable elements of reality that are needed to explain how natural regularities 
that initially appear accidental are in fact necessary.” Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, 42. 
16 Chalmers, “Facing Up...”, 20. 
17 Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, 126ff.  
18 Chalmers, 127.  
19 Godehard Brüntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla “Introduction”, in Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives, 4. 
20 Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, 128. He later acknowledges that “it is probably fair to say that [this] view is a 
variety of panpsychism. . . we ought to take the possibility of some sort of panpsychism seriously: there seem to 
be no knockdown arguments against the view, and there are various positive reasons why one might embrace 
it.” Chalmers, 299. 
21 Chalmers, 124; Chalmers, The Character of Consciousness, 17.  
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about consciousness; it is just another natural phenomenon . . . to embrace dualism is not 
necessarily to embrace mystery.”22  
From the perspective of Christian theology, what are we to make of Chalmers’ stubbornly 
anti-religious treatment of consciousness? Should this threaten Christian theologians? Quite 
the opposite. I suggest that Chalmers’ naturalisation of panpsychism, as a kind of ‘dualism all 
the way down’, is an important aspect of contemporary panpsychism in dialogue with 
theology. This is because Chalmers’ description of consciousness as a purely natural 
phenomenon provides an important buffer against false characterisations of Christian views 
of the human soul as ‘divine’, a little piece of God, or autonomously immortal.23 If 
consciousness were a divinely transcendent phenomenon or slice of uncreated light, then any 
realist philosophy of mind would slide towards emergent theism, pantheism, polytheism or 
paganism. Consciousness, in Christian theology, must remain a created phenomenon of 
creaturely minds that, in keeping with the principle of creatio ex nihilo, neither emanate from 
God nor collectively constitute a divine mind or world-soul.   By arguing for fundamental 
consciousness as “just another natural phenomenon”, Chalmers points the way forward for a 
Christian panpsychism to posit creaturely or created finite minds throughout the universe as 
fundamental and possibly ubiquitous, without implying that these minds are identical to God 
or in any way constitutive of divinity; but more of that later. 
 
Galen Strawson’s Gauntlet: The Argument for Entailment  
 
The third major figure in the recent history of panpsychism is Galen Strawson. Strawson took 
panpsychism onto the offensive and argued in such a way that his physicalist and emergentist 
colleagues found themselves having to justify how their positions managed to avoid or deny 
panpsychism. Whereas Nagel’s essay placed panpsychism back on the philosophical map, 
and Chalmers framed panpsychism as a scientific and naturalistic option, it was Strawson 
                                                 
22 Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, 126, 128. The accusation that “dualism wallows in mystery, accepting 
dualism is giving up” is a common one, but it is here paradigmatically expressed by Dennett, Consciousness 
Explained, 37.  
23 David Skrbina, for example, writes that panpsychism is incompatible with monotheistic religion because, “In 
all monotheistic Western religions, humans alone possess a divine and immortal soul.” David Skrbina, 
“Panpsychism in history: An overview”, Mind That Abides, ed. David Skrbina (Amsterdam, John Benjamins, 
2009), 1.  
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who threw down the gauntlet and made panpsychism impossible for contemporary 
philosophers of mind to ignore.  
In 2006, Strawson published an article entitled, “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails 
Panpsychism”. Strawson argued that “something akin to panpsychism is not merely one 
possible form of realistic physicalism, but the only possible form, and hence, the only 
possible form of physicalism tout court.”24 Given Strawson’s own standing within the 
philosophical community and the dominance of physicalist ontology in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, it is unsurprising that this article was “something of a watershed event in 
recent analytic philosophy of mind”,25 which brought “panpsychism to the attention, and 
critical scrutiny, of mainstream philosophers of mind, also making a new generation aware of 
its appeal.”26  
Strawson’s argument can be formulated in the following way: 
1. Physicalists hold that every real, concrete27 phenomenon is wholly physical. 
2. Nothing is more certain than that consciousness is a real, concrete phenomenon.  
Therefore, 
3. (Realistic) physicalists must hold that consciousness is wholly physical.  
How can (3) possibly be the case? To our ordinary (neo-Cartesian) definitions of 
“consciousness” and “physical”, this conclusion appears to be a direct contradiction in terms. 
The catch is that Strawson argues that the definition of “physical”, as used at the end of the 
first premise, is an utterly mysterious category in and of itself. Strawson points to John 
Locke, David Hume, Joseph Priestly, Arthur Eddington, Bertrand Russell and Noam 
Chomsky as each coming to this conclusion in their own time; namely that “we have no good 
reason to think that we know anything about the physical that gives us any reason to find any 
problem in the idea that mental phenomena are physical phenomena.”28 This is not because 
the mind can be reduced to the functional interaction of physical parts, but because even the 
physical – properly understood – cannot be exhaustively described by physics.29 When 
                                                 
24 Strawson, “Realistic Monism,” in Consciousness and Its Place, 9.  
25 Leemon B. McHenry and George W. Shields, “Analytic Critiques of Whitehead’s metaphysics,” Journal of 
the American Philosophical Association (2016): 492. 
26 Coleman, “The Real Combination Problem,” 22.  
27 ‘Concrete’ means a spatiotemporally located, non-abstract, entity. 
28 Strawson, Real Materialism, 20, 39.  
29 This argument is distilled from; Galen Strawson, Real Materialism and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 19-20, 46-47; Strawson, “Realistic Monism,” in Consciousness and Its Place, 3-31. 
Interestingly, therefore, Strawson is unimpressed with David J. Chalmers’ hard problem of consciousness, 
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Strawson agrees with other materialists that experience is “really just neurons firing”, he 
means that “there is a lot more to neurons than physics and neurophysiology record (or can 
record).”30 At its core, Strawson’s argument for panpsychism is primarily a refutation of 
dualism. He describes “Descartes’ greatest mistake” to be the assumption that we really know 
enough about the nature of spatial-extension to place it in opposition to conscious 
experience.31  
What about emergence theory? Given Strawson’s argument so far, a materialist could 
respond that all micro-parts are wholly non-experiential, but consciousness certainly exists at 
some macro-level by virtue of some strong emergence-based relation. At this point, Strawson 
added his voice to the growing number of philosophers who – inspired by Nagel’s 1979 essay 
– argue that,  
It is built into the heart of the notion of emergence that emergence cannot 
be brute in the sense of there being absolutely no reason in the nature of 
things why the emerging thing is as it is (so that it is unintelligible even 
to God).32  
Strawson iterates that emergence is, by definition, an in-virtue-of relation whereby there must 
be something about the material base (the brain, for example) in virtue of which, it gives rise 
to the mind. For (super-)strong emergentists, who reject panpsychism and state that matter is 
wholly non-experiential, there can be nothing about the brain in virtue of which it gives rise 
to the mind.33 In Strawson’s words, “You can make chalk from cheese, or water from wine, 
because if you go down to the subatomic level they are both the same stuff, but you can’t 
                                                 
zombie thought experiments, or naturalistic dualism, because these imply that we know more about non-
experiential reality than we really do. 
30 Strawson, Real Materialism, 56. Strawson is aware of the accusation that he is playing fast and loose with 
accepted terminology here, and that his argument is little more than a language game. Arguments about 
terminology are common enough in philosophy and, in this case, it is intended to provoke his interlocutors to 
see the “silliness” of their own version of physicalism/materialism. Strawson, Real Materialism, 48-49. 
31 Strawson, Real Materialism, 46. The idea that dualism went wrong over its characterisation of matter, rather 
than of mind, is becoming common amongst panpsychists. Gregg Rosenberg writes, “I argue that Descartes’ 
most dangerous errors were the ones he made about matter, not mind.” Gregg Rosenberg, A Place for 
Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 7-8. 
David Ray Griffin writes, Descartes’ “view of the mind is indeed problematic, but even more problematic is his 
view of matter.” Griffin Unsnarling the World-Knot, 46-47. 
32 See, Strawson, Real Materialism, 65.  
33 Interestingly, Alvin Plantinga affirms this argument against emergence and reduction when he writes, “If 
electrons and quarks can’t think, we won’t find anything composed of them that can think by way of the 
physical interaction of its parts.” Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley, Knowledge of God (Oxford Blackwell, 
2008), 53.  
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make experience from something wholly non-experiential.”34 For the emergence relation to 
work, mental properties must be built in at the bottom; found at the fundamental level.35  
Strawson most often articulates his position as a form of Russellian monism.36 Russellian 
monism states there is one type of stuff in the universe (monism), but that it has intrinsic and 
extrinsic qualities. The extrinsic quality of things is the behavioural structure, which is 
measured mathematically in how things relate. This is what we call the physical.37 If 
physicality is merely the measurement of behaviour and relations, what is it that behaves or 
relates? What is the stuff of the world, in and of itself? Bertrand Russell argued that, since we 
only have access to the intrinsic nature of ourselves and not of anything else it is justifiable to 
imagine (although by no means certain) that all other things have the same intrinsic quality as 
human beings; namely the quality of experience.38 This is the Intrinsic Natures Argument for 
panpsychism; the intrinsic nature of all things (that which is related in causal relations or that 
which is measured by scientists) is experiential.  
 
Thomas Nagel Again: The Evolutionary Argument for Panpsychism  
 
In 2012 Thomas Nagel published the slim volume Mind and Cosmos. Here, Nagel defended 
panpsychism as the most satisfactory explanation as to both “why specific organisms have 
the conscious life they have”, and “why conscious organisms arose in the history of life on 
earth.”39 Nagel’s affirmation of panpsychism, of a neutral monist variety, was made partly on 
the basis of his previous 1979 argument and partly on the demystifying effect that the passing 
of years can have upon even the most unusual philosophies.40 However, Nagel’s primary 
                                                 
34 Strawson, Real Materialism, 74.  
35 In response to Strawson, Colin McGinn writes that, “It isn’t physicalism that entails panpsychism: it’s his 
commitment to emergence . . . if you agree that experiences are irreducible to non-E facts, and if you accept 
emergence, then you end up with panpsychism – which is not a very surprising outcome given the assumptions.” 
Although McGinn may be correct, many strong emergentists would find this very surprising, if not alarming. 
Colin McGinn, “Hard Questions: Comments on Galen Strawson,” in Galen Strawson et al. Consciousness and 
its place in nature, ed. Anthony Freeman (Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic, 2006), 92-93 
36 Chalmers now also sees Russellian monism as the most important version of panpsychism, since it is best 
suited for explaining mental causation. David J. Chalmers, “Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism”, The Amherst 
Lecture in Philosophy 8 (2013): 1-35.  
37 Strawson, Real Materialism 27ff; Bertrand Russell, An Outline of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 
1927/1992), 125; Bertrand Russell, “Mind and Matter,” in Portraits from Memory (Nottingham: Spokesman, 
1956/1995), 153. 
38 Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Matter (London: Routledge, 1927/1992).   
39 Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, 50-51. 
40 As Galen Strawson writes of his own position, “This sounded crazy to me for a long time, but I am quite used 
to it, now that I know that there is no alternative short of ‘substance dualism’…” Real Materialism, 71.  
59 
 
motivation was due to a larger dissatisfaction with the whole Neo-Darwinian interpretation of 
evolution, which he refers to as “a heroic triumph of ideological theory over common 
sense.”41  Hence, his book’s controversial subtitle, Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian 
Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False. 
Nagel’s evolutionary argument for panpsychism is neatly summarised in the following quote:  
But since conscious organisms are not composed of a special kind of 
stuff, but can be constructed, apparently, from any of the matter in the 
universe, suitably arranged, it follows that this monism will be universal. 
Everything, living or not, is constituted from elements having a nature 
that is both physical and non-physical – that is, capable of combining into 
mental wholes. So this reductive account can also be described as a form 
of panpsychism: all the elements of the physical world are also mental.42 
This argument for panpsychism based on ontological continuity within the universe has been 
made not only by contemporary panpsychists, but is found in the work of early evolutionary 
biologists Ernst Haeckel, William Kingdon Clifford, Morton Price, Sir Charles Scott 
Sherrington, Sir Julian Huxley and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin.43 The most famous historical 
statement of the panpsychist argument from evolutionary continuity was penned by William 
James, and continues to influence panpsychist philosophers today. In The Principles of 
Psychology, James wrote,  
If evolution is to work smoothly, consciousness in some shape must have 
been present at the very origin of things. Accordingly, we find that the 
most clear-sighted evolutionary philosophers are beginning to posit it 
there. Each atom of the nebula, they suppose, must have had an 
aboriginal atom of consciousness linked with it; and, just as the material 
atoms have formed bodies and brains by massing themselves together, so 
the mental atoms, by an analogous process of aggregation, have fused 
into those larger consciousnesses which we know in ourselves and 
suppose to exist in our fellow-animal . . . Some such doctrine . . . is an 
indispensable part of a thorough-going philosophy of evolution.44 
 
As James expressed, panpsychism is a “philosophy of evolution” found at the interface of 
metaphysics and evolutionary biology, and not a testable hypothesis. Yet, as a philosophy of 
                                                 
41 Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, 128. 
42 Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, 57. 
43 Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West, 131-133, 141-144, 191-192. 
44 William James, The Principles of Psychology (Dover, 1890/1950), 149. It can be noted that by the time of his 
Hibbert Lectures in 1907, published as A Pluralistic Universe in 1909, James had reconciled himself to 
panpsychism despite the combination problem. See, Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West, 147-149. 
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nature, panpsychism does seem to find traction with the underlying principle of continuity 
within evolutionary theory.45 
The mind-body problem, as the name implies, is commonly localised to humanity. However, 
since bodies arise from, interact with, and return to the dust of the ground and stars, the mind-
body problem is truly a cosmic problem. How can we locate the phenomenon of experience, 
not just in connection to the brain, but in the universe at all? As Nagel posits, if we take the 
biological evolution of homo sapiens seriously then we are confronted with the fact that the 
mind-body problem “is not just a local problem . . . but that it invades our understanding of 
the entire cosmos and its history.”46 Moreover, if evolution brought about consciousness then 
evolution cannot be “just a physical process”, but “may have to be something more than 
physical all the way down.”47 Nagel refers to the materialist Neo-Darwinian claim to be able 
to answer everything through random efficient causation as a “Darwinism of the gaps” 
approach; the sooner abandoned the better.48 
 
Rounding up The Campaign  
 
What I have referred to as ‘The Campaign’ was neither planned nor organised as such. It 
presents a slow, but steady, trend of dissatisfaction in recent philosophy of mind with both 
materialist reduction and emergentist mystery. In one sense, the most powerful argument for 
panpsychism is the Last Man Standing Argument; all other theories seem to fail, and (so far) 
panpsychism remains. The more positive version of this argument is The Genetic Argument, 
stating that consciousness at the human level needs a compelling, naturalistic, evolutionary, 
origin story; panpsychism alone provides such a story. The other main argument for 
panpsychism is The Intrinsic Natures Argument, outlined in reference to Strawson and 
Russell. This has been a secondary argument in comparison to The Genetic Argument in 
recent history, but it seems to be growing in importance due to its explanatory promise within 
                                                 
45 Contemporary zoologist, Donald R. Griffin, describes the acceptance of panpsychism as “the final crowning 
chapter of the Darwinian revolution” in “From Cognition to Consciousness,” A Communion of Subjects: 
Animals in Religion, Science, and Ethics, eds. Paul Waldau and Kimberley Patton (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2006), 498. 
46 Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, 3.   
47 Nagel, 46. 
48 Nagel, 127. Nagel is adapted the pejorative label, ‘god-of-the-gaps’, first used by Charles Coulson to refer to 
the positing of divine action as the explanation for any and every currently unexplained event in the universe. 
Charles A. Coulson, Science and the Idea of God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 32. 
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philosophy of causation (but that’s another story).49  The arguments for panpsychism are 
radical, but persuasive. Are they enough to overcome the various objections that have been 
brought against panpsychism? It is to this question that this chapter now turns.  
 
2. The Battle: Contemporary Objections to Panpsychism 
 
The resurgence of panpsychism has not been without resistance. To discern if panpsychism 
has the potential longevity within philosophy of mind, such that theologians will need to be in 
dialogue with panpsychism in the coming decades, the power of these objections needs to be 
assessed. The objections against panpsychism can be grouped into three main categories, 
presented in ascending order of severity. First, what I refer to as ‘The Incredulous Stare’ is 
the set of objections that panpsychism is too counter-intuitive to take seriously. Second, it has 
been argued that panpsychism is unscientific and, as such cannot be accepted in the light of 
scientific progress. Third, and by far the most serious, is the challenge that even when 
accepted on its own terms panpsychism simply fails to deliver on its promise of an 
explanation for human consciousness.  
 
The Incredulous Stare Objections 
 
The first type of objection that most theories of panpsychism encounter are made on the basis 
that it is simply incredible, implausible or beyond the scope of a reasonable explanation. 
Initially, this objection is often made through the tacit, but powerful Incredulous Stare 
Objection. This is an a priori objection that panpsychism is too counterintuitive to take 
seriously. Colin McGinn gives voice to this objection when he writes that the view that 
“elementary particles enjoy an inner life” or that “rocks actually have thoughts” is 
“outrageous” and “absurd”.50 Despite its persuasive power for many, The Incredulous Stare 
Objection is easy to respond to since no concrete argument is being made here. That 
panpsychism is surprising, unusual or counter-intuitive does not entail its falsity. As Philip 
                                                 
49 Rosenberg, A Place for Consciousness, 129-297; Galen Strawson, “Realism and Causation,” in Real 
Materialism, 387-408; Patrick Lewtas, “Panpsychism, Emergentism and the Metaphysics of Causation,” Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly (2016): doi: 10.1111/papq.12167. 
50 Colin McGinn, The Character of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 32.  
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Goff writes, “It is hard to see why the fact that most Westerners living today happen to be 
pre-theoretically inclined to think panpsychism false constitutes a reason to think that it is 
false.”51 Panpsychists are quick to point out that most people today believe a whole series of 
highly counterintuitive things on the basis of modern science: time slows down at high 
speeds, quantum particles have determinate positions only after they are measured, the Earth 
goes around the Sun, and our ancestors were apes.  However, the fact that our modern 
Western intuitions, modelled as they are by a mechanistic scientific picture, fail to account 
for consciousness is perhaps reason to doubt that these intuitions are reliable.  
The No Sign Objection tries to give an account for the incredibility of panpsychism by 
arguing that there is no evident sign from our everyday experience or scientific experiments 
that the inanimate world contains mentality. However, not having signs or direct experience 
of a theory, especially a theory of consciousness, does not rule out its possibility. As Gregg 
Rosenberg writes, “From my own perspective, any theory that attributes consciousness to 
people other than myself is going beyond my evidence for the existence of consciousness.”52 
Typically, we attribute consciousness to other creatures based on a pre-conceived notion of 
what constitutes consciousness. For example, if I believe language constitutes consciousness, 
I will exclude animals, whereas if I believe neurology constitutes consciousness, I will extend 
it to all animals with a sufficiently similar nervous system to my own. Therefore, it is hard to 
make an argument for or against consciousness on the basis of evidence without 
predetermining the outcome in some way.  
The Incredulous Stare and No Signs Objections derive from The Analogical Argument for 
Other Minds. Since the primary way we think about the existence of other human minds is 
based on a perceived analogy between others and oneself, it is understandable that this is 
often the first objection to be levelled against panpsychism. The problem is that the 
panpsychist does not argue for fundamental minds based on an analogy to perceived 
behaviour or biology. This is because, to the panpsychist, all behavioural signs of 
consciousness are inessential features of experience, such as volitional movement and 
language, which the panpsychist denies exist at the fundamental level. As Gregg Rosenberg 
writes, 
When we speak of the qualitative field of some other, noncognitive, 
system, we are obviously not attributing to it the qualities of our own 
                                                 
51 Goff, Consciousness and Fundamental Reality, 174.  
52 Rosenberg, A Place for Consciousness, 93.  
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experiences. We are not attributing little pangs of pain or experiences of 
tiny blue dots to noncognitive systems. Whatever we are attributing, it is 
not any kind of feeling with which we can empathize. We are supposing 
that there are experienced qualities that share some essence with the 
qualities of our experience.53 
If panpsychists claimed that objects such as rocks and telephones, which give no visible sign 
of being conscious, have a unified consciousness with functional abilities, then the No Sign 
Objection becomes more serious. However, no contemporary panpsychists I know of posit 
such a unified consciousness or psychological abilities in rocks (or most other inanimate 
objects).54 Instead, they posit that rocks (and other such objects) contain mentality in an 
aggregated form, which we should not expect to see signs of at the level of the rock. In this 
way, contemporary panpsychism successfully sidesteps the No Sign Objection.  
Panpsychists are untroubled by the No Sign Objection, not only because the level of 
consciousness at the fundamental level is minimal and barely recognisable if placed alongside 
human experience, but also because raw experience gives no behavioural evidence for itself. 
It is because there is no work for consciousness to do that Chalmers’ zombie argument 
against materialism is successful; phenomenal consciousness is something other than ‘work’ 
(material causation), it is experience.55 When a panpsychist is asked by the sceptic, ‘but what 
does it really mean for a fundamental wave/particle to be conscious?’, one way to interpret 
the question is as an appeal for a description of fundamental consciousness that contains a 
sign or function analogous to consciousness at the human level. To any such appeal, the 
panpsychist cannot give satisfaction without overstepping her own claims, and so should 
resist the temptation to say too much.  
Another way that these objections are expressed is through the Uneconomic Objection; the 
complaint that panpsychism is ontologically excessive and uneconomic because it posits 
unnecessary and superfluous phenomena. Philip Goff previously wrote that, when facing the 
hard-problem of consciousness, there is always “a parallel, non-panpsychist strategy which is 
more economical and more plausible.”56 Similarly, J.P. Moreland describes panpsychism as 
                                                 
53 Rosenberg, A Place for Consciousness, 95.  
54 Historically, a (very) few panpsychists have argued that rocks are conscious; see, Griffin, Unsnarling the 
World Knot, 95-96. 
55 A more dubious, but possible, response to this objection might be that there are ‘signs’ of fundamental 
consciousness in various interpretations of quantum physics. See Michael Lockwood, Mind, Brain and the 
Quantum (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989); and Lockwood, “The ‘Many Minds’ Interpretation of Quantum 
Mechanics,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47, no.3 (1996):159-88. 
56 Philip Goff, “Why Panpsychism Doesn’t Help Us Explain Consciousness,” Dialectica 63, no. 3 (2009): 310.  
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“a bizarre, incredible, and ontologically bloated [to] claim”.57 McGinn employed this 
objection when he described panpsychism as “extravagant”.58 The implication is that 
panpsychism unnecessarily overloads our ontology of the universe with mentality. And yet, 
on the same page that McGinn calls panpsychism extravagant, he also admits that “something 
pretty remarkable is needed if the mind-body relation is to be made sense of.”59 Indeed, he 
writes that if we credit neurons with proto-consciousness then, “it seems easy enough to see 
how neurons could generate consciousness.”60 Positing mentality as fundamental certainly 
appears lavish to our miserly mechanistic intuitions. However, until there is another 
satisfactory explanation for the awkward anomaly of consciousness, the claim that 
panpsychism is excessive or unnecessary does not reach beyond rhetorical polemics. Perhaps 
we live in a more extravagantly endowed universe than the austere ontology of the natural 
sciences is able to describe.  
 
The Unscientific Objection and the Question of Naturalism 
 
It was stated above that the natural sciences are particularly effective in convincing 
contemporary Western people to believe highly counter-intuitive ideas. The reign of the 
natural sciences also means that it is unsurprising that the second type of objection against 
panpsychism, that it is incompatible with the natural sciences, is perceived by many as a 
sufficient reason to dismiss panpsychism without recourse to any court of appeal. Achim 
Stephan jokes that panpsychism “is what happens when philosophy throws a party and 
forgets to invite science.”61 Philip Clayton rebukes panpsychism as a “robustly metaphysical 
move” that “cuts [itself] off from the evidential considerations that science could otherwise 
provide.”62 Willem Drees accuses panpsychism for being “substantially at odds with current 
science”.63  
                                                 
57 J.P. Moreland, Consciousness and the Existence of God (New York: Routledge, 2008),128. 
58 McGinn, The Problem of Consciousness, 2.  
59 McGinn, 2.  
60 McGinn, 28n.  
61 Achim Stephan, “Emergence and Panpsychism,” Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives, 347.  
62 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 130. 
63 This is based on a misunderstanding that panpsychism denies the evolution of, and thus layered nature of, 
consciousness. Willem B. Drees, Religion and Science in Context: A Guide to the Debates (New York: 
Routledge, 2010), 92.  
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And yet it was shown above that panpsychism claims traction with the underpinning 
principles in evolutionary biology, and one can point to (minority) interpretations of quantum 
mechanics.64 Moreover, Chalmers’ defence of panpsychism is due to his commitment to 
finding a scientific explanation for consciousness. Whence the objection that panpsychism is 
unscientific? Answering this question reveals that panpsychism complicates philosophical 
assumptions about the natural sciences in truly intriguing ways. This question also takes us to 
the core of current debates regarding the relationship between religion and the natural 
sciences, and so forms a side-entrance into this thesis’ main task; evaluating the possibility of 
a forthcoming relationship between panpsychism and theology.   
It is clear that panpsychism is not unscientific in the sense of being totally contrary to, or 
disproved by, the best scientific theories of our day; there are no quick dismissals here. What 
is less clear is the relationship that panpsychism has to the philosophical position of 
naturalism. This is a term that has already been encountered in this thesis in the critical 
expositions of emergence theology, but now needs to be given more detailed analysis. In the 
following description, I distinguish between naturalism’s positive truth claims, regarding 
what does exist, and naturalism’s negative truth claims, regarding what does not exist. I argue 
that contemporary panpsychism entails a rejection of naturalism’s positive truth claims. It is 
this rejection that lies at the heart of what can be described as a question-begging objection 
that panpsychism is unscientific. I also note that panpsychists typically choose to align 
themselves with naturalism’s negative truth claims, and this creates problems for the 
possibility of a theistic panpsychism. Panpsychism’s relationship to naturalism seems one of 
unrequited love; many naturalists want little to do with panpsychism, but panpsychists still 
want to associate themselves with naturalists, vainly hoping that their beloved naturalism will 
                                                 
64 Examples of contemporary interpretations of quantum mechanics that place mentality at the fundamental level 
include: Henry Stapp’s ‘orthodox collapse’ in Mindful Universe. Quantum Mechanics and the Participating 
Observer (Berlin: Springer, 2007). Stuart Hameroff’s and Roger Penrose’s ‘objective reduction’ and the 
experiential collapse of the wave function in “Conscious Events as Orchestrated Space-Time Selections,” 
Journal of Consciousness Studies 3, no.1 (1996): 36-53, and “Consciousness in the Universe: A Review of the 
‘Orch OR’ Theory’,” Physics of Life Review 11, no.1 (2014): 39-78. Michael Epperson’s ‘decoherence’ theory 
in Quantum Mechanics and the Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (New York: Fordham University Press, 
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goal-directed: Sam P. Brown and Rufus A. Johnstone, “Cooperation in the Dark: Signalling and Collective 
Action in Quorum-Sensing Bacteria,” Proceedings of the Royal Society of Biological Sciences 268, no. 1470 
(2001): 961-965. Cornforth et al, “Combinatorial Quroum Sensing Allows Bacteri to Resolve their Social and 
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no. 11 (2014): 4280-4284; Jonathan T. Delafield-Butt et al. “Prospective Guidance in a Free-Swimming Cell,” 
Biological Cybernetics 106 (2012): 283-93. For more on panpsychism in the history of quantum theory and its 
relevance for science and religion see, Joanna Leidenhag, “The Revival of Panpsychism and its Relevance for 
the Science-Religion Dialogue” Theology & Science (published online October 6th, 2018). 
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turn from the error of her positive truth claims. Fortunately, this chapter has no interest in 
arbitrating between panpsychism and naturalism, and instead advises panpsychists to realign 
themselves with theism.  
Naturalism is a controversial concept and notoriously difficult to define.65 It seems wisest to 
gather definitions given by leading naturalists themselves in order to see why deviation from 
naturalism is heralded as unscientific. Michael Devitt describes naturalism as the view that 
“there is only one way of knowing: the empirical way that is the basis of science (whatever 
that way may be)”.66 Brendan Larvor articulates naturalism as the belief that “the sciences of 
nature are the best (and in some versions, the only) guides to what there is, what it is like, and 
why.”67 Therefore, all “[m]ethodological naturalism is the view that philosophy – and indeed 
any other intellectual discipline – must pursue knowledge via empirical methods exemplified 
by the sciences, and not by a priori non-empirical methods.”68 Most bluntly, naturalism states 
that “[s]cience is the measure of all things, of what is that it is and of what is not that it is 
not.”69 Wilfred Sellars, in this quote, points the way to showing how the epistemological and 
methodological definitions of naturalism quickly become ontological and metaphysical. Since 
the empirical method of the sciences can only provide knowledge of physical, law-like, 
deterministic events it might seem that reality really is a closed system of material and 
efficient causation in a giant mechanical universe. Perhaps unsurprisingly, when the physical 
sciences are taken as all-sufficient, this leads to physicalism. Thus, David Armstrong 
characterises naturalism as an ontological commitment to the view that reality is nothing but 
a closed spatio-temporal system.70 It is this web of interconnected commitments that inspires 
Jaegwon Kim to characterise naturalism as “imperialistic; it demands ‘full coverage’ . . . and 
exacts a terribly high ontological price.”71 
                                                 
65 This is exemplified by the fact that some naturalists, such as David Papineau, find it simpler to refuse to offer 
a definition for their position. David Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993). 
Perhaps the most succinct presentation of how many incompatible definitions of naturalism currently exist is 
found in Owen Flanagan, “Varieties of Naturalism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, eds. 
Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 430-451.  
66 Michael Devitt, “Naturalism and the A Priori,” Philosophical Studies 92 (1998): 45.  
67 Brendan Larvor, “Naturalism,” in The Wiley Blackwell Handbook of Humanism, ed. Andrew Copson and A. 
C. Grayling (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015), 37. 
68 Jean Hampton, The Authority of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 20.  
69 Wilfrid Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” in Science, Perception and Reality (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), 173.  
70 David Armstrong, “Naturalism, Materialism, and First Philosophy,” in Contemporary Materialism, eds. Paul 
Moser and J.D. Trout (New York: Routledge, 1995), 35.  
71 Jaegwon Kim, “Mental Causation and Two Concepts of Mental Properties,” presented at the American 
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This is an ontological price panpsychism is unwilling to pay. Panpsychism cannot be 
naturalistic in any of the senses outlined above. In fact, panpsychism stands in direct and 
deliberate opposition to these anti-rationalist presuppositions and reductive or physicalist 
conclusions.72 Although psyche at the fundamental level might (for some) be a reasonable 
conjecture taken from the strange results produced by quantum mechanics and the principles 
of evolutionary biology, there can be no direct empirical test for phenomenal consciousness. 
Instead, the panpsychists’ commitment to the realism of consciousness is taken as a priori 
and self-evident (for, at least, the very good reason that any empirical tests presuppose the 
experience of the scientists conducting them). Therefore, the a priori nature of the 
panpsychist argument is not because the physical sciences have not yet designed a test for 
consciousness, but because phenomenal or experiential consciousness is defined as that 
which is left over even if we had a complete and perfect scientific understanding of the world. 
If consciousness could be established on the basis of empirical tests, then it could be 
functionally reduced and measured in terms of behaviour. The panpsychists’ commitment to 
the reality of experiential consciousness is precisely the rejection of any such psycho-physical 
reduction.  
The panpsychist looks for the best way to explain and locate consciousness in the world that 
the natural sciences describe, but the existence of consciousness is accepted a priori. If 
panpsychists’ opposition to restrictive naturalism is what is implied by the charge that 
panpsychism is ‘unscientific’, then panpsychism stands guilty as charged. However, most 
panpsychists would shrug their shoulders and go about their business. It is simply part of the 
argumentative appeal of panpsychism, an appeal that includes the claim that natural science 
cannot proceed without conscious agents, that it rejects naturalism in this sense. 
Increasingly, naturalists are seeking to soften their position in various ways such that a 
rejection of physicalism and empiricism does not warrant the objection that any given theory 
is unscientific.73 A softer or more liberal naturalism affirms that the natural sciences are an 
                                                 
72 Roy Wood Sellars describes panpsychism as historically the main alternative to materialism through 
philosophical history in “Panpsychism or Evolutionary Materialism,” Philosophy of Science 27, no. 4 (Oct. 
1960): 329-350.   
73 There are numerous titles for naturalisms that expand the ontological toolbox beyond that of mindless, 
valueless, matter. Fiona Ellis uses “expansive naturalism”, in God, Value and Nature (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014). Jeffry King refers to “linguistic naturalism” in “Can Propositions be Naturalistically 
Acceptable?,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994): 53-75. Mikael Leidenhag has critically evaluated a 
group of philosophers who all defend “religious naturalism”, as well as other such liberal approaches to 
naturalism. See Mikael Leidenhag, Naturalizing God? A Critical Evaluation of Religious Naturalism (New 
York: SUNY Press, forthcoming). Sean Carroll argues for “poetic naturalism”, The Big Picture: On the Origins 
of Life, Meaning, and the Universe Itself (New York: Dutton, 2016). Perhaps most problematically, some 
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important route to knowledge, but that other phenomena (such as values and minds) exist and 
other paths to truth can also be taken. That is, a liberal naturalist might claim that all 
knowledge must be “continuous with” scientific knowledge or that we must go “beyond the 
natural sciences as little as possible”.74 This idea is typically affirmed by panpsychists 
(indeed, who denies it?). Strawson describes “[g]ood philosophy” as that which “stays close 
to the science of its day and is continuous with it in certain respects.”75 Chalmers writes that 
his ideas are “compatible with contemporary science” but that he has “not restricted [his] 
ideas to what contemporary scientists find fashionable.”76 In endorsing panpsychism 
Chalmers argues that “our picture of the natural world is broadened, not overturned.”77 
Clearly panpsychists do not abandon all commitment to the natural sciences, but I find it 
implausible that they (or any so-called liberal naturalism) can be regarded as naturalists in so 
far as the term connotes any positive propositions that distinguish it from other positions. 
How, or to what degree, philosophy should be continuous with the natural sciences is rarely 
specified. The question immediately arises, how far is too far and on what grounds could 
such a judgement be made?78 As a positive truth claim (that the empirical methods of the 
natural sciences are one source of knowledge amongst others and that we should seek mutual 
compatibility between various truth-seeking practices) these softer forms of naturalism are 
fairly uninteresting; that is, they cannot be distinguished from almost any other 
epistemological or methodological position.  
The claim that panpsychism adheres to naturalism is not entirely fraudulent if taken to refer 
to the negative, rather than the positive, part of the naturalist’s credo; anti-supernaturalism. 
Barry Stroud writes, “Naturalism on any reading is opposed to supernaturalism” and 
supernaturalism means “the invocation of an agent or force which somehow stands outside 
                                                 
theologians claim the position, “theistic naturalism” which is often parsed out in terms of divine action but 
ultimately entails fitting God into the metaphysical framework of the natural world. See, Arthur Peacocke, Paths 
from Science Towards God: The End of All Our Exploring (Oxford: OneWorld, 2001), 138ff; Christopher 
Knight, “Theistic Naturalism and ‘Special’ Divine Providence,” Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 44, 
no.3 (2009): 533-42. 
74 Jack Ritchie, Understanding Naturalism: Supervenience (New York: Routledge, 2014) 1, 195ff; Brian Leiter, 
“Naturalism and Naturalized Jurisprudence,” in Analyzing Natural Law: New Essays in Legal Theory, ed. Brian 
Bix (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 81. Arthur Danto, “Naturalism,” in The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Paul Edwards, vol. 5 (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1967), 44. Peter Forrest, God without the 
Supernatural: A Defence of Scientific Theism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 89.   
75 Strawson, Real Materialism, 1. 
76 Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, xiii.  
77 Chalmers, xiv.  
78 Thomas Nagel, for example, claims to be a naturalist, but also admits that his argument for moral realism is 
“relying on a philosophical claim to refute a scientific theory supported by empirical evidence.” Nagel, Mind 
and Cosmos, 106, see also 4, 18, and 69.  
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the natural world and so whose doings cannot be understood as part of it.”79 Soft or liberal 
naturalists (such as panpsychists) often give definitions for their position along the lines that 
“the natural world is the whole world” or “everything is natural”. 80 If understood as a 
positive statement about the character of the cosmos this is an almost vacuous definition. 
Instead, it should be taken as a negative truth claim asserting that there is no transcendent 
reality, or nothing exists ‘outside of’ this universe. More importantly this means that no 
entities, property or event within this universe can be explained by reference to any 
transcendent or divine, reality. In its negative form, naturalism is a commitment to atheism 
(with negotiating room left for pantheism). When panpsychists claim that their model of 
consciousness is the last hope for naturalism, they allude to the ever-looming possibility that 
the only explanation for the existence of consciousness is that souls are created ex nihilo by 
God (or some other immaterial agent) and attached to embryos. As J.P. Moreland argues, if 
this is the best or only explanation for consciousness, it adds substantial evidence to 
arguments for the existence of God.81  
Moreland has given panpsychism one of the few evaluative examinations from the 
perspective of Christian theism. He argues that panpsychism is “a rival to and not an 
appropriate specification of naturalism.”82 Given this antagonism between naturalism (as 
anti-supernaturalism) and panpsychism, it is surprising that Moreland states that 
“panpsychism follows only if classical theism is ruled out”, thereby placing panpsychism in 
competition to, rather than in support of, his argument for the existence of God from 
consciousness.83 Contrary to Moreland, this chapter will conclude by suggesting that 
panpsychism and theism function best in partnership, not in competition. 
This section has unpicked the origin of why panpsychism is sometimes critiqued as 
unscientific by examining its strenuous relationship to philosophical naturalism. The 
                                                 
79 Barry Stroud, “The Charm of Naturalism,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical 
Association 70, no. 2 (1996): 44. 
80 Jaegwon Kim, “From Naturalism to Physicalism: Supervenience Redux,” Proceedings and Addresses of the 
American Philosophical Association 85, no. 2 (2011): 109. 
81 Moreland’s Consciousness and the Existence of God is a monograph length example. Alvin Plantinga claims 
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accusation that panpsychism is unscientific has little to do with the current conclusions and 
theories of the natural sciences. Instead, it arises from naturalistic philosophers who “wrap 
themselves in the mantle of science like a politician in the flag” such that to question strong 
naturalism is to appear ‘unscientific’.84 I am under no illusion that the description above 
would satisfy all who take upon themselves the auspicious mantle of naturalism. After all, 
there are almost as many types of naturalism as there are philosophers advocating the 
position. I argued that all of the positive claims made by naturalism, which can be taken as a 
genuinely distinctive position, must be rejected by panpsychists. In their negative 
commitments, naturalists present a more united front against supernaturalism, which a 
panpsychist can choose to adopt or reject at will. I will argue in my final section that it makes 
more sense for panpsychists to also reject the negative, anti-supernaturalist, claims of 
naturalism and instead align themselves with theism.    
 
The Objection from Explanatory Failure and Questions of Combination 
 
The final type of objection is not concerned whether panpsychism is a scientific explanation, 
but whether it is an explanation at all. Most positions within philosophy of mind claim 
superiority over competing frameworks on the basis of increased explanatory power.85 The 
further the position lies from present-day intuitions the more explanatory power is needed. 
Since panpsychism is widely accepted to be more counter-intuitive than most of its rivals, 
any deficit in explanatory power hits the panpsychists particularly hard.  I consider two forms 
of the Explanatory Failure Objection: The Brute Objection and The Combination Problem.  
There is a brute feature within every theory within philosophy of mind. For something to be 
‘brute’ is to say, ‘it just is that way, and there is no explanation for why it is so.’ The brute 
element is the terminus of explanation. All theories have such a terminus, it is just a question 
of where. Every small child knows that the question ‘Why?’ can be asked ad infinitum, and 
the inevitable answer ‘Just because!’ is more satisfactory at some points than at others. If all 
theories contain an element of bruteness, then The Brute Objection is only such when the 
location of bruteness lies at the heart of the explanation itself, thereby landing a fatal blow to 
the theory’s explanatory power.  
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Since that which is fundamental can neither be derived from, nor explained in terms of, 
anything else, the location of fundamental features of the world are often identical to the 
locations of bruteness within a theory. Thus, D.S. Clarke writes that “[m]entality, like matter, 
simply is a fundamental feature of what is, and all questions about its origins must therefore 
be dismissed as meaningless.”86 Geoffrey Madell voices this fundamental bruteness as an 
objection when he complains that,  
the sense that the mental and the physical are just inexplicably and 
gratuitously slapped together is hardly allayed by adopting . . .  a pan-
psychists…view of the mind, for [it does not] have an explanation to 
offer as to why or how mental properties cohere with [the] physical.87  
Coleman calls this “brute accompaniment” and asks, “if brute accompaniment is acceptable 
at the lowest level, it is hard to see why it should be objectionable at the macro-level.”88 
Since substance dualists also posit minds as fundamental, but only in conjunction with the 
human (or animal) organism, brute accompaniment is often seen as one of the main 
explanatory weaknesses of substance dualism. Substance dualism states that human minds 
and bodies just happen to go together and causally interact. Since human minds are 
fundamental in a way that is radically discontinuous with the rest of the (non-panpsychist) 
natural order, substance dualists can offer little explanation from within the natural order as 
to why this might be the case. As a result, contemporary defenders of substance dualism tend 
to be theists and draw on the additional explanatory power of theism from outside of the 
natural order to support their substance dualism.  The question is, does the brute 
accompaniment of mind and matter at the fundamental level of reality (as in the panpsychist’s 
thesis) lead to the same explanatory weakness in panpsychism as it does in substance 
dualism? If so, then it would seem sensible – especially for a theologian – to defer to the 
more intuitive and economic position, substance dualism. 
The main reason that the panpsychist can claim explanatory power over the substance dualist, 
despite its own instance of brute accompaniment, is that the panpsychist gives an account of 
the human person that is not radically different from the rest of the universe. That is, the 
panpsychists’ brute accompaniment is ubiquitous and integrated, whereas (arguably) the 
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87 Geoffrey Madell, Mind and Materialism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1988), 3.  
88 Sam Coleman, “Being Realistic: Why Physicalism May Entail Panexperientialism,” in Galen Strawson et al. 
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substance dualists’ brute accompaniment has the additional disadvantage of being patchy. 
Not only does the substance dualist leave unanswered the question of why mind and matter 
are slapped together, but also the question ‘why here (in the case of human beings) and not 
elsewhere’ cries out for some kind of explanation.   
Contrarily, the panpsychist offers an answer to the question ‘why here?’ by giving an account 
of the ontology of the universe more widely and taking into consideration the evolutionary 
history of humans as organisms (whether one thinks the panpsychists’ explanation is 
adequate is a separate matter at this point). The panpsychist cannot account for why the 
universe contains material and mental properties in the first place, but she does offer a more 
substantial answer to the question of why, within this dualistic universe, human beings have 
mental and material properties. It seems, then, that The Brute Objection, (on the grounds of 
brute accompaniment) does not force the panpsychist to defer to substance dualism.   
By far the most serious challenge facing contemporary panpsychism is The Combination 
Problem: How do the experiences at the fundamental physical level combine to yield the 
experiences humans typically enjoy? It is important to note that the combination problem is 
not, in and of itself, an objection; it is a challenge. The combination problem is important 
because it is a weakness that the various objections examined above can exploit to 
significantly bolster their claims. In the words of Sam Coleman, the combination problem 
“plausibly represents the major theoretical ‘I owe you’ of the panexperientialist/panpsychist. 
But that there is work to be done does not imply the falsity of a view, and there are avenues 
to be explored.”89 In the metaphorical narrative of this chapter, it is the lack of an 
understanding of ‘mental chemistry’ – that is the lack of a solution to the combination 
problem - that stalls the panpsychists’ campaign for philosophical dominance, and as such 
leaves contemporary philosophy of mind more widely in a stalemate.  
The combination problem is so-called because it was originally presented as the problem of 
articulating how minds at the fundamental level combine, rather than merely aggregate, to 
bring about the experience of a complex human mind with a unified first-person perspective. 
However, the combination problem now refers to a large network of problems regarding how 
to relate the explanans (fundamental mentality) to the explanandum (the human mind).90 
Panpsychism’s explanatory promise rests upon the idea that human minds can be explained 
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by fundamental mental entities. If panpsychism fails in providing a satisfactory account of the 
relationship between fundamental mentality and human minds, then fundamental mentality 
adds nothing to the explanatory power of panpsychism. As such, critics who decry 
panpsychism for being uneconomic (see the objection above) can justifiably call upon 
Ockham to use his infamous razor and cut away all “bloated” notions of fundamental 
mentality from our ontology.91 Fundamental properties have to earn their “explanatory keep” 
so to speak.92 
The ‘combination problem’ was a phrase coined by contemporary philosopher William 
Seager, but the problem itself was famously articulated a century earlier by William James. It 
is worth quoting at length:  
Take a hundred [feelings], shuffle them and pack them as close together 
as you can (whatever that may mean) till each remains the same feeling it 
always was, shut in its own skin, windowless, ignorant of what the other 
feelings are and mean. There would be a hundred-and-first feeling there, 
if, when a group or series of such feelings were set up, a consciousness 
belonging to the group as such should emerge. And this 101st feeling 
would be a totally new fact; the 100 feelings might, by a curious physical 
law, be a signal for its creation, when they came together; but they would 
have no substantial identity with it, nor it with them, and one could never 
deduce the one from the others, or (in any intelligible sense) say that they 
evolved it.93  
The upshot of this monadic view of fundamental consciousness is that “private minds do not 
agglomerate into a higher compound mind.”94 The idea that minds are just not the sort of 
things that can combine boils down to an intuition, but it is one that many philosophers find 
highly compelling.  
Much ink has been spilt on the combination problem in the contemporary literature 
surrounding panpsychism. This is not only because it represents the greatest gap in the 
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panpsychists’ account of human consciousness, but it is also the anvil upon which different 
versions of panpsychism are formed. The panpsychist needs to tell a story of combination to 
alleviate this intuitive objection against mental combination. There are three main types of 
such a story. First, a panpsychist might reformulate their position, and adopt either holistic 
panpsychism or panprotopsychism. Both these reformulations of panpsychism claim to not 
need a theory of combination at all.  Second, constitutive panpsychism, claims that macro-
experience is grounded in, realised by, or constituted by micro-experience in the same way 
macro-physical facts are constituted by micro-physical facts. Constitutive panpsychism seeks 
to tell a story that leaves the overall framework of physicalism intact; it retains causal closure 
and reductive explanations and merely adds unobservable intrinsic natures to the scientific 
image. Third, non-constitutive panpsychism reintroduces emergence theory in order to 
account for mental combination; macro-experience is a non-additive emergent from micro-
experience. Non-constitutive panpsychism opts for downward causation and free will over 
causal closure.  
In order to provide an adequate introduction to contemporary panpsychism, the various 
positions given below need to be surveyed. However, it would be an over-indulgent use of 
space to explore each position in detail. This section concludes that, although no one solution 
has achieved a general consensus amongst panpsychist philosophers, there are a number of 
ways to approach this challenge. From this it can be concluded that The Combination 
Problem, although a serious challenge, is not yet a defeater against panpsychism; it does not 
make panpsychism an unrespectable position for theologians to seriously consider. 
First, instead of taking on the task of solving the combination problem some scholars seek to 
find ways to avoid or deflate the need for such an account. The most common forms of this 
tactic are Holistic Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism. Panpsychism, as it has been 
explicated thus far might be specified as atomistic panpsychism, which assumes smallism as 
the structure of explanation. Smallism is the view that all facts are determined by the facts 
about the smallest things, or those entities existing at the lowest level of ontology (which may 
not, in fact, be small at all – such as super strings or black holes). It is the lowest level of 
reality that is seen as the fundamental level. Smallism is the explanatory structure of most of 
the natural sciences; complex entities are explained by referring to their various parts. 




Different versions of holistic panpsychism have been referred to as ‘panexperiential holism’, 
‘priority cosmopsychism’ and ‘cosmological panpsychism’, but they all share the common 
thesis that the whole is more fundamental than the parts.95 As panpsychist positions, they all 
must state that mentality is found at the fundamental level of reality, but they take the 
‘highest’ or ‘largest’ level of reality as the fundamental level. The universe as a single whole 
is, then, fundamental as opposed to the ‘building blocks’ of reality.96 For holistic 
panpsychists it is the universe as a single whole which instantiates consciousness. If the 
atomistic panpsychist felt threatened by the incredulous stare of modern Western intuitions, 
holistic cosmopsychism is far worse off since, by abandoning reductive explanations, 
cosmopsychism seems a step further away from contemporary natural science.97 What then is 
the appeal of holistic panpsychism? The only reason why a panpsychist may opt for holistic, 
rather than atomistic, panpsychism is because, prima facie, holistic panpsychism faces no 
combination problem.98 If holistic panpsychism has no combination problem and provides a 
more satisfactory account of human consciousness, then the problems of intuitive incredulity 
and empirical implausibility pale in comparison with the promise of explanatory success. 
However, holistic panpsychism can currently claim no such victory.  
Although holistic panpsychism faces no problems of combination, it runs into the arms of the 
equally difficult problem of the boundedness of consciousness, merely from the other 
direction; the individuation of experience to be ‘my’ experience alone. Holistic panpsychism 
must provide an account of the individuation of consciousness and although this problem is 
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97 See, Nagasawa and Wager, “Panpsychism and Priority Cosmopsychism,” 126-127. 
98 Nagasawa and Wager also argue that cosmopsychism avoids the potential problem of infinite decomposition 
where physics reveals that there is no final fundamental level at the lowest level to which panpsychism can 
attribute mentality. See, Nagasawa and Wager, “Panpsychism and Priority Cosmopsychism,” 118-120.  
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sometimes gestured towards, I know of no systematic treatments of it.99 There are, to my 
mind, at least four individuation problems: 
a. How does one consciousness give rise to many distinct subjects, whose 
experience and perspective is neither identical to each other, nor to the former 
single consciousness? (The Subject Individuation Problem) 
b. How does one experiential or quality-laden field individuate into distinct 
qualities and experiences, which may be distinguished by individual subjects 
within their own total experience, and which may be had by one subject but not 
another? (The Quality Individuation Problem and The Experience Individuation 
Problem) 
c. How does the sparsely structured, unbounded cosmic consciousness or field of 
experience structure itself in such a way as to hold within it distinct (compactly 
structured) subjects and qualities? (The Structural Individuation Problem) 
d. What prevents the continuous individuation of consciousness so that every 
configuration of matter at every level of reality is a discrete agent? (The Over-
Individuation Problem) 
These problems appear at least as difficult as the various combination problems. This, then, 
removes any advantage that holistic panpsychism might claim to have over the (relatively) 
more intuitive position of atomistic panpsychism, and so in the remaining discussion we shall 
return to assuming atomistic panpsychism.100  
The second way that contemporary panpsychists sometimes seek to escape the combination 
problem is by adopting panprotopsychism. Pan-proto-psychism is the view that fundamental 
physical entities have proto-phenomenal properties. Protophenomenal properties are not 
phenomenal properties; there is nothing it is like to be a protophenomenal property, and there 
is nothing it is like to have a protophenomenal property. Panprotopsychism seems to be a 
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form of neutral monism; the fundamental level consists neither of wholly physical nor wholly 
experiential properties, but something else that constitutes both the physical and the 
experiential. There are two popular options for what kind of properties protophenomenal 
properties might be: raw experiences or unexperienced qualities. These positions are called 
panexperientialism and panqualityism respectively. 
Panexperientialism, as adopted by Process philosophers, states that experience and 
spontaneity are fundamental and ubiquitous. David Ray Griffin gives two reasons why he 
prefers to call his position panexperientialism, rather than panpsychism.101 First, he is 
concerned that ‘psyche’ suggests subjects which, independent of the stream of experience, 
endure through time. As a Process theologian within a strictly event-based ontology, he 
rejects any temporal endurance of substances. Second, he is concerned that ‘psyche’ implies 
higher levels of cognition beyond experience and spontaneity. Panexperientialists emphasise 
the rejection of complex subjects with cognition, volition (although they accept basic 
spontaneity), self-consciousness and other such psychological properties. 
It is unclear, however, that panexperientialism is as distinct from subject panpsychism as the 
former often claim. Most self-proclaimed panpsychists do not posit that complex 
psychologically functioning subjects are fundamental; only basic phenomenal subjects. 
Moreover, due to the flux and instability of the fundamental level of (physical) reality, many 
panpsychists do posit fundamental subjects that endure for long periods of time. This is why 
Strawson argues that “‘panpsychism’ doesn’t have any implications that the word 
‘panexperientialism’ doesn’t also have . . . the word ‘panpsychism’ doesn’t in itself imply 
that there are subjects of experience in addition to experiential reality”.102 If this is correct, 
then the panexperientialist will face the same puzzles regarding combination that the 
panpsychist faces.  
An alternative version of panprotopsychism is panqualityism. Panqualityism is commonly 
associated with Herbert Feigl and is currently advocated by panpsychist philosopher, Sam 
Coleman.103 As the name suggests, panqualityism posits qualities as fundamental and 
ubiquitous, not experiences. Qualities are not phenomenal but become phenomenal when 
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perceived or experienced by a subject. For example, we might say that redness is a quality. 
This means there is nothing it is like to be redness, but there is something it is like to perceive 
redness. So far, panqualityism seems quite sensible.  
In addition to abandoning the counter-intuitive idea of subjects and experience at the 
fundamental level, the main theoretical motivation behind panqualityism is that it needs no 
theory of subject combination. Instead qualities combine to yield a subject that perceives 
reality in an experiential way. On panqualityism, subjects remain self-contained, bounded and 
unified entities of a metaphysically primitive nature; they can neither combine nor 
individuate, instead they are simply created as they are and cease to exist as they are. 
Subjectivity is not a diffused sort of ‘stuff’ or generalised property but exists only in the form 
of particular subjects.104 The main disadvantage of panqualityism is the need to account for 
how micro-qualities yield a macro-subject and there is no reason to think this will be an 
easier problem than the panpsychists subject-summing problem. To the contrary, the 
panpsychist’s denial of radical, brute emergence means that a panpsychist will most likely be 
predisposed to see this as the greater mystery. The panqualityist needs to show why their 
position is not a return to brute emergence. It seems that neither holistic panpsychism, nor 
various forms of panprotopsychism truly avoid the need for a compelling account of 
combination.  
The second type of response tackles The Combination Problem head-on by constructing 
possible models of how micro-subjects necessitate the appearance of a single unified macro-
subject. These solutions are Identity Panpsychism and Phenomenal Bonding respectively.  
Identity Panpsychism is the theory that macro-experience is (or can be) identical to micro-
experience. Historically, this was the theory put forward by Leibniz, who argues that a single 
dominant monad “makes up the centre of a composite substance (an animal, for example) and 
is the principle of its unity, is surrounded by a mass composed of an infinity of other monads, 
which constitute the body belonging to this central monad”.105 Leibniz left woefully 
unanswered questions of why some collections of monads obtain a dominant monad and 
subsequent unity, whereas other collections do not, and even which types of objects or 
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systems are aggregates or unities.106 The human subject is, for Leibniz, identical to one single 
monad.  
This is not a model of combination strictly speaking, since Leibniz’s “windowless” monads 
are never seen to combine in any internal sense, but each remains entirely private and 
independent.107 This response to The Combination Problem has never been popular; the 
instability of fundamental entities over time, the extremely limited causal role they play, the 
fact that all fundamental entities appear physically replaceable with one another (and so, 
presumably are almost phenomenally identical), and the absurdity that a single electron has 
the same internal life as a human subject immediately makes this an unattractive model for 
combination.108 One might even go so far as to say that if this were the only possible way to 
relate fundamental mentality and human subjects, it would be a reason to abandon 
panpsychism all together. Happily, this is not the case.  
The second attempt to solve The Combination Problem is Philip Goff’s notion of phenomenal 
bonding.109 Goff argues that combination is primarily a problem when one imagines that the 
relations by which mental combination occurs are spatio-temporal or causal relations. This 
assumption arises from the fact that most physical combinations are related in this way; 
bricks form a tower only when certain spatio-temporal relations between the distinct bricks 
hold. Goff argues that it is unrealistic to suppose that mental entities, if they are irreducible to 
physical entities, will be combined through the same relations as physical unities; fitting 
phenomenal properties into physical relations is like fitting a round peg into a square hole.  
Instead, Goff argues we need phenomenal bonding relations, “which bond subjects of 
experience together to constitute other subjects of experience.”110 He points out that it is 
hardly surprising that we are unable to perceive any such bonds, since we are unable to 
perceive only one subject through introspection and cannot directly perceive any other 
subjects at all. In order to perceive a relation between multiple subjects, it would first have to 
                                                 
106 Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West, 97-98. 
107 Yet Leibniz remained dissatisfied with this aspect of his theory because of the need for a real unity in the 
person of Jesus Christ. See Maria Rosa Antognazza, “Leibniz’s Theory of Substance and His Metaphysics of the 
Incarnation,” in Locke and Leibniz on Substance, ed. Paul Lodge and Tom Stoneham (London: Routledge, 
2015), 231-253.  
108 Chalmers, “The Combination Problem,” 195.  
109 Philip Goff, “The Phenomenal Bonding Solution to the Combination Problem,” in Panpsychism: 
Contemporary Perspectives, eds. Godehard Brüntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017), 284-302.  
110 Philip Goff, “Can the panpsychist get around the combination problem?,” Mind That Abides, ed. David 
Skrbina (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2009), 132. 
80 
 
be possible to perceive multiple subjects. In this way, it seems perfectly possible that there 
are phenomenal bonding relations which we should not expect to have direct knowledge of.  
The weakness with this solution is that it introduces a significant mystery into panpsychism. 
The less mystery introduced into any theory of mind, the more attractive the theory is to most 
philosophers.111 Therefore, from a competitive perspective (in relation to emergence theory 
and substance dualism, for example) the introduction of unknowable phenomenal relations 
comes at a cost to the panpsychist. One proposal is that just as Russellian panpsychism posits 
that physical properties have intrinsic natures that are phenomenal, spatio-temporal relations 
might have phenomenal intrinsic natures that allow for co-consciousness or something 
similar. Rosenberg has argued that this proposal gives a robust account of causation.112 
However, since spatio-temporal relations are ubiquitous, this proposal needs additional work 
to avoid entailing that the universe as a spatio-temporal whole (and everything in it) is 
mentally related. The phenomenal bonding solution cannot be taken as a comfortable resting 
place for a theory of panpsychism, but it shows that mental combination is not a conceptual 
impossibility and it might point the direction for further investigation.  
The third, and most promising, approach to The Combination Problem is exhibited by 
Emergent Panpsychism and Panpsychist Infusion, which offer non-constitutive accounts of 
combination by reintroducing a qualified form of emergence into their position.113 Given the 
panpsychists denunciation of traditional emergence as a form of ‘magic’ parading as an 
explanation, any employment of emergence within panpsychism has to be careful not to be 
self-refuting. That said, emergent panpsychism currently seems the most promising form of 
panpsychism for theologians wishing to maintain a robust notion of freewill via downward 
causation.  
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Emergence is a non-combinatorial relation between parts and wholes and so Emergent 
Panpsychism is a non-combinatorial and non-constitutive response to The Combination 
Problem. That is to say emergent panpsychism posits contingent laws of nature, which allows 
(but not necessitate in a strong sense) macro-experience to emerge from micro-experience 
and then downwardly act upon the micro-experiences from which it emerged. The downward 
causation thesis means that these wholes are only weakly supervenient and irreducible to 
their micro-experience parts, and so this is a strong emergence thesis (a weak emergent thesis 
between micro-experience and macro-experience would most likely, in effect, be a 
combinatorial solution similar to Goff’s Phenomenal Bonding). Emergent panpsychism, like 
panprotopsychism, maintains the intuition that human subjects are irreducible, non-
combining and non-divisible.  
Emergent panpsychism appears, then, very similar to traditional strong emergence with the 
essential qualification that emergent panpsychism denies brute, or radical, emergence from 
one categorical attribute to another. Just as abstract entities cannot give rise to concrete 
entities (and vice versa), emergent panpsychism maintains that physical (non-mental) entities 
cannot emerge from mental entities (and vice versa). Godehard Brüntrup refers to this inter-
attribute emergence as “superstrong emergence” because it argues that whole new 
metaphysical categories are created, as in the case of emergent dualism or emergent 
theism.114 Emergent panpsychism, like all contemporary panpsychists, rejects inter-attribute 
emergence from one category to another, but reintroduces intra-attribute emergence within 
categories; that is, from mental parts to mental wholes (or from physical parts to physical 
wholes).    
One sub-type of Emergent Panpsychism is Panpsychist Infusion.115 This is a solution to The 
Combination Problem proposed by William Seager, whose article, “Consciousness, 
Information and Panpsychism” was an early contribution to the campaign to give 
panpsychism renewed attention within analytic philosophy of mind.116 Infusion is merging or 
blending of two entities, which then cease to exist in their own right, and are instead 
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superseded by a new whole. Seager gives two examples of possible analogies from physical 
instances for fusion. The first is Paul Humphreys’ interpretation of quantum entanglement as 
a type of fusion where the merged quantum particles can only be measured as a unity.  The 
second is the formation of black holes, whereby the physical entities prior to the black hole 
no longer exist but are replaced by a single fundamental entity.117 It is important to note that 
the fusion of consciousness is not reducible to physical theories regarding fusion, even 
spooky quantum theories or black hole theories. These physical examples only point to a 
possible analogy, not to evidence or even intelligibility of mental fusion. In either its typical 
or fusion subtype, the emergent panpsychist solution appears by far the most promising of all 
the solutions given here.  
Emergent panpsychism has neither the philosophical nor the theological problems articulated 
in chapter one; since it does not posit ontological jumps, it cannot slip into emergentism or 
emergent theism. Emergent panpsychism also has the added advantage of being the strongest 
guarantor of downward causation/free will and the closest position to dualism, whence most 
theologians come. If one approaches panpsychism, having become discontent with previous 
loyalties to substance dualism or traditional emergentism (or emergent dualism), then 
emergent panpsychism is likely to be an attractive option. However, if one has boxed a few 
rounds with materialism (or physicalism, et al.), then the constitutive combinatorial responses 
are more likely to appeal.  
What is the outcome of all this duelling over objections and dancing around The Combination 
Problem? Panpsychists and their critics alike need to be careful not to overstate their claims; 
the outcome of this battle is best categorised as a stalemate. Most of the objections levelled 
against panpsychism (The Incredulous Stare Set and The Unscientific Objection) can be 
adequately responded to by panpsychists. However, in the absence of a satisfactory account 
of mental combination, these prior objections cannot be dismissed entirely; they remain 
waiting in the wings. The Combination Problem itself is “significant but not insurmountable” 
and remains a weakness in the panpsychists’ account of consciousness; but it is not a deep 
metaphysical mystery of the same kind that brute emergence seems to be and does not land a 
fatal blow.118 This means that at present panpsychism “offers only the form of an explanation 
without any content” and although this is perhaps only a small advance on competing 
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theories, it points in a promising direction and may yet be able to fill out the content in the 
future.119  Contemporary panpsychism is a robust and growing philosophical movement that 
has earned its place at the philosophical table and is worthy of further theological 
consideration.   
 
3. A New Alliance: Panpsychism and Belief in God  
 
This chapter first outlined how the arguments from three leading philosophers culminated in 
bringing about a resurgence of interest in panpsychism within contemporary philosophy of 
mind. Second, I examined the battlefield of debate by evaluating the main objections and 
responses to panpsychism. In particular, it was seen that The Combination Problem has 
scattered the troops and created a plurality of versions of panpsychism currently at play in 
analytic philosophy of mind. At several points in this chapter, the contemporary literature on 
panpsychism has been seen to bump up against issues of spirituality and raise the question of 
God’s existence. It is now my intention to examine these issues more closely and broker an 
alliance between panpsychism and belief in God.  
When responding to the objection that panpsychism is unscientific, it was acknowledged that 
many panpsychists affirm naturalism’s negative truth claim against supernaturalism. This 
rejection of supernaturalism bears no logical relationship to panpsychism. In the remainder of 
this chapter, it is argued that although panpsychism does not entail belief in God, 
panpsychism is more logically consistent with theism than with atheistic naturalism. In other 
words, unbeknownst to most contemporary panpsychists, the arguments made in the recent 
turn to panpsychism invite or imply belief in a Creator. Thereafter, it is suggested that not 
only should panpsychists be open to theism, but conversely, theists should seriously consider 
panpsychism a suitable theory of consciousness to employ within their worldview.  
The argument that is most central in the recent resurgence of interest in panpsychism is The 
Genetic Argument. As seen above, this argument is the rejection of super-strong emergence 
from the physical to the mental based on the causal principle ex nihilo nihil fit – nothing can 
emerge out of nothing, or nothing can give something a property that it does not itself 
possess. Superstrong emergence argues that the process of emergence can introduce 
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ontological novelty, such as minds where there was only dead matter before, into the 
universe. This ontological jump, the panpsychist argues, violates this causal principle and so 
warrants the pejorative adjectives of being “brute” or “magic”. Panpsychists not only reject 
the emergentists’ ontological thesis, they also reject the epistemological thesis of 
unpredictability as a violation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The Principle of 
Sufficient Reason states that “no fact can be real or existent, no statement true, unless there 
be a sufficient reason why it is so and not otherwise.”120 It is because the panpsychist cannot 
abide the abandonment of these two principles that, despite years of objections and 
dismissive stares of incredulity, an increasing number of contemporary philosophers have 
been motivated enough to posit mentality as fundamental and ubiquitous.121 It is the 
commitment to the causal principle ex nihilo nihil fit and the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
that has motivated the recent revival of panpsychism within analytic philosophy of mind.  
These two core principles, ex nihilo nihil fit and the Principle of Sufficient Reason, are 
similarly employed within various cosmological arguments for the existence of God. 
Cosmological arguments seek to demonstrate the existence of a sufficient reason or an 
ongoing first cause for the existence of the cosmos.122 The Causal Principle is a central 
component in the Thomistic Cosmological Argument and the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
in the Leibnizian Cosmological Argument. Theists who employ either of these cosmological 
arguments affirm that it is impossible that something could contingently exist in an uncaused 
way, or that a contingent universe could pop into existence without some prior cause. The 
ontological division between not-existing and existing is too wide. Panpsychists employ this 
principle of causation with regards to the ontological divide between matter and mind when 
they reject (super)strong emergence. Indeed, Strawson even makes the comparison to the 
creation of the universe when he writes that if emergence is intelligible then “it will be 
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intelligible to suppose that existence can emerge from (come out of, develop out of) non-
existence.”123 This too is something, by implication, Strawson cannot find intelligible; if 
consciousness needs an explanation so presumably does existence.  
The Genetic Argument for panpsychism provides an account of the evolution and 
manifestation of minds within the universe, but does not aim to answer the why of existence 
itself; again, why is there mind (or anything) at all? It would seem then that brute 
contingencies are unsatisfactory to the panpsychist logic; and yet without a Creator or First 
Cause of some kind, this is exactly what the panpsychist is forced to claim with regards to the 
existence of the universe. In order to avoid such inconsistency, panpsychists need to posit 
some necessary being, or adopt the theory that the universe itself exists necessarily.124 It 
should also be remembered that the idea that being cannot come from non-being, or that 
something cannot come into existence uncaused, is not a physical law but a metaphysical 
principle which therefore applies to all of reality, including the totality of the universe, and 
not merely to the things inside the universe. In Charles Taliaferro’s words, “Theism can thus 
provide an explanation for the existence of the panpsychistic cosmos as well as for the 
different levels of consciousness pervading it.”125 Taliaferro goes on to say that, from the 
perspective of a theist and interactive dualist, “panpsychism’s willingness to recognize the 
mind or the mental […] goes well beyond contemporary naturalism”  and provides “an 
eminently challenging position” in contemporary debate.126 This gestures towards the 
conclusion that, although theism is not a strict entailment of panpsychism, if the central 
arguments for panpsychism were extended towards the universe as a whole then this would 
result in theism; one might say that panpsychism implies theism.127 
The question as to why a theist might want to adopt panpsychism is less straightforward. 
Panpsychism and theism are clearly compatible, but would a theistic panpsychism be an 
overdetermined theory of consciousness? After all, a theistic substance dualism can state that 
God acts directly to infuse or inject embryos with souls and directly sustains the causal 
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interaction between the mind and the body throughout a person’s life (this is a traditional 
creationist account of the origin of the soul). This view remains a permissible account of 
consciousness and, as with panpsychism, there are no defeating objections to it. However, 
this account has weaknesses of its own to bear in mind. For example, it has given rise to a 
problematic ontological divide between humanity and other creatures, which sits 
uncomfortably with the theory of evolution. It also gives the soul and the body two radically 
different origin stories, which has been used to contribute to a perceived axiological 
difference between the soul and the body in Christian thought such that, despite the 
incarnation and resurrection accounts, materiality remains a second-class substance.  
Most uncomfortably, there remains a lingering dissatisfaction in employing divine action as 
an explanation for a widespread and systematic feature of the universe before all other 
possibilities have been exhausted.128 This is the core of Nagel’s critique against theistic 
explanations; that pushing “the quest for intelligibility outside the world” into the 
intentionality of God, cannot provide the explanation as to “how beings like us fit into the 
world.”129 The objection against the creationist view of souls whereby God created each soul 
ex nihilo (with or without the guise of emergence) implies a denial of the comprehensiveness 
of the natural order. As stated above, these are not defeating objections against the traditional 
account of the soul (or consciousness) within Christian theology; God could have set things 
up to require continuous additions of souls. However, these issues are unsettling, and it is 
worthwhile for theologians to consider what other accounts of consciousness philosophy of 
mind suggests that are compatible with, perhaps even beneficial to, the wider concerns of 
Christian thought and practice.  
This is not to say that special divine acts are impossible or should not be posited at all. To the 
contrary, in chapter four I will argue that panpsychism provides a framework of a robust 
articulation of special divine action.  However, appeals to special divine activity should not 
be taken as an alternative to scientific or philosophical explanations. This approach has been 
labelled ‘god-of-the-gaps’ theology. As an objection it is portrayed in what might be called a 
fable in contemporary science and religion dialogue, the story of Isaac Newton’s hypothesis 
that God might need to regularly adjust the orbits of the planets to avoid disaster. This idea 
was ridiculed by Leibniz as equivalent to the idea that “God Almighty wants to wind up his 
                                                 
128 This concern is famously articulated by Leibniz, who although never denying the possibility of miracles or 
sudden additions into the natural order, saw them as exceptions to be kept to a bare minimum since it is of more 
glory to God to have created a more complete system (apart from the disruptive influence of evil). 
129 Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, 62, 26. 
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watch from time to time: otherwise it would cease to move. He had not, it seems, sufficient 
foresight to make it a perpetual motion.”130  When Laplace’s equations of elliptical orbits 
replaced Newton’s model, there was no longer any use for God within the theory; God was 
squeezed out of the explanation, so to speak. The moral of the story is that it is a risky 
strategy to employ special divine action within one’s explanation of systematic aspects of 
creation. This goes for accounts of the origin of consciousness as it does for the movement of 
the celestial spheres. If the principle that systematic features of the world should not be 
explained via appeal to special divine action is accepted, then so long as panpsychism offers 
an otherwise compatible account of consciousness within God’s creation alongside the 
evolution of matter, theologians have a responsibility to seriously consider, if not lend their 
support to, panpsychism. 
  
Conclusion: Taking Panpsychism Forward 
 
The story of contemporary panpsychism is a tale of how old problems die hard (or rarely die 
at all) and even the strangest solutions do not go out of fashion forever. It is a tale of how 
three eminent philosophers stubbornly argued that an account of consciousness could not be 
swept under the physicalist carpet and should not be rocketed into the heavenly sphere of 
transcendence if at all possible.  Instead, Nagel, Chalmers and Strawson – now joined by 
many others – have dared to imagine that the physicalist, emergentist and even traditional 
substance dualist picture of the fundamental features of the world has been too barren; 
consciousness may go all the way down. The arguments for panpsychism, surveyed under the 
heading of ‘the campaign’, took reason and science together and have successfully brought 
about a revival of interest in this ancient and eccentric theory. This is not a negligible 
achievement, but neither is it a total victory. The various objections levelled against 
panpsychism, the philosophical ‘battle’ so to speak, were evaluated. Although panpsychism 
still stands, she is not unscathed for she has her own ‘old problem’ of the one mind and the 
many minds to contend with; there is still work to be done. However, it seems the 
panpsychist has found work worth doing and, what may turn out to be another blind alley has 
not been proven such yet.   
                                                 
130 Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, “The Controversy between Leibniz and Clarke,” in Philosophical Papers 
and Letters, ed. Leroy Loemker, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 1096.  
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But is there panpsychist work worth doing for theologians? To glance at the literature 
surrounding panpsychism, it might seem that the growing success of philosophers such as 
Nagel, Chalmers and Strawson is bad news for Christian philosophy and theology. In recent 
decades, Christian philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga, Richard Swinburne, Timothy 
O’Connor and J.P. Moreland have worked tirelessly to build impressive apologetic arguments 
for the existence of God on the basis of the failure of all naturalistic attempts to explain 
consciousness; the so-called Argument from Consciousness for the Existence of God. 
Although panpsychists and theists are natural allies against materialism, the potential success 
of panpsychism seems to threaten this apologetic enterprise; theistic substance dualism is not 
the last man standing. Perhaps Christian philosophers can simply take solace in watching the 
crumbling edifice of materialism and restrictive naturalism as a broadly religious 
temperament is readmitted into academic consideration?131  
We need not settle for so little. The possibility of a new alliance gives more cause for hope 
than appears at first glance. The resurgence in panpsychism is good news for Christianity; for 
although panpsychism does not require God to inject minds into the universe at successive 
intervals, it does stand firmly within the logic of the Cosmological Argument. Panpsychism 
still needs a Cause or a Reason – a Creator – to bring about and sustain the fundamental level 
of reality upon which panpsychism’s account of consciousness is built. The existence of 
consciousness in a panpsychist universe may still increase the probability of theism, but it 
does not do so because there are epistemic or causal gaps in the creation of individual animal 
minds, such that God becomes a hypothesis in lieu of a scientific explanation. Instead, the 
argument from consciousness for the existence of God can still be an important part of the 
apologetic toolbox, but in a manner subsumed perhaps within a cosmological argument to 
form a deeper and more integrated version of this traditional argument. Not only should we 
ask ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’, but also ‘Why is that something 
experiencing something, rather than experiencing nothing?’ This is a question to which 
theists can provide some compelling answers. Front-loading creation with consciousness in 
this way may turn out to be beneficial to Christian theology in other areas. But, for this 
alliance to work panpsychists will need to abandon their lingering, unrequited relationship to 
naturalism; and I encourage them to do so. 
                                                 
131 See, Thomas Nagel, “Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament,” in Secular Philosophy and the 
Religious Temperament: Essays 2002-2008 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).  
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Historical Interlude: Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz 
 
The philosophical problems with the emergence of mind from matter, and the theological 
strain that emergence theologies place upon the transcendence of God, as explored in the first 
chapter, motivated consideration of contemporary panpsychism as a viable alternative in 
chapter two. The revival of interest in panpsychism by prominent philosophers of mind 
provides an opportunity for renewed theological attention. However, it would be false to 
assume from this that panpsychism is nothing but a passing fad or that panpsychism is alien 
to the venerable tradition of Christian thought and practice. As such, this thesis now offers a 
historical interlude for the purpose of demonstrating that the theological benefits of 
panpsychism have long been recognised. The consideration of panpsychism by contemporary 
theologians is neither a mere chasing after the winds of fashion, nor does it entail conceding 
ground to Process theology. Instead, the current philosophical revival is an opportunity to 
recover something already present within the history of Christian thought. 
Panpsychism is an ancient theory regarding the place of consciousness in the world.1 Any 
contemporary theological evaluation of panpsychism does well to heed the past 
incorporations of panpsychism within Christian theology. Although, few theologians have 
cared to launch explicit and robust defences of panpsychism, panpsychist ideas nevertheless 
flow through the tradition. As an aspect of intellectual history there is a largely unknown 
story to be told here, which this chapter makes a small contribution to. The recognition of 
panpsychism as an ontology congruent with core commitments of Christian orthodoxy, 
broadly conceived, comes to the surface in the theological argumentation of Gottfried 
                                                 
1 Panpsychism was a widespread and foundational explanatory principle in pre-Socratic, Platonic, Aristotelian, 
and Stoic schools of thought; see Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West, 23-58. In particular, panpsychism was 
employed to explain movement and causation (the argument from indwelling powers) most famously expressed 
by Thales’ maxim, ‘all things are full of gods’, in Aristotle, De Anima, I.5; 411a7, trans. J.A. Smith (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1931) and affirmed by Plato in Laws, 899b, trans. Trevor J. Saunders in Plato Complete 
Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1997). Panpsychism undergirded the 
continuity and order within the universe (the argument from continuity) such that the arch, whether a spiritual 
ever-living fire (Heraclitus) or the air, breath and soul (Anaximenes), was a form of psyche in all things. Lastly, 
the order (argument from design) of the universe was explained as the presence of νους – mind, spirit, reason – 
throughout all things. This would later develop in to the Stoic active principle, logos, the intelligent force and 
‘vehicle of logos’, pneuma, which are both “the faculty of man which enables him to think, to plan, and to 
speak” and “literally embodied in the universe large.”A.A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans 
and Sceptics (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), 108; See also, B. Inwood and L. 
Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1997), 133. As a common feature within 
most ancient Greek philosophies, panpsychism can be described as a part of the intellectual foundation upon 
which European thought and Christian theology has developed. 
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Wilhelm von Leibniz. As such, Leibniz’s writings offer contemporary theology a historical 
example of how panpsychism can be employed within the doctrine of creation for the benefit 
of Christian theology; a philosophy for the service of theology.  
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz gave panpsychism one of, if not the most, systematic 
articulations in the modern period, and his influence remains evident upon panpsychist 
philosophy today. Although not recognised as such during his own lifetime, Leibniz’s has on 
occasion been seen as “probably the most universal genius that there had ever been in 
Europe.”2 Despite clear theological argumentation in his work and evidence of a tenacious 
commitment to ecumenical dialogue in post-reformation Europe, the influence of Leibniz 
upon theology has not been recognised until more recently.3 This is in large part due to 
Bertrand Russell’s influential Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, which 
dismissed all of Leibniz’s theological argumentation as “arbitrary” and a “lazy device”.4 
Moreover, Russell hones in on the panpsychist aspect of Leibniz’s thought, writing that 
Leibniz was wrong in his traditional Christian beliefs because, “A monism is necessarily 
pantheistic, and a monadism, when it is logical, is as necessarily atheistic.”5  
Accepting this reading of Leibniz, some Christian thinkers, such as Hermann Dooyeweerd 
have dismissed Leibniz’s thought as the “humanistic secularisation of the Christian 
religion.”6 Dooyeweerd pinpointed Leibniz’s monadology as the primary conceptual culprit 
of such secularisation when he mischaracterised the “autarchy” and “self-sufficient 
individuality of the monads” apart from God.7 Despite the recent reappraisal of Leibniz as a 
philosophical theologian par excellence, the theological status of Leibniz’s panpsychist 
                                                 
2 C.D. Broad, Leibniz: An Introduction, ed. C. Lewy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). 3. 
Discussion of Leibniz’s almost unparalleled impact on the natural sciences — in the development of differential 
calculus, the invention of binary arithmetic which forms the basis of modern digital technology, his work in 
dynamic forces (f = mv2) and his theory that space and time are relative, to name but a few —  can be found in 
Justin Smith, Divine Machines: Leibniz and the Sciences of Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).  
3 For example, David Grummet has argued that Leibniz has had an unrecognized impact on the development of 
Roman Catholic understandings of the Eucharist in the modern period. See, David Grummet, “Blondel, Modern 
Catholic Theology, and the Leibnizian Eucharistic Bond,” Modern Theology 23, no. 4 (2007): 561-577.  
4 Bertrand Russell, A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1935/1990), 172. An argument from theological reasons is taken as ungrounded and no argument at all; Russell, 
143n.3.  
5 Russell, 172.  
6 James K.A. Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-secular Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Academic, 2004), 207. Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought vol. 1 “The 
Necessary Presuppositions of Philosophy,” translated by David H. Freeman and William S. Young. 
(Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1955/1997), 227. 
7 Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, 231.  
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monads remains ambiguous.8 Contrary to such earlier interpretations, this chapter sits within 
the stream of Leibnizian scholarship which highlights how Leibniz’s philosophy, and his 
panpsychist ontology in particular, was conceived and employed to serve distinctly 
theological ends.   
This interlude will first summarise Leibniz’s panpsychism as expressed in his theory of 
monads. Second, I will show how this philosophical metaphysic served three interwoven 
theological arguments; the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, the idea of creation as a single 
comprehensive order, and a sacramental ontology. It is not that a theologian must adopt 
panpsychism in order to hold these three theological positions, but that panpsychism can be, 
and has historically been, used to reinforce the affirmation of them. These three theological 
arguments afford the constructive intention of the remaining two chapters of this thesis both 
the seeds to develop a contemporary panpsychist doctrine of creation, and the assurance of 
panpsychism’s good heritage within the history of ideas.  
 
1. Monads and Panpsychism 
 
Leibniz’s mature metaphysics is a system of monads. The word ‘monad’ is defined in 
Correspondence with John Bernoulli, as “a substance which is truly one, i.e. not an aggregate 
of substances.”9 Monads are not (only) the fundamental individual building-blocks of reality 
found at the bottom of a finite chain of being, but are unities found at every level of reality; a 
human mind unifying the composite substances of a human body, a dog mind unifying the 
composite substances of a dog’s body, the microbe entelechy unifying the microbe-body, are 
                                                 
8 See Irena Backus Leibniz: Protestant Theologian (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). Christia Mercer, 
Leibniz’s Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Maria 
Rosa Antognazza, Leibniz on the Trinity and the Incarnation. Reason and Revelation in the Seventeenth Century 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). Robert Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994). 
9 Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, Correspondence with John Bernoulli in Leibnizens Mathematische Schriften, 
herausgegeben von G. I. Gerhardt, 7 vols. (Berlin and Halle, 1849-63) [hereafter, GM], III, 537. See also, Letter 
to de Volder, where a monad is “a complete simple substance” in Die Philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz, herausgegeben von G. I. Gerhardt, 7 vols. (Berlin, 1875-90) [hereafter G], II, 252 and 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters, a selection translated and edited with an 
introduction by Leroy E. Loemker, 2nd ed. (Dordrecht, 1969) [hereafter, Loemker], 530. In Monadology, a 
monad is defined as “a simple substance, i.e. one without parts”. (G. II, 607; Loemker, 643). Leibniz adopted a 
preference for the word ‘monad’, rather than ‘individual substance’ around the 1690’s, coinciding with his 
public announcement that the true nature of substance is force. See, Pauline Phemister, Leibniz and the 
Environment (Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2016), 36. 
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all monads.10 Every monad is said to have an experiential centre, that is a substantial form of 
either a soul (in humans or animals with memory) or an entelechy (in plants and small 
creatures without memory).11 Together with an organic body a monad forms a ‘corporeal 
substance’, such that all individual finite substances are embodied as living things. A body, 
by contrast, is a collection of monads, a composite substance; a community of souls with a 
single telos. A body of a living organism and a clock are both, then, composite substances, 
but what distinguishes the two is that the former is a “genuine unity, like what is called ego in 
us; while a clock is nothing but an aggregate.”12 Demarcating his view from that of Thomas’ 
hylomorphism, Leibniz argued that there can be no detachment of the soul from the body, 
even in death.13 Instead, death is described as the disintegration of the composite unity into an 
aggregate, but the individual parts continue to exist so long as the universe is sustained by 
God.14 Leibniz is clear that monads are created and contingent substances of secondary 
power, of which every animate and inanimate creature is composed, and which is made to the 
glory of God. 
 
Although the monads are simple substances they have two properties; appetition and 
perception. Appetition is an active tendency, a kind of striving which moves the monads 
through time, from unconscious perception to the next, in causation from predecessor to 
successor. According to Leibniz, there is no interaction from one monad to another so this 
pattern of appetition contains the total causal history and future of any monad, and it is 
impressed on God from the beginning as a kind of law. Perception is described by Leibniz as 
how “multiplicity is represented in unity”.15 Each monad has represented within itself the 
                                                 
10 Phemister, 38-39.  
11 Leibniz relationship to the Scholastic language of ‘substantial forms’ varied greatly throughout his life time. 
As a young man he rejected this language, as was the fashion of the early modern period, for being more 
obscure than explanatory. In Discours §11, however he writes, “I know that I am putting forward a great 
paradox in claiming to rehabilitate ancient philosophy to some extent, and to restore the rights of citizenship to 
substantial forms, which have practically been banished.” In this later work, he uses the term very frequently, 
and in New Essay 317 he seems to suggest that this is due to the bad reputation of the term, rather than any 
disagreement as to content. See, Stuart Brown, Leibniz (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1984), 30-31, 137-38.  
12 Leibniz, New System §2; in Leibniz, The Monadology and other philosophical writings (trans.) Robert Latta 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899) [hereafter, Latta], 321. For more on Leibniz’s understanding of the 
embodiment of living beings as “nested individuals” with a common telos, see Ohad Nachtomy, “Leibniz’s 
View of Living Beings: Embodied or Nested Individuals,” Embodiment: A History, ed. Justin E. H. Smith 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 189-215.  
13 Leibniz, Considerations on Vital Principles and Plastic Natures (GP VI 545-546; Latta, 590). See, Stuart 
Brown, “Soul, Body and Natural Immortality,” The Monist 81, no.4 (1998): 578-580. 
14 Leibniz, Nature and Grace §6 (Latta, 413-14).  
15 Leibniz, Monadology §14 (G. VI, 608-9; Loemker, 644). Leibniz drew upon the traditional concept of 
humanity as microcosm, structurally representing within itself the whole universe, and applied to every monad 
in the universe. Phemister, Leibniz and the Environment, 42.  
93 
 
contemporary states of all other monads, it is a “mirror [of] the whole universe from its own 
special point of view.”16 It is this unique point of view of each monad that undergirds 
Leibniz’s account of space; not as extension but as multiple points of view from each monad. 
Thus, nowhere is “fallow, sterile, or dead”, and everywhere is filled with monads each of 
which is unique, forming a kind of “plenum” of living creatures that fill the universe.17 
 
Perception also accounts for consciousness, “which is the internal state of the monad 
representing external things”.18 Importantly, this is distinguished from “apperception, which 
is consciousness, or the reflective knowledge of the internal state, something not given to all 
souls, nor at all times to a given soul.”19 Leibniz criticises Descartes for making self-
consciousness the paradigm for all mentality and consequently excluding souls from all non-
human organisms or phenomena. Instead, Leibniz writes that monads have consciousness like 
that of a “prolonged unconsciousness”, “a profound dreamless sleep”, or a “state of stupor”.20 
Perception, thus, stands in continuity with human consciousness but it is not identical to it. It 
is perception — the unconscious first-person perspective found in even the barest monad — 
that Leibniz, in his famous mill analogy argues is “inexplicable on mechanical grounds.”21 It 
is this Leibnizian argument, that perception as analogous to human consciousness cannot be 
explained through the interaction of physical parts, that is foremost in the revival of 
panpsychism in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind.22 
 
2. Creation ex nihilo and the Fittingness of Panpsychism  
 
The doctrine of creation ex nihilo can be summarised as the affirmation that God freely 
creates the world, without compulsion or necessity, out of nothing (not from pre-existing 
materials, nor divinely emanating ‘god-stuff’, nor space-time), such that God also continues 
to sustain creation in each moment of its existence. The contemporary resurgence in 
                                                 
16 Leibniz, Monadology §57 (G. VI 618; Loemker, 649). 
17 Leibniz, Monadology §68-69; Ariew & Garber, 222.  
18 Leibniz, Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason; G VI 600; Ariew & Garber, 208. 
19 Leibinz, 208.  
20 Leibniz, Monadology §14, §20 and §24; Latta, 224, 230, 231. 
21 Leibniz Monadology §17; Latta, 227-28. 
22 This is commonly called ‘The Mill Argument’, because it involves arguing that if the mind is like a mill in 
which we can only observe “parts that push one another, and we will never find anything to explain a 
perception.” Leibniz, Monadology §17; Latta, 227-28. In chapter two, I referred to the contemporary form of 
this argument as The Genetic Argument.  
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defending and articulating the doctrine of creation ex nihilo can be seen as a response to two 
misinterpretations of this doctrine. The first is an interpretation of this doctrine as a scientific 
formula (the Big Bang or equivalent), and the second is as the cause of domineering, 
authoritarian, and abusive pictures of God and God’s relationship to the world.23 This latter 
concern has been most emphatically argued by Process and feminist theologians, who are 
often attracted to forms of panpsychism (or a panexperientialist metaphysic) as ways to stress 
the value and possibly eternality of the creation. Therefore, the historical illustration of a 
panpsychist affirmation of creation ex nihilo, such as is found in Leibniz’s writings, holds 
particular benefit in this current discussion. By undermining any post-modern opposition 
between panpsychism and creation ex nihilo, Leibniz underscores how the doctrine of 
creation ex nihilo can be affirmed without entailing that God is distant, domineering or that 
creation is emptied of intrinsic value.24 To the contrary, as is argued in the final two chapters 
of this thesis, panpsychism is a useful ontology for articulating how a radically transcendent 
God interacts with and empowers the community of creation. 
The different concepts of creation as eternal, a necessary emanation from God, formed from 
primal matter, or created out of nothing are not ultimately concerned with the (temporal) 
origin of creation but with creation’s ongoing relationship to the Creator.25 Creation ex nihilo 
is not a position within ontological debates regarding what is, in effect of God’s will, created. 
The ontology of the creation has remained an open question within Christian thought. Thus, 
whilst this doctrine affirmed the creation of matter directly by God, over against Gnostic and 
Middle-Platonic intermediaries, the development of this doctrine in the second and third 
centuries was not orientated towards a contrast between materiality and immateriality but 
between the Creator and all things (immaterial and material creation).26   
                                                 
23 A good defence of the congruity between modern cosmology as what creation ex nihilo might be expected to 
look like from the inside, see Andrew Davison, “Looking Back toward the Origin: Scientific Cosmology as 
Creation ex nihilo Considered ‘from the inside’,” in Creation ex nihilo: Origins, Development, Contemporary 
Challenge, eds. Gary A. Anderson and Markus Bockmuehl (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 
2018), 367-389. For scientific discussion of this doctrine, see also Paul Copan and William Lane Craig, 
Creation Out of Nothing: A Biblical, Philosophical, and Scientific Exploration (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic, 2004). Authors who reject creation ex nihilo because of a concern over the resulting doctrine of God, 
see Catherine Keller, The Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming (London: Routledge, 2003) and Thomas 
Jay Oord, ed. Theologies of Creation: Creatio ex Nihilo and Its New Rivals (New York: Routledge, 2015).  
24 This is not to say one must hold to panpsychism in order to respond to contemporary critiques against the 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Instead, Leibniz shows that panpsychism can be put to the service of such a 
defence as easily as it can be employed in such attacks against this doctrine.  
25 This point has been well argued for in Ian A. McFarland, From Nothing: A Theology of Creation (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2014) and Kathryn Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or 
Empowerment? (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).  
26 To that end, Janet Soskice suggests that whilst the current revival of creation ex nihilo is undoubtedly 
indebted to the historical work of Gerhard May, his portrayal has resulted in “too much emphasis on the creation 
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To claim that God creates ‘out of nothing’, is to imply that the verb ‘to create’ is predicated 
of God in a radically different way to how it might be predicated of humanity or any other 
creature. This doctrinal formulation arises from a Scriptural exegesis on the otherness of 
Israel’s God and the dependency of creation upon the voice of God (in the Psalms in 
particular), and this is reinterpreted in light of the incarnation and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ.27 For God to create out of nothing is to suggest that God has ultimate power and 
sovereignty over that which is created, and for the creation to be conditioned by nothing but 
the generosity of God’s will. Creation as a gift, as a work of grace, cannot be separated from 
Christian teaching on redemption. Creation ex nihilo is, therefore, a “distributed doctrine” 
manifesting across Christian treatments of the whole divine economy.28  
We now turn to consider how Leibniz’s panpsychism, as outlined above, served his 
understanding and affirmation of creation ex nihilo. Many of Leibniz’s arguments are 
motivated by the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and this is no different for his panpsychism. 
This famous principle is outlined in the Discours as “for every contingent fact there is a 
reason why that fact is so and not otherwise”.29 In a letter to Arnauld on July 14th 1686, 
Leibniz describes this as “my great principle”, namely that “There must always be some 
                                                 
of matter”, and so underplayed the createdness of the soul as emphasised, for example, in the Athanasius’ De 
Incarnatione. Soskice’s astute comment on contemporary scholarship allows her to endorse closer analysis of 
the potential compatibility between Galen Strawson’s panpsychism and Christian theology. Janet Soskice, “Why 
Creatio ex nihilo for Theology Today?,” in Creation ex nihilo: Origins, Development, Contemporary 
Challenges, eds. Gary A. Anderson and Markus Bockmuehl (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 
2018), 49, 50-51. See Gerhard May, Creation ex Nihilo: The Doctrine of ‘Creation out of Nothing’ in Early 
Christian Thought, translated by A.S. Worrall (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994).  
27 The progenitor of this doctrine, Theophilus of Antioch clearly expresses the relationship between the 
doctrines of creation and resurrection when defends Christian hope in the resurrection on the basis that “God 
created man out of nothing, in that he formed him from a tiny drop of seed which did not exist before.” Such 
reference to a “seed” suggests a stronger link than has yet been recognized between Theophilus and the Gnostic 
defender of creation ex nihilo, Basilides, who argued that the world was created from absolutely nothing in the 
form of a cosmic seed of not-yet being, i.e. potentiality. This is contra May, Creation ex nihilo, 68-70, 84, 163. 
See also, Eric Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 68-69. Theophilus of 
Antioch, To Autolycus 1.4, in Patrologia Graeca (hereafter PG), 6:1029B, quoted in McFarland, From Nothing, 
1, 6-8. Gregory of Nyssa, over a century later, also drew heavily upon the notion of “the seed of all things” such 
that souls are within matter and both are created “at the beginning” and allowed to develop “little by little” by 
progressing “from the least perfect to the most perfect”. In hexaem. I, 77 D, quoted in, von Balthasar, Presence 
and Thought, 58; cf. De op. hom. 8; I 148 B; PG 44, 125-256 and De op. hom. 22; I, 177 A; PG 44, 125-256. As 
such, Gregory could affirm that “creation is self-contained, without experiencing the need for a new intervention 
and without diminution, as it continues in its arrangements.” In inscriptiones Psalmorum, ed. McDonough, 
GNO V; I, 610 BC. Hans Urs von Balthasar describes how Gregory depicts the earth becoming the living organs 
of a human being “in order to prove the indissoluble unity of the spirit and the body and their common history”, 
in von Balthasar, Presence and Thought, 58, 60 (italics added); cf. De op. hom. 30; I, 22 B-253 A. This lack of a 
need for intervention in the creation of humanity or souls is a theological strength of panpsychism argued for by 
Leibniz, as we shall see later in this interlude. 
28 John Webster, “Love is also a lover of life”: Creatio ex nihilo and creaturely goodness,” Modern Theology 29, 
no.2 (April 2013): 156.   
29 Leibniz Discours de Métaphysique, §13; G., IV, 436-9; Loemker, 310-11. 
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foundation for the connexion of the terms of a proposition which is true, and this foundation 
must be in the notions of the terms.”30 Put more simply, “Nothing happens without it being 
possible to give a reason why it happened as it did and not in another way.”31 As Leibniz 
notes in Principles of Nature and Grace, “the first question we are entitled to put will be – 
Why does something exist rather than nothing?”; it follows from the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason for Leibniz that the “ultimate reason of things is called God”.32  
The Principle for Sufficient Reason in one sense grounds the doctrine of creation ex nihilo 
and in another sense is grounded by it.33 In the former sense, if there is to be a sufficient 
reason for the universe taken as a whole, one must posit a being with ultimate creative power 
                                                 
30 Leibniz, G., II, 56; Loemker, 337.  
31 Leibniz, G., II, 56; Loemker, 337. Elsewhere Leibniz defines sufficient reason as “in virtue of which we hold 
that there can be no fact real or existing, no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason, why it should be 
so and not otherwise, although these reasons usually cannot be known by us.” Leibniz, Monadology, §32; Latta, 
235, 
32 This is the general thrust of Leibniz’s Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God, touched upon in the 
previous chapter. Leibniz, The Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason (1714), G. IV., 598-606, 
Loemker, 1038-39.  
33 Some scholars have interpreted Leibniz as abandoning the doctrine of creation ex nihilo for the Platonic 
notion of emanation. Catherine Wilson (and Philip Clayton) suggest that Leibniz was covering up his true 
emanatist leanings out of fear of a Church inquisition. Wilson, Leibniz’s Metaphysics 86, citing G 3:575, and 
Philip Clayton, The Problem of God in Modern Thought (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2000), 233-
34, 244. Christia Mercer also argues that Leibniz believed that “there is a single, unified, and perfect Supreme 
being who chooses to emanate its being and perfection into creatures and who nonetheless remains 
transcendence while all its creatures contain an imperfect instantiation of its essence.” The confluence of 
emanation and volition complicates the traditional lines in the debate between emanation versus creation as in 
some sense to do with creation as an act of will, an emanation as a necessity. Mercer, Leibniz’s Metaphysics, 
216. This is direct contrast to the interpretation I am here presenting, which argues that Leibniz constructed a 
system of panpsychism on the foundation of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Scholars who argue for an 
emanationist reading of Leibniz often point to three texts where Leibniz uses the language of emanation. In 
Discours, Leibniz writes that “created substance depend on God, who preserves them and who even produces 
them continually by a kind of emanation, just as we produce our thoughts.” (Discours, par. 14) In the Theodicy, 
Leibniz writes that God prevents suffering, “insofar as the perfection of the universe, which is an emanation 
from him, permits it.” (Theodicy par. 167). Finally, in the Monadology Leibniz writes that monads “are 
generated, so to speak, by continual flugurations of the divinity”. Robert Latta helpfully describes Leibniz’s 
choice of the word ‘fluguration’ as “a middle term between creation and emanation” and thus between 
Descartes’ and Spinoza’s philosophies (Latta 243-44, n.75). In all three of these instances of emanation 
language, Leibniz’s was, perhaps, not as clear as one might wish in contemporary debate. However, given the 
central argumentative place that the concept of creation ex nihilo plays within the structure of many of his 
arguments from sufficient reason and the best of all possible worlds; perhaps Leibniz did not think he needed to 
be terminologically precise on this point. Moreover, having emptied the emanation scheme of any mediating 
role, the term ‘emanation’ may have presented itself as useful terminology for the uniqueness of the causal 
relation. As Kathryn Tanner writes, “Emanationist imagery . . . is often retained in creation ex nihilo accounts. . . 
but with significant warping.” Tanner points out that across the tradition, emanation is often used to 
counterbalance personal and intentional language of God’s choice to create to avoid an untoward 
anthropocentricism that makes the act of creation an arbitrary choice by a bored little deity. Since avoiding such 
arbitrariness is one of Leibniz’s most pressing concerning in the Principle of Sufficient Reason and throughout 
his writings, it seems likely that the same counterbalancing of terminology provides a more sufficient 
explanation for Leibniz’s use of emanation language, rather than revealing his true heterodox colours. See, 
Kathryn Tanner, “Creation ex nihilo as mixed metaphor,” Modern Theology 29, no.2 (April 2013): 148. For 
evidence that Leibniz rejects “the universe as a stairwell” view of an emanating creation, see, Leibniz, Nature 
Itself, in Philosophical Texts, ed. R.S. Woodhouse and Richard Francks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998), §6; Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy, 210, n.82.   
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who acts with intentionality, namely God.34 Once this is achieved, the question arises as to 
why God chose and willed to create this particular world from, in Leibniz’s words, all the 
other “possible universes” which God might have chosen to create.35 Thus, in the latter sense, 
God is perfectly good and rational and so does not act without reason. It follows from the 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo, for Leibniz, that everything about this world as a whole and 
everything within this world has a sufficient reason for being as it is at all times. This logic 
results in Leibniz’s much maligned, teleological notion that this is the best of all possible 
worlds. The relationship between Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason and his affirmation 
of creation ex nihilo can be seen, therefore, to be circular or mutually reinforcing.  
Directly flowing from his theistically endowed Principle of Sufficient Reason and creation ex 
nihilo, Leibniz gives his first theological argument for panpsychism. We might refer to this as 
Leibniz’s Argument from Perfection or Fittingness. He wrote, it is “in conformity with the 
greatness and beauty of the works of God for him to produce as many substance[s] are there 
can be in this universe . . . it is a perfection of nature to have many [souls].”36 Since this is the 
best of all possible worlds, Leibniz argues, it is fitting that “there is nothing fallow, nothing 
sterile, nothing dead in the universe, no chaos, no confusion, save in appearance.”37 
Moreover, but “since every mind is like a mirror” then many minds mean that “there will be 
greater light, the mirrors blending the light not only in the [individual] eye but also among 
each other. The gathered splendour produces glory.”38 The perception of monads means that 
“the universe is in some way multiplied as many times as there are substances, and the glory 
of God is likewise multiplied by as many entirely different representations of his work.”39 It 
is a panpsychist universe that Leibniz suggests brings greatest glory to God by reflecting the 
divine light at every point of creation, from every possible perspective. 
Elsewhere Leibniz describes a panpsychist universe as “the simplest in hypotheses and 
richest in phenomena.”40  He would make this more explicit in Monadology where he wrote, 
I believe that . . . it is consistent neither with the order nor with the 
beauty of the reason of things that there should be something vital or 
immanently active only in a small part of matter, when it would imply 
                                                 
34 Leibniz, On The Ultimate Origination of Things (1697); Latta, 337-354.  
35 Leibniz, Monadology §53; Latta 247. Leibniz, Theodicy, trans. E.M. Huggard, ed. Austin Farrer (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951), §44, 98-99, §173, 234-5, §196, 249.  
36 Leibniz, “To Arnauld (April 30 1687)”; Ariew & Garber, 87.  
37 Leibniz, Monadology §69; Latta, 257.  
38 Leibniz, Elements of Natural Law, §5; Loemker, 214.  
39 Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, §9; Ariew & Garber, 42.  
40 Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, §6; Loemker, 470. 
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greater perfection if it were in all. And even if . . . intelligent souls . . . 
cannot be everywhere, this is no objection to the view that there should 
everywhere be souls, or at least things analogous to souls.41  
Importantly, in this passage, not only does Leibniz argue that panpsychism “shows up the 
greatness of God in an appropriate way” but reinforces that this glory-reflecting 
panpsychism allows for the distinction between intelligent souls and non-intelligent souls or 
“at least things analogous to soul.”42 It is not only the intellectual rationality of the human 
mind that brings glory to God, but the basic property of experience found across the 
universe as well.   
In many ways, Leibniz’s Argument from Fittingness dovetails with the affirmation that the 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo means that God’s “Perfect power does not absorb, exclude or 
overwhelm and dispossess other dependent powers and agents, but precisely the opposite: 
omnipotent power creates and perfects creaturely capacity and movement.”43 Leibniz, at 
least, argued that the maximum fulfilment of this ex nihilo principle — the maximum 
amount of secondary causation, contingent creaturely power and goodness — results in a 
panpsychist universe. In a panpsychist universe, at every point of the universe, God has 
bestowed indwelling powers of action and subjectivity of intrinsic value.  
 
3. Three Arguments for Panpsychism from a Comprehensive Created Order 
 
Leibniz’s second great principle is the Principle of Predicate-in-Notion.44 This principle is the 
main explanatory principle in The New System but finds its clearest definition in the earlier 
Discours: “In every true proposition, necessary or contingent, universal or singular, the 
notion of the predicate is contained in some way in the subject. If not, I do not know what 
truth is.”45 This principle, that “It is the very nature of substance that the present is great 
[pregnant] with the future and that everything can be understood out of one [that is, the future 
can be inferred from the present], at least if God does not intervene with a miracle”, is a 
                                                 
41 Leibniz, On Nature Itself §12; Loemker, 820. 
42 Leibniz, Monadology, §59; Latta, 249 and §19; Latta. 230.  
43 John Webster attributes this affirmation to both Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth. Webster, “Love is also a 
lover of life,” 170.  
44 Broad, Leibniz, 6-10.  
45 Leibniz, Discours §8; G. II, 56; Loemker, 337. 
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crucial principle for Leibniz’s panpsychism.46 It is because every individual substance is 
known by God as a “complete concept”, that each monad “contains” within it all truths about 
itself, past, present and future.47 It is in defence of a theological conviction, that the universe 
has a comprehensive order and so reflects the unity, rationality, and omniscience of the 
Creator, that motivates Leibniz’s Argument from Continuity, the Argument from Indwelling 
Powers, and the Argument from Non-Emergence for panpsychism. We shall examine in turn 
how Leibniz’s formulated each of these arguments for panpsychism and used each for the 
service of theology.  
Theologically, the Principle of Predicate-in-Notion means that when “God at first created the 
soul or any other real unity”, God did so in such a way “that everything must arise in it from 
its own inner nature”.48 All integrity and causal powers are given “from the beginning”.49 
Leibniz argues that God loaded all properties, events, and powers for all time into the first act 
of creation. This is a result of Leibniz’s commitment to the wisdom and foreknowledge of 
God, that no later additions or corrections should be required. The act of creation ex nihilo 
stands unique and sufficient. In this way, Leibniz’s holds to the continuity of all things, such 
that “the nature of things is uniform, and our [human] nature cannot differ infinitely from the 
other simple substances of which the whole universe consists.”50 There no latter additions of 
new substances, which would introduce a dualism of discontinuity into the universe. Leibniz 
declares proudly that, “it is one of my great and best confirmed maxims that nature never 
makes leaps. I call this the Law of Continuity.”51 Thus, the mentality or the potential for 
mentality found in humans must also be found in the simplest monads of the universe. These 
are the bones of a theological argument for panpsychism from continuity. 
The Argument from Indwelling Powers for panpsychism is important for this theological 
assessment of panpsychism because it underpins Leibniz’s view of providence. Leibniz’ 
panpsychism grounds his articulation of double agency and the distinction between primary 
and secondary causation, in contrast to many of the trends in philosophy in his lifetime which 
sought to move away from this medieval theological schema. In his correspondence with 
Arnauld, Leibniz writes that “all [a substance’s] actions come from its own depths, except of 
                                                 
46 See, “Leibniz to Des Bosses”, Hanover 19 August, 1715,”; G., II, 502-5; Loemker, 999.  
47 See, Phemister, Leibniz and the Environment, 35-45. 
48 Leibniz, New System §14; Latta, 313.  
49 Leibniz, New System §15; Latta, 315; Third Explanation; Latta, 333. 
50 Leibniz, Correspondence with De Volder, 30 June 1704; G. II, 270; Loemker, 876.   
51 Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, trans. P. Remnant and J. Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), 56; G., VI.vi.56. 
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its dependence on God.”52 Primary causation is each monad’s dependency on God for 
continued existence; secondary causation is the actions and forces which come from within 
the monad which God sustains. Leibniz’s panpsychism is an articulation of the creation as a 
plenum of secondary powers, created, sustained and harmonised by God. 
Leibniz rejected Descartes’ account that emptied the non-human world of any indwelling 
powers or teleology, because Descartes then had to suppose that God recreated each atom and 
the whole universe entirely afresh from moment to moment. Robert Boyle’s Free Inquiry and 
On Nature Itself expanded Descartes’ view to argue that external divine laws were the sole 
cause governing all things.53 Leibniz was concerned that this would make nature into a kind 
of idol since the objects of the world were direct and immediate manifestations of the Divine 
will. For similar reasons, Leibniz also rejects the occasionalism of Malebranche as requiring 
a “perpetual miracle”, in favour of his own view of “harmony pre-established”.54  
Leibniz’s monads owe their origin to God and require God’s perpetual concurrence as a 
necessary condition for their continued existence – they are dependent upon God at all times 
– but all things have genuine secondary causal powers of their own as “an inherent law, 
impressed by divine Decree”.55 As such, there can be no competition between God’s agency 
and the indwelling powers in Leibniz’s panpsychist universe. Although “Monads have no 
windows” to allow causation between created objects, “we might say that, for Leibniz, God 
can walk through walls”.56 Leibniz can affirm the reality of miracles, albeit that God foresaw 
and preestablished their need, since these are not violations of natural laws but “something 
which exceeds the power of created things”, or goes beyond the “God-given nature of things” 
for a particular purpose.57 Further discussion on this topic of panpsychism and special divine 
action is given in the next chapter.  
                                                 
52 Leibniz, Correspondence with Arnauld, in The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence, trans. and ed. H.T. Mason 
(Manchester/ New York: Manchester University Press, 1967), 170; G II.136. Cf. Theodicy §10, in Huggard and 
Farrer, 80.  
53 Robert Boyle’s Free Inquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature (1682) and the subsequent On 
Nature Itself (1688) were defended by J.C. Sturm’s “Defence” (appended to Elective Physics), which Leibniz 
responds to in Nature Itself (1698).  
54 Leibniz, New System, §12-13; Latta, 312; Third Explanation, Latta, 333. See also, On Nature Itself §10; 
Loemker, 816-17.  
55 Leibniz, On Nature Itself, §12; Loemker, 819. Brandon C. Look, "Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz", The Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/leibniz/>. 
56 Smith, Introduction to Radical Orthodoxy, 221. See, Leibniz, Monadology §7; Ariew & Garber, 214.  
57 Leibniz, “Response to Bayle” GP IV 520; Loemker, 494. 
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Leibniz also employed the Argument from Non-Emergence for panpsychism. In his New 
Essays on Human Understanding, Leibniz responds to Locke’s philosophy, critiquing what 
he sees as a “pervasively materialist tendency.”58 Leibniz clearly disagreed with Locke’s 
assertion that matter “is evidently in its own nature void of sense and thought”.59 What is 
more intriguing, however, is Leibniz’s careful refutation of Locke’s statement that “I see no 
contradiction in [that God] should, if he pleased, give to certain systems of created senseless 
matter . . . some degrees of sense, perception, and thought.”60 Skrbina describes this moment 
in Locke as one that “could lead to a version of panpsychism” if the author were not such a 
thorough-going sceptic and empiricist.61 Why, then, does Leibniz vehemently disagree with a 
passage where Locke seems to allow for the possibility of Leibniz’s own position? It is 
because the similarity is superficial and the differences profoundly theological.  
Leibniz distinguishes Locke’s imagined possibility, where God gives thought to matter as a 
kind of miracle, from his own view of conceivable modification of the principles given to 
matter from creation. In his response to Locke, we have Leibniz’s clearest articulation of the 
Argument from Non-Emergence for panpsychism. It is almost identical to contemporary 
arguments in philosophy of mind, but with more explicit theological concerns and reasoning.  
Consistent to the principle of predicate-in-notion, Leibniz argues that changes in nature must 
arise from what is natural to the genus of a thing.62 He states that “God is not arbitrarily free 
to give to substance one set of qualities or another indifferently” for God has already freely 
bestowed objects certain natures, and so God “will never give them any [modifications] but 
those which are natural to them, that is to say, which can be derived from their [God-given] 
nature.”63  Leibniz here is not trying to limit God’s power or freedom but denying the 
implication that God would act arbitrarily, that is “without rhyme or reason” and either make 
modifications to substances which had not been foreseen and prepared for in the creation of 
the universe. It is not that Leibniz denies the possibility of miracles, to the contrary he 
continually qualifies statements to allow for the possibility, but he holds “that God should 
usually perform miracles would certainly be without rhyme or reason.”64 Leibniz argues that 
miracles should not be built into our systematic or scientific understandings of nature, for this 
                                                 
58 Nicholas Jolley, Leibniz and Locke: A Study on New Essays on Human Understanding (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984), 7.  
59 Jolley, 7. 
60 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Dent: Dutton, 1689/1964), IV.3.vi.  
61 Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West, 92.  
62 Leibniz, New Essays; Latta, 398.  
63 Leibniz, New Essays; Latta, 399. 
64 Leibniz, New Essays; Latta, 399. 
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is to make a kind of category error. Leibniz writes that to fail to distinguish the natural and 
conceivable from the inexplicable and miraculous “would be to maintain something worse 
than occult qualities and accordingly to renounce philosophy and reason, and to provide 
refuges for ignorance and idleness.”65 Any modifications which do occur, then, must be 
“conceivable, if we were admitted into the secret of things.”66 That is, we may not be able to 
explain consciousness precisely, but we must hold the form of an explanation that is 
conceivable. For something to obtain a new property, quality or capacity – say the capacity 
for thought – it must have hidden within its nature something which makes such a 
modification conceivable and natural to it. Leibniz is arguing for panpsychism, against 
theistic emergent dualism whereby God intermittently creates each animal mind from 
nothing, on the basis of his theology of the uniqueness of creation ex nihilo and his 
commitment to the rationality, power and foreknowledge of God.67 
What we find in Leibniz is a thoroughly panpsychist ontology, motivated by theological 
concerns guarding the rationality, power, and wisdom of God through a single, 
comprehensive created order. Whilst the principles of sufficient reason and predicate-in-
notion are thoroughly philosophical, they are also derived from theological commitments and 
serve theological ends. Leibniz argues for a theological panpsychism on the basis that a 
panpsychist universe is most fitting or perfect, by giving maximum glory to God and 
therefore it is the type of universe that God has sufficient reason to create. The radical 
uniqueness of the act of creation and foreknowledge of God undergirds Leibniz’s version of 
the argument from continuity as the front-loading of creation. All later developments in the 
diversity of the natural world are contained in the earliest created monads. A panpsychist 
continuity between humanity and monads removes any need for additional acts of creation or 
the addition of new substances to explain human rationality. The indwelling, secondary, 
powers of a panpsychist creation undergird Leibniz’s view of providence as a pre-established 
harmony. Lastly, Leibniz disavows the possibility of radical emergence of mind from inert 
matter not as a metaphysical impossibility, but as contrary to the rationality of God. In all 
these arguments, Leibniz depicts panpsychism as the ontological conclusion of his 
                                                 
65 Leibniz, New Essays; Latta, 399.  
66 Leibniz, New Essays; Latta, 399. 
67 These theological concerns manifest through his philosophical principles, the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
and the Principle of Predict-in-Notion. One might say that these philosophical principles function as 
intermediaries between Leibniz’s theology and his panpsychism. These principles arise out of Leibniz’s doctrine 
of God and, when put to work in Leibniz’s understanding of nature, result in a panpsychism metaphysic.  
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theological commitment to a single comprehensive created order, which best reflects the 
power and goodness of the Creator.  
 
4. Panpsychism as a Sacramental Ontology 
 
When panpsychism is moulded to serve the theology of a single comprehensive creation, 
made from nothing but the free and transcendent will of God, the resulting ontology is 
thoroughly sacramental. That is, all finite substances symbolise, or point beyond themselves, 
to their transcendent, supernatural source. This final theological aspect of Leibniz’s 
panpsychism arises out of the amalgamation of the indwelling powers that panpsychism 
posits throughout reality, and the radical dependency of those powers that the doctrine of 
creation ex nihilo prescribes. The universe participates in God’s power and in so doing does 
not stand in competition to God but is sustained as a panpsychist, sacramental, universe. This 
combination of statements, bolstered by claims of continuity across the created order, results 
in the view that all points, bodies, or subjects of creation are sacramentally open to the 
indwelling power of God. Panpsychism facilitates a form of sacramentality by suggesting that 
it is at the point of interiority that all things remain dependent upon and open to the divine 
presence. Insofar as these indwelling powers of panpsychism also exist on a scale with 
perception and consciousness, this fundamental mentality allows for a view of creation as 
filled with praise and with knowledge of the glory of God.68  
                                                 
68 The idea of all creation as a community that offers praise to God is most famously expressed in Francis of 
Assisi’s Canticle of the Creatures. This is a fairly unsystematic, even doxological, approach to theological 
panpsychism, to which we shall return in chapter five. Francis of Assisi, “Canticle of the Creatures,” in Francis 
of Assisi: Early Documents, eds. R.J. Armstrong, J. A. W. Hellmann and W. J. Short, 4 vols. (New York: 1999-
2002), vol. 1, 114. This sibling attitude towards all creation and his care for animals in particular is attested to 
by his biographers, Thomas of Celano and Bonaventura. See, Thomas of Celano, The Life of Saint Francis 
(1228-9) in Francis of Assisi, eds. Armstrong et al., 180-308; and Bonaventura, The Major Lie of Saint Francis 
(1260-63), in Francis of Assisi, eds. Armstrong et al., 525-683. See also, Timothy J. Johnson, “Francis and 
Creation,” in The Cambridge Companion to Francis of Assisi, ed. Michael J.P. Robson (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 143-158. One finds the idea of a sacramental and doxologically ordered universe in 
conjunction with panpsychist thinking scattered throughout Christian tradition. One might point to Cambridge 
Platonist, Margaret Cavendish, as an example when she wrote, “All parts of Nature, even the inanimate, have an 
innate and fixt self-knowledge, it is probable that they may also have an interior self-knowledge of the existency 
of the Eternal and Omnipotent God, as the Author of Nature.” Margaret Cavendish, Observations upon 
Experimental Philosophy, ed. Eileen O’Neill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1655/2001), 16. The 
non-reflective subjectivity in all things, Cavendish suggests, signifies an awareness of creaturely contingency, 
and this feeling of absolute dependence of creation the God who communicates one’s own existence, may 
described as the reverse side of a sacramental ontology. 
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It is, perhaps unsurprisingly, in the unfinished collection of writings known as Catholic 
Demonstrations that Leibniz’s sacramentalism comes through strongest. Leibniz wrote that 
the real presence in the Eucharist reveals that God is “diffused through everything”.69 God is 
present to the world through the sensory accidents that are not God.70 Drawing upon the more 
Platonic stream in Christian theology, Leibniz saw creation as the “Ideas of God” such that 
“an act of God is in the creature although God is everywhere.”71 Moreover, the substance of a 
thing is an idea in the concurrent mind of God, such that all of creation stands in union with 
God.72 Therefore, humanity need not escape the world in order to know God, but “the beatific 
vision or the intuition of God, face to face, is the contemplation of the universal Harmony of 
things”, for the beauty and harmony of all things is a reflection of God.73 Christia Mercer 
argues from this that God, for Leibniz, is found as much in the diversity as in the unity of 
creation, “like an infinite melody played in infinitely complex ways.”74 Whether the 
metaphor is auditory, as an “Echo”, or visual as a “mirror”, Leibniz depicted the minds of 
creation as a “reflection and refraction or multiplication” of God.75 The minds, as the active 
principle of substance, of Leibniz’s ontology are “the instrument of God”, that is God’s active 
presence in the world and so are “unified with God”.76  
 
Leibniz employed his panpsychist metaphysic to depict a universally sacramental ontology, 
in an attempt to pacify the divisions between Lutherans, Reformed, and Roman Catholics 
over the Eucharist. Leibniz’s idea was that when Christ proclaims the words ‘this is my 
body’, then the mind, which is the substantial form and principle of action, in the elements is 
replaced by the mind of Christ. It is because Leibniz argues that all substances must be united 
                                                 
69 Leibniz, On transubstantiation, VI i. 511; quoted in Mercer, Leibniz’s Metaphysics, 224.  
70 According to Hans Boersma, a recent version of this sacramental, eucharistic ontology is found in Henri de 
Lubac. See Hans Boersma, “Sacramental Ontology: Nature and the Supernatural in the Ecclesiology of Henri de 
Lubac,” New Blackfriars 88, no.1015 (2007): 242-273. For a similar contemporary proposal see, Catherine 
Pickstock “Thomas Aquinas and the quest for the Eucharist,” in The Radical Orthodoxy Reader, eds. John 
Milbank and Simon Oliver (London: Routledge, 2009), 270-271. 
71 Leibniz, Notes on the Eucharist (supplement); Loemker, 184.   
72 Leibniz, On transubstantiation, Loemker, 179,183; Leibniz, Notes on the Eucharist, Loemker 184.  
73 Leibniz, Conspectus, quoted in Mercer, Leibniz’s Metaphysics, 213; GW, VI, i. 499. Later, around 1690 in On 
the true Theologia Mystica, Leibniz would write that “The divine perfections are concealed in all things, but 
very few know how to discover them there” because “Only the inner light which God himself kindles in us has 
the power to give us right knowledge of God.” See, Loemker, 608. 
74 Mercer, Leibniz’s Metaphysics, 215. She notes that Philo made the same argument centuries earlier when he 
wrote that “our whole system, like a melodious chorus of men, may sing in concert one well-harmonized 
melody of different sounds well combined.” Her analysis, however, suggests that God is not the worshipped, but 
the music itself. Philo, On the migration of Abraham, XVIII 104 in The Words of Philo, trans. C.D. Yonge, 
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1993), 263.  
75 Quoted in Mercer, Leibniz’s Metaphysics, 218, taken from the second note for the Elements of Nature Law, 
VI i 438. 
76 Leibniz, On the incarnation, VI.i.534; quoted in Mercer, Leibniz’s Metaphysics, 221.  
105 
 
with a mind (and this is one of Leibniz’s arguments for the existence of God) that all bodies 
and ideas are a sacramental “union of God with creature.”77 Transubstantiation occurs when 
the sustaining and concurrent mind to which a substance is unified is changed from the mind 
of God (as primary act), to the mind of Christ. This constitutes a real multi-presence, a 
substantial change without altering the accidents, that makes the elements numerically the 
same substantial form (numerically the same body) as the crucified and glorified body of 
Christ.78 Leibniz’s understanding of the sacrament of Eucharist is founded upon a wider 
sacramental ontology.79 
 
The benefit of Leibniz’s metaphysical system for contemporary theology is argued for by 
James K.A. Smith. Smith describes Leibniz’s thought (read through the eyes of Deleuze) as 
containing “the resources for countering a Platonic and modern disenchantment of the world 
through the re-enchantment of nature, emphasizing the creational character of reality by an 
affirmation of the integrity of immanence.”80  Smith urges the proponents of the Radical 
Orthodoxy movement in particular to adopt a Deleuze-interpreted-Leibnizian ontology, in 
order to articulate their idea of the “suspension of matter” through participation of God.81 In 
envisioning what is required for the future of Radical Orthodoxy, John Milbank too has 
called for a “nuanced version of panpsychic vitalism in which a self-organising power 
operates with different degrees of intensity at every level of physical reality from the 
inorganic to the consciously rational.”82 The rediscovery of panpsychism as a sacramental 
ontology by the proponents of Radical Orthodoxy is one possible future articulation of a 
theological panpsychism, which could draw upon the historical resources fronted in this 
chapter and be clearly distinct from either pantheist or Process thought. 
                                                 
77 GW, VI, i., 508-12, (I.8), Loemker, 179.  
78 Backus, Leibniz, 18-20.  
79 This is rather differently expressed, but without significant theological changes, in Leibniz’s complex 
exchange with Des Bosses over the role of the vinculum, as Christ as the substantial bond of union, in 
transubstantiation. G.W. Leibniz, The Leibniz-Des Bosses Correspondence, ed. and intro. Brandon C. Look and 
Donald Rutherford (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007), lvii-lxxii.  
80 Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy, 207.  
81 Radical Orthodoxy is a contemporary theological movement seeking to rediscover the idea that, “If matter is 
to be more than inert, and even capable of subjectivity and meaning, then it must be innately more than a 
spatially or mechanically limited substance.” John Milbank, “Materialism and Transcendence,” Theology and 
the Political: The New Debate, eds. Creston Davis, John Milbank, and Slavoj Žižek (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2005), 394-95. Similarly, Catherine Pickstock argues for the universal musicality and liturgy 
which resists the reduction of subjectivity to ‘spatialisation’ on a cosmic scale. Catherine Pickstock, After 
Writing: The Liturgical Consummation of Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 60-61 and Catherine Pickstock, 
“Music: Soul, city and cosmos after Augustine,” in Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1999), 243-277.  
82 John Milbank, “The grandeur of reason and the perversity of rationalism: Radical Orthodoxy’s first decade,” 






This historical interlude has explored the way that Leibniz’s system of monads, as one 
idiosyncratic version of panpsychism, was employed to serve theological arguments 
amenable to a broad understanding of Christian orthodoxy. Leibniz is not alone in this 
endeavour, but his panpsychism certainly ran deeper and was expressed more explicitly than 
in most, and as such Leibniz served the purposes of this interlude well. This brief discussion 
forefronts how the ontology of panpsychism has long been considered a fruitful dialogue 
partner for Christian thought, such that the contemporary revival of interest in analytic 
philosophy of mind is better seen as the opportunity for theological recovery, rather than an 
introduction of a new philosophical fashion into Christian thought. Panpsychism was both 
derived from Leibniz’s commitments to the transcendence, foreknowledge, and rationality of 
God, and employed to bolster his affirmation of creation ex nihilo, the view of creation as a 
complete and comprehensive order, and a sacramental ontology. These three theological 
claims remain important theological principles in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, 




Chapter 4: Indwelling Creation:  Panpsychism and Divine Action 
 
Divine action is one of the most discussed topics in recent theology, and it is common to assert 
that it is a discussion in crisis.1 Located at the heart of the gospel, many have noted that “the 
very idea of God stands or falls with the idea that God acts in relation to the world.”2 Moreover, 
theologians must do more than claim that God acts in a vague and ubiquitous manner, since 
unless some historical events are more decisive than others for understanding who God is, then  
“[a]ll is thrown back on man rather than on God.”3 What is required is a suitably differentiated 
account of the variety of divine acts that forms the basis of the biblical and ecclesial witness to 
who God is.4 An interweaving plurality of models of divine action may be required to represent 
the diverse ways God is depicted as interacting with the world by the biblical authors. 
It would be foolhardy to claim that by reconceiving the creation as a panpsychist universe all 
the questions surrounding divine action can be solved; panpsychism is not a deus ex machina. 
The acts of God affirmed by the Christian tradition are too varied and the resulting questions 
to be asked too wide-ranging for any one single solution.5 However, philosophy of mind has 
long been considered a parallel discourse to divine action, such that when exploring the 
implications of a particular ontology for Christian theology, divine action is a pertinent area of 
investigation. There are two conclusions from this chapter’s enquiry. First, panpsychism is a 
flexible metaphysical backdrop that would be of benefit to a range of theological proposals in 
the area of divine action. Second, panpsychism’s distinctive contribution allows for a greater 
emphasis upon the indwelling of the Holy Spirit as the ongoing interaction between God and 
                                                 
1 This is the oft cited conclusion in Nicholas Saunders, Divine Action & Modern Science (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 215. 
2 Brian Hebblethwaite and Edward Henderson, eds., Divine Action: Studies Inspired by the Philosophical 
Theology of Austin Farrer (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990), 1. 
3 Gunton, Being and Becoming, 47. 
4 It is customary to organise the various acts of God into typologies, such as distinguishing between general a 
special divine action, or between preservation, concursus, and gubernation. Since these given categories do not 
always map on as neatly as one might hope to the events of divine action given in Scripture and personal 
testimonies, and instead tend to collapse non-identical acts into a single treatment, this chapter’s own 
construction avoids relying on these overarching typologies and will seek to refer as specifically as possible to 
the divine action in question where possible. This is not to say that such typologies are not helpful in some 
circumstances.  
5 This point is well made by William J. Abraham who writes that it is wrong to suggest “that there is something 
like ‘the problem of divine action’. . . there is no one problem of divine action or divine agency; there is a 
cluster of issues that overlap in complex ways and that require both careful delineation and reintegration if we 
are to make progress.” William J. Abraham, Divine Agency and Divine Action: Exploring and Evaluating the 
Debate, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 12-13.  
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all God’s creatures, which is to be held in conjunction with other manifestations of divine 
agency.  
In order to establish these conclusions, this chapter is best understood as having four tasks, or 
investigating four questions: (1) What is the perceived problem in discussions of divine action? 
(2) Given this problem, what solutions are currently offered by theologians? (3) How might 
panpsychism help make these specific solutions more satisfactory?  (4) Finally, what is it that 
panpsychism brings to the overarching area of divine action? The first three sections of this 
chapter each discuss questions one to three in the context of different theological projects. The 
fourth question is discussed independently thereafter.  
The first task is to understand what the problem of divine action is understood to be in 
contemporary theology; why is it that Christianity’s claims to believe that God acts in the world 
today are often met with manifest scepticism (even by many Christians and theologians)? This 
chapter characterises the current difficulty facing the proclamation of divine action as the effect 
of a shadow. If God’s actions are like lights shining onto this world, but articulating this idea 
raises issues in different areas, then these issues can be depicted as casting a shadow over the 
Christian witness to divine acts. This shadow is identified as the resistance to invoking the 
language of intervention in describing how God acts in the world. Millard Erickson, for 
example, simply states that “God resides outside the world and intervenes periodically within 
the natural processes through miracles.”6 This seems to be a straightforward conception of 
divine action, so why does the crucial verb, “intervenes”, throw the proclamation of God’s 
action into murk for many? The first three sections of this chapter categorise the issues of 
intervention into scientific objections, ethical concerns, and theological dilemmas. Together 
these issues, insofar as they are perceived to be real and legitimate challenges for theology, 
have placed significant constraints upon contemporary accounts of divine action.7  
The challenge has been – and continues to be – articulating a model of God’s redemptive 
personal engagement with the world without invoking the language of intervention. The second 
task of this chapter is to evaluate three prominent answers, each of which is written as a 
response to a different aspect of the shadow of interventionism; Robert J. Russell’s response to 
scientific objections by use of quantum indeterminacy, David Ray Griffin’s answer to ethical 
                                                 
6 Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1985), 304. 
7 The widespread resistance to the language of intervention has been challenged by Alvin Plantinga. Alvin 
Plantinga, “What Is ‘Intervention’?,” Theology and Science 6, no. 4 (2008): 369-401. Writing on divine action 
after this publication certainly requires theologians to be clearer about what the problem with intervention 
language is taken to be, which is the first task of this chapter.  
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concerns through a Process account of divine persuasion, and Kathryn Tanner’s account of 
double agency as the best way to hold together theological claims of power, grace, and freedom. 
The third task of this chapter is to consider if and how panpsychism could be a beneficial 
metaphysic for each of these three theologians to adopt in their effort to dispel the shadow of 
interventionist language. This is not a syncretistic argument since the three models of divine 
action are constructed as incompatible alternatives by their various proponents. This variety is 
deliberate since it serves to show the theological flexibility of panpsychism. The intention is 
not to construct a single, new, all-inclusive panpsychist model of divine action; a task which I 
neither have the space to achieve, nor does panpsychism alone provide the theological 
resources to accomplish. To construct a new single panpsychist model of divine action would 
be to portray panpsychism as a theological alternative, rather than a metaphysical view of 
creation that may be of benefit to various theological positions. Due to my prior affirmation of 
the doctrine of creation ex nihilo and resistance of naturalism, I am only able (or willing) to 
engage in the latter sort of investigation and subsume this metaphysical ontology of 
panpsychism within different theological proposals, not vice versa.  
The fourth task, considered in the final section, is to gather together the various strands of this 
argument to identify panpsychism’s distinctive contribution to discussions of divine action. In 
so doing, we are left with the conclusion that what panpsychism uniquely offers is a robust way 
to articulate an interactive divine presence. By envisioning an interior depth to all created 
beings, panpsychism allows theologians to extend the concept of the indwelling of the Holy 
Spirit as the means of divine action in the life of the believer to the whole of creation; in so 
doing panpsychism dispels a bit more of the gloom cast by the shadow of interventionism.  
 
1. Scientific Objections and Quantum Solutions: Robert J. Russell  
 
Robert J. Russell defines divine intervention as when “God performs such acts by intervening 
in or suspending the laws of nature.”8 This definition presupposes theological incompatibilism, 
                                                 
8 Robert J. Russell, “Introduction,” in Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, eds. 
Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, William R. Stoeger, S.J., (Vatican City State/ Berkeley, CA: Vatican 
Observatory Publications/ The Centre for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1997), 10. This definition is often 
traced back to David Hume’s rejection of miracles as the “transgression of a law of nature by a particular 
volition of the Deity”. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the 
Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902), 115f. John Wilkins, one of the 
110 
 
such that divine action and creaturely action compete as alternative explanations for events. 
The central question raised by this common definition of divine intervention is, what do we 
mean by ‘laws of nature’ such that they seem to compete with God? Natural laws can be 
understood in a variety of ways; do natural laws prescribe or describe the activity of nature or 
are they just useful in scientific models such that we cannot be sure they refer accurately to 
reality at all?9 Due to commitments to epistemological realism and the contingency of the 
natural order, many theologians reject the anti-realist, instrumentalist, or prescriptive 
interpretations of natural laws. Instead, contemporary theologians working in the dialogue 
between science and religion typically support the view that natural laws describe the 
regularities that exist in the created world. However, these regularities may be neither ironclad, 
nor identical to our scientific descriptions, which reduce to deterministic equations.10  
This understanding of natural laws already introduces a measure of ambiguity and flexibility 
into the mechanistic description of the natural world offered by Newtonian physics. And yet, 
theologians still find themselves doing conceptual gymnastics to avoid implying that God’s 
actions “break” natural laws or intervene in nature.11 Why? There is nothing within science 
itself that prohibits God’s action over and above the causal powers of the creation and our 
description of how they usually function. Yet, the fear of interventionist language remains 
because the idea that God suspends nature’s regular processes seems to threaten some of the 
core philosophical presuppositions upon which scientific research proceeds, as well as some of 
the most longstanding and celebrated ways of construing harmony between the natural sciences 
and belief in God. I will briefly outline the theological foundations and philosophical 
presuppositions of these scientific objections to divine intervention, and then explore the non-
interventionist model of divine action proposed by Robert J. Russell.  
The concept of natural laws in Western thought was developed upon the theological foundation 
of belief in a Divine lawgiver. One of the most celebrated ways of construing harmony between 
                                                 
founding members of the Royal Society, was another an early voice in defining miracles as “violation” or 
“disordering” the “universal laws of nature”. Peter Harrison, “Newtonian Science, Miracles, and the Laws of 
Nature”, Journal of the History of Ideas 56, no.4 (1995): 535. 
9 See, Rom Harré, Laws of Nature (London: Duckworth, 1993).  
10 A good example of this discussion is found in William R. Stoeger, “Contemporary Physics and the 
Ontological Status of the Laws of Nature,” in Quantum Cosmology and the Laws of Nature: Scientific 
Perspectives on Divine Action, eds. Robert J. Russell, Nancey Murphy, and C.J. Isham (Vatican City State/ 
Berkeley, CA: Vatican Observatory Publications/ The Centre for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1996), 
207-234. See also, John Polkinghorne, “The Laws of Nature and the Laws of Physics,” in Quantum Cosmology, 
429-440. 
11 Philip Clayton writes that “the real problem here, apparently, is that is it very difficult to come up with an idea 
of divine action in the world in which such action would not constitute ‘breaking natural laws’ or ‘breaking 
physical law’.” Clayton, God and Contemporary Science, 195, 203, 206. 
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science and theology is the argument that the search for underlining principles in the natural 
order in the early modern period was only made possible because of the widespread belief in a 
rational, faithful, and all-powerful Creator.12 The regularities of the natural order serve as 
testament to the “faithful and trustworthy action” of God.13 In the preface of the second edition 
of Isaac Newton’s Principia Mathematica, Roger Cotes wrote that from “the perfectly free will 
of God . . . those laws, which we call the laws of Nature, have flowed.”14 As the medieval 
distinction between created processes as secondary causation, and God’s primary action which 
sustains and directs creation, faded from view, God’s relationship with the discoveries of 
science became more immediate. In his correspondence with Leibniz, Samuel Clarke argued 
that, “What men commonly call ‘the course of nature’ . . . is nothing else but the will of God 
producing certain effects in a continued, regular, constant, and uniform manner.”15 Not only 
does the regular uniformity of natural laws manifest the constancy of God’s character and the 
rationality of God’s will, but since natural laws are finitely inviolable – they cannot be broken 
or made void by finite beings – they point to the power of God. Although the fallible laws of 
physics constructed by the scientist may not be identical to the infallible laws of nature made 
by God, decoupling the two is not a straightforward matter. As such, the descriptions of science 
often appear in the place of the pronouncements of God. 
This is all well and good, until one turns to consider the particular divine acts to which Scripture 
and tradition witness. These claims go beyond God’s original creation and preservation of the 
world to describe events that stand apart from scientific descriptions of nature’s usual 
processes. Wesley Wildman summarises the concern of many that, “the idea of God sustaining 
nature and its law-like regularities with one hand while miraculously intervening, abrogating 
or ignoring those regularities with the other hand struck most members [of VO/CNTS project, 
see below] as dangerously close to outright contradiction.”16 One could respond, as Alvin 
Plantinga has done, that the objection that God’s intervention would be inconsistent 
presupposes that God could not have any good reasons for acting in a twofold way.17 God’s 
actions, eschatologically conceived, might be seen as consistently working to bring about the 
                                                 
12 This paragraph is indebted to Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies, 275-77.  
13 Robert J. Russell, Cosmology. From Alpha to Omega: The creative mutual interaction of theology and science 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008), 119. 
14 Roger Cotes, Newton’s Philosophy of Nature: Selections from his writings (New York: Hafner Library of 
Classics, 1953), 132-33.  
15 Samuel Clarke, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, ed. Ezio Vailati (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 149. 
16 Wesley Wildman, “The Divine Action Project, 1988-2003,” Theology and Science, 2 (2004): 38. 
17 Plantinga, “What Is ‘Intervention’?,” 373. 
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same intended end.18 Who are we to judge the consistency between God’s acts? Moreover, the 
inconsistency objection often follows Clarke in implying that God not only mercifully sustains, 
but directly wills natural laws. Clarke’s view should be questioned, since it leaves little scope 
for articulating the idea of creation as in need of redemption or as fallen in some way. These 
responses notwithstanding, it remains the case that objections from within the science and 
religion dialogue against the language of intervention are linked to an association between 
natural laws as signs of God’s rationality, constancy, and power, such that any contradiction of 
these laws implies irrationality, inconsistency and weakness on the part of God. 
A subtle shift in the conceptual framework underpinning the natural sciences, from theological 
foundations to philosophical presuppositions, slowly transpired throughout the modern period. 
In the early part of the twentieth century this transference became manifest in the arguments of 
some prominent theologians against belief in divine intervention. Rudolf Bultmann, for 
example, identified divine action with ‘myth’ because supernatural causation is “not capable 
of objective scientific proof”.19 Bultmann is discussing the epistemology, or inability for 
objective (empirical) verification, of special divine action. In contemporary terminology we 
might refer to this as methodological naturalism, a term first coined by theologians seeking to 
protect theology against expansionist tendencies of scientism.20 However, the presupposition 
that science can provide an accurate and complete description of the world apart from divine 
action rests upon another questionable presupposition; the principle of causal closure. Causal 
closure is defined by John Macquarrie as the assumption “that whatever events occur in the 
world can be accounted for in terms of other events that also belong within the world.”21 If God 
is spoken of at all in conjunction with causal closure/physical determinism, it is to 
                                                 
18 Colin E. Gunton, The Triune Creator: A Historical and Systematic Study (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
1998), 176-77.  
19 Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology (New York: Charles Scribner’s Son, 1958), 61. This 
disenchantment lead to the two-language problem in theologies of divine action, famously criticised by Langdon 
Gilkey, “Cosmology, Ontology and the Travail of Biblical Language,” The Journal of Religion 41 (1961): 194-
205. Robert J. Russell’s work in founding the VO/CNTS project and providing scientific solutions to theological 
questions can be seen as a response to Gilkey’s paper, as is clear in the title of Russell’s article, “Does ‘The God 
Who Acts’ Really Act?,” Theology Today 54 (1997): 44-65.  
20 Harry Lee Poe and Chelsea Rose Mytyk, “From scientific method to methodological naturalism: the evolution 
of an idea,” Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 59, no. 3 (Sept. 2007): 213-19.  
21 John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, 2nd ed. (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1977), 248. Nicholas 
Saunders summarises that “The causally closed view of science in which every event leads to another seems to 
many to leave no room for God at all.”  Nicholas Saunders, “Does God Cheat at Dice? Divine Action and 
Quantum Possibilities,” Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 35, no. 3 (2000): 518. As such, Benedikt Göcke 
argues that causal closure “is neither a consequence, nor a presupposition of science itself. Instead, it is a 
philosophical assumption that belongs to an atheistic and naturalistic worldview.” Benedikt Paul Göcke, “The 
Many Problems of Special Divine Action,” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7, no.4 (Summer 
2015): 32.   
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metaphysically prop up the causal structure that the natural sciences describe, to sustain but 
never transform or interact with creation.22 These naturalistic presuppositions leave theological 
concepts barren and vacuous. 
 
These objections to divine intervention, arising from the theological and philosophical 
underpinnings of the natural sciences, have been responded to (but not critiqued) in a 
tremendous joint effort from The Vatican Observatory and The Centre for Theology and the 
Natural Sciences (VO/CNTS). The resulting publications from this project, which each bears 
the subtitle Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, explore the fecundity of different areas in 
the natural sciences where God (or human minds) may objectively be said to influence the 
causal nexus in a manner consistent with the scientific description of events. This model is 
often referred through the acronym “NIODA”; Non-Interventionist, Objective, Divine Action. 
 
The importance of specific scientific theories, which posit that some events “have necessary 
but not sufficient natural causes” so that the future is “influenced but underdetermined by the 
factors of nature acting in the present”, cannot be overstated for this approach to divine action.23 
This is because proponents of NIODA accept methodological naturalism, causal closure, that 
most events are physically determined, and Clarke’s view of natural laws as manifestations of 
God’s direct will. As such, the language of interventionism is taken as a very serious threat to 
the dialogue between science and religion. It is believed that insofar as Christianity stakes its 
claims upon accounts of divine intervention, it places itself in conflict with the natural sciences. 
It is predicted that this is a war that theology is unlikely to win. If the policy is one of 
appeasement, then the terms of peace are seen in the search for indeterministic openings within 
our current scientific theories that ‘make room’ for God to act in a non-interventionist manner.  
 
One of the most popular models emerging from the VO/CNTS project is the engagement with 
quantum mechanics (accounting for more than 25 of the 91 published chapters).24 The leading 
                                                 
22 See William Alston analysis of this problem, “Divine Action, Human Freedom, and the Laws of Nature,” in 
Quantum Cosmology, 185-206.  
23 Thomas Tracy, “Particular Providence and the God of the Gaps,” in Chaos and Complexity, 289-324. Robert 
J. Russell, Cosmology, 156. 
24 See Robert J. Russell’s table summarising the contents of the whole project. Russell, “Challenge and Progress 
in ‘Theology and Science’, Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, 9-17. Theological engagement with 
quantum mechanics for articulations of divine action goes back to the 1950’s in the work of William G. Pollard, 
Chance and Providence: God’s Action in the World Governed by Scientific Laws (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1958) and Karl Heim Transformation of the Scientific World View (London: SCM Press, 1953). 
Heim lent towards a more panpsychist interpretation of quantum phenomena.  
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architect of the quantum approach to special divine action is Robert J. Russell, and his efforts 
have been supported by Nancey Murphy, George Ellis, and Thomas Tracy. Russell summarises 
his model:  
If quantum mechanics is interpreted philosophically in terms of 
ontological indeterminism (as in one form of the Copenhagen 
interpretation), one can construct a bottom-up, non-interventionist, 
approach to mediated, objective, and direct divine action in which God’s 
indirect acts of general and special providence at the macroscopic level 
arise in part from God’s direct action at the quantum level.25 
The indeterminacy of quantum phenomena, Russell suggests, provide “intrinsic, naturally 
occurring gaps” in which God may act without intervening.26 The main advantage of this model 
of special divine action is the fundamental and ubiquitous nature of quantum 
events/particles/waves: “God is active everywhere in space and time in relation to ψ [the wave 
function] as it extends throughout space and evolves in time.”27 Locating divine action in 
quantum events means that this one model can account for the pervasiveness of divine action 
in the 11 billion years of cosmic history prior to the phenomenon of life, and God can be just 
as effective at the far reaches of the universe as on planet earth. But what does God actually do 
at the quantum level? 
I am not trained in the area of quantum physics, but an illustration can be helpful in conveying 
what Russell proposes. A common example of an under-determined quantum event is the 
decay of uranium into thorium, which occurs by the emission of an alpha particle. In a sample 
of uranium atoms, there appears to be no determining sufficient physical cause for when the 
alpha particle will be admitted from each atom, only probabilities (known as a ‘wave 
function’).28 Similar probabilities occur throughout the subatomic realm, which is then 
characterised as full of open potentiality (Heisenberg interpretation). Russell suggests that, 
because quantum events are underdetermined, there is space for God to act at this subatomic 
level by changing the probability (collapsing the wave function) of when the decay of uranium 
occurs.  
                                                 
25 Russell, Cosmology, 151.  
26 Robert J. Russell “Quantum Physics and the Theology of Non-Interventionist Objective Divine Action,” in 
The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, eds. Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 584. 
27 Russell, Cosmology, 184.   
28 Russell, 156.  
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If we are looking for a ‘causal joint’, a mechanism in the natural world where God can act 
“immediately in nature”, without interrupting sufficient and determinist causal networks, then 
Russell has clearly identified such a place; the wave function of quantum mechanics.29 The idea 
is that by “direct action” at the subatomic level, God’s will can be brought about indirectly at 
other levels of reality (biological, historical, etc.); “God can act providentially to determine the 
future course of the world through the openness of quantum reality.” 30 For the purposes of 
showing the flexibility of panpsychism for discussions in divine action, this section argues that 
Russell’s proposal faces significant challenges on its own terms, which a panpsychist 
interpretation of quantum mechanics would resolve. However, this is not to endorse the 
presuppositions explored above that have led to the search for non-interventionist openings in 
nature. Indeed, a panpsychist interpretation of quantum mechanics moves Russell’s account of 
divine agency away from the problematic assumptions of incompatibilism and naturalism, 
towards a more adequate theological picture. 
Russell’s theological incompatibilism inclines him towards the Copenhagen interpretation of 
quantum indeterminacy because it posits causal gaps in the natural order; God need not 
interrupt the causal nexus, because God created spaces in the causal chain at the quantum level. 
This leaves Russell’s proposal vulnerable to the ‘God-of-the-gaps’ objection, where God’s 
actions are limited to the (potentially temporary) phenomena science cannot explain.31 Russell 
responds to the god-of-the-gaps accusation by drawing a strong distinction between 
epistemological gaps in our current knowledge and ontological gaps that arise from what we 
do know. This distinction, however, is not as clear-cut as Russell suggests since quantum 
mechanics remains a mysterious scientific field (full of epistemological gaps) and the reality 
of indeterminacy is highly debated.32 Russell’s distinction between “epistemic gaps” and 
“ontological ‘bubbles’” slips easily through our fingers.33  
Panpsychism is closely associated with two of the other interpretations of quantum mechanics 
(the mind-dependent views of von Nuemann, Wigner, Wheeler and Stapp, and Bohm’s theory 
of “hidden variables”). As such, theologians invested in quantum models of special divine 
                                                 
29 Russell, “Introduction,” 12. Cf. Robert J. Russell, “Cosmology from Alpha to Omega”, Zygon: Journal of 
Religion and Science 29, no.4 (December 1994): 567-68.   
30 Russell, “Cosmology from Alpha to Omega”, 567-68.  
31 Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, Creation and Humanity: A Constructive Christian Theology for a Pluralistic World 
vol. 3 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2015), 180. See more on ‘god-of-the-gaps’ in chapter two, section three.  
32 As physicist Richard Feynman famously quipped: “nobody understands quantum mechanics.” Richard 
Feynman, The Character of Physical Law (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1967), 129. 
33 Russell, “Cosmology from Alpha to Omega”, 567-68. 
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action should consider the implications of panpsychism.34 Moreover, these interpretations 
reject the gappy view of nature posited by Heisenberg’s interpretation; one might even say that 
consciousness is employed to plug the apparent gap of indeterminacy. A panpsychist 
interpretation of quantum divine action could depict God as working with or within the psyche 
of quantum phenomena. 
Interestingly, this more panpsychist-compatibilist approach, is gestured towards by Russell in 
response to the challenge, launched by two VO/CNTS colleagues, to specify the extent of God’s 
involvement at the quantum level. If God acts directly in all quantum events, this leads 
dangerously close to “omnideterminism”.35 Alternatively, if God is only acting in some 
quantum measurements (because only a few quantum events are indeterminate), then John 
Polkinghorne has argued that this leads to a woefully “episodic account of providential agency” 
by a “hole-and-corner deity, fiddling around at the rickety roots of the cosmos”.36  
In response to this challenge, Russell follows Nancey Murphy in arguing that God is active in 
all quantum events, but not in an all-determining fashion. Instead, he writes that this model 
involves “a continuous creative (divine) presence within each (quantum) event, co-determining 
the outcome of these elementary physical processes.”37 This is an elegant and promising 
solution. However, there is a large question mark over the words “within” and “co-determining” 
here. How is the “within each (quantum) event” to be understood? It seems unlikely, given the 
non-material nature of divine presence and from what we know of quantum particles/waves, 
that this can be interpreted in a purely spatial way. A better interpretation would be to posit that 
quantum particles/waves have a “within” by virtue of having experiences, since this is how we 
use the word “within” when referring to God’s presence within human beings; “a subjective 
inwardness rather than an inner receptacle.”38 But this, of course, is panpsychism.  
Furthermore, any implication for Russell’s and Murphy’s account of co-operation between 
elementary physical processes and Divine agency can only be metaphorical. It is unclear that 
“co-determining” as used here sufficiently avoids the charge of determinism when there is only 
                                                 
34 I have developed this line of enquiry in Leidenhag, “The Revival of Panpsychism”.  
35 Russell rejects Karl Heim’s and E.L. Mascall’s employment of quantum indeterminacies to support divine 
omni-determinism. Russell, Cosmology, 153-154.  
36 John Polkinghorne, Science and Creation: The Search for Understanding (London: SPCK, 1988), 58; John 
Polkinghorne, Science and Providence: God’s Interaction with the World (West Conshohocken, PA: Templeton 
Press, 2005), 27-28; John Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality: The Relationship Between Science and Theology 
(London: SPCK Classics, 2011), 40-41.  
37 Russell, Cosmology, 156.  
38 Ian T. Ramsey, Models For Divine Activity (London: SCM Press, 1973), 12.  
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one active agent, as incompatibilism prescribes. Again, it seems that panpsychism, which posits 
a genuine “within” and the possibility of genuine co-operation (in so far as there are indwelling 
powers, but not rational volition) at the quantum level, may aid Russell in this regard.39  
If quantum indeterminacies are interpreted as the result of gaps (or openings) rather than of 
fundamental interiority, then Russell must say that God only works directly at the quantum 
level, since it is only here that such openings appear.40 But is the emission of an alpha particle 
(or similar subatomic events) a sufficient basis for God to achieve transformation or effect 
change at the level which human persons interact with and are concerned with? The formal 
argument against divine action through quantum events on these grounds has become known 
as ‘the amplification problem’. This is the argument that “whatever God might do at the 
quantum level, nature by and large prevents those actions from affecting the macroscopic 
realm.”41 The reason that nature prevents the amplification of quantum events to have 
macroscopic effects is because of emergent “protectorates”, which make higher-level 
fluctuations less sensitive to lower-level changes.42 Therefore, even if the subatomic world is 
truly indeterministic, this indeterminism seems to level out into deterministic regularities at the 
atomic and molecular level.43  
If quantum indeterminacy is the only means through which God could act within the universe, 
then the amplification problem would be a fatal blow to the power and effectiveness of divine 
agency. However, Russell and other theologians invested in this model limit their claim to 
arguing that “quantum physics contributes a necessary – though not a sufficient – piece to the 
explanatory puzzle of how God acts in the world.”44 Russell makes additional appeals to 
                                                 
39 Nancey Murphy implies an indwelling powers concept when she describes God “activating or actualising one 
or another of the quantum entity’s innate powers at particular instants.” Nancey Murphy, “Divine Action in the 
Natural Order,” in Chaos and Complexity, 340. 
40 The concern that Russell only leaves room for divine action at the quantum level is furthered by his argument 
that as consciousness evolves in complex organisms God must “increasingly refrain” from acting. Accordingly, 
and contrary to the majority of the Christian tradition, God, for Russell, is less involved in human affairs and 
inter-personal relationships, and more invested in mechanistic changes of events. This does not seem like a 
promising conclusion for Russell’s view of divine action. Russell, Cosmology, 189.  
41 Jeffrey Koperski, “Divine Action and the Quantum Amplification Problem,” Theology and Science 13, no.4 
(2015): 379.  See also, Timothy Sansbury, “The False Promise of Quantum Mechanics,” Zygon: Journal of 
Religion and Science 42 (2007): 111-21.  
42 Robert W. Batterman coined the term “Protectorates” in “Emergence, Singularities, and Symmetry Breaking,” 
Foundations of Physics 41, no.6 (2010): 1031-1050. See also Robert B. Laughlin and David Pines, “The Theory 
of Everything,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 97, no.1 
(2000): 28-31.  
43 There are some good examples of amplification, such as individual photons falling onto the retina of a 
mammal or determining a genetic mutation. Russell makes a great deal of these examples of amplification in his 
account of theistic evolution. Russell, Cosmology, chapter 6.  
44 Robert J. Russell, “Christian Discipleship and the Challenge of Physics: Formation, Flux, and Focus,” 
Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 42, no.3 (1990): 150.  
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concepts of strong emergence in particular. There is an unrealised tension in this move. Strong 
emergence is based on the idea of causal irreducibility, and often makes appeals to emergent 
protectorates.45 By contrast, this quantum model relies upon reductionism in claiming that 
God’s direct action at the micro-level can have indirect effects at the macro-level through 
amplification. Put simply, if causes do not reduce down, then they also do not amplify up. 
Whilst quantum-based and mind-based accounts can be developed in parallel, Russell states 
that “we will eventually need to work out the detailed relations between these models by 
integrating them into a consistent and coherent, adequate and applicable metaphysical 
framework.”46 It seems that this may be an impossible task if the philosophy of mind employed 
is strong emergence theory. Instead, panpsychism, which shares with this quantum model the 
view that microscopic entities (minds at the micro-level) play an important constituting role in 
macroscopic entities (animal minds); they amplify up. Panpsychism might be a better ally for 
Russell in understanding how God’s action includes, but also goes beyond, interaction with 
quantum phenomena.  
Adapting quantum-based accounts of divine action to work with panpsychist interpretations of 
quantum mechanics remains compatible with Russell’s commitment to non-interventionism 
and provides a way to integrate his theory with more mind-based and personal approaches. 
However, the language of non-interventionism seems increasingly unnecessary as 
panpsychism draws Russell towards a more compatibilist view of divine action; God acts in 
and with the minds of quantum phenomena in a way that neither replaces, suspends, nor fills 
in the causal gaps of natural processes. Quantum based models of divine action should be 
retained in so far as they are useful for highlighting God’s omnipresence. However, they fail 
in this task if they limit God to the microscopic realm. By integrating mind-based and quantum-
based models of divine action in a more compatibilist fashion, a panpsychist model of divine 
action is as effective in articulating God’s presence at the interpersonal level of reality as at the 
quantum level of reality. God competes with neither free human action, nor scientific 
explanations for God sustains and indwells the agencies and powers of the natural world.   
 
                                                 
45 Philip Clayton emphasis that what it means “to say that emergent properties are irreducible to lower-level 
phenomena presuppose that reality is divided into a number of distinct levels or orders.” Clayton, Mind and 
Emergence, 5. This is clear for example in the work of William C. Wimsatt. See, Re-Engineering Philosophy of 
Limited Beings: Piecewise Approximations to Reality (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).  
46 Russell, Cosmology, 159.  
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2. Ethical Concerns and the Process of Persuasion: David Ray Griffin  
 
The section above explored the shadow of interventionist language in the theology-science 
dialogue and investigated how the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics has been 
used to find a non-interventionist work-around. Although the definition of intervention, as 
breaking natural laws or interfering in a closed causal network, may arise from the dialogue 
with natural science, the pejorative tone of this language is sourced from elsewhere. That is, 
while language of intervention may be deemed problematic on scientific grounds, but it is 
judged as incriminating largely on moral grounds. The moral ambiguity of interventionist 
language relates to both the implied manner and the occasionality of divine intervention. The 
following section evaluates the Process theology of David Ray Griffin, which is pitched as the 
moral alternative to interventionism. It is argued that the panexperientialism adopted by 
Process metaphysics is less suited than its subject-based counterpart (subject panpsychism) to 
deal with the ethical concerns of Process theologians. It is also argued that the doctrine of God 
that Process theology offer does not provide the balm needed to meet the needs of a suffering 
world.  
 
The first moral concern that many theologians have with the language of intervention as a 
description of the manner in which God acts in the world is revealed by the frequency to which 
“violation” and “coercion” are employed as synonyms of intervention.47 Process theology has 
been particularly vocal in rejecting the language of divine intervention as a “divine intrusion 
into a manipulation of the world”.48 Intervention, it seems, has malicious overtones that imply 
that any such action from God, regardless of the outcome, would entail an abuse of creation in 
some way. Process theologians place an emphasis on the integrity of the world as something 
that must be respected, even by God. From this emphasis, the concern follows that any 
unilateral action by God within or upon nature would be intrusive, violent, or akin to the 
                                                 
47 David Ray Griffin, Two Great Truths: A New Synthesis of Scientific Naturalism and Christian Faith 
(Louisville, KN: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), 2, 4, 23, 50, 88. Griffin, Reenchantment without 
Supernaturalism, 5, 27, 40, 43, 52, 54, 78, 116, 124, 133, 136, 148, 152, 153, 292. David Ray Griffin, 
Panentheism and Scientific Naturalism: Rethinking Evil, Morality, Religious Experience, Religious Pluralism, 
and the Academic Study of Religion (Claremont, CA: Process Century Press, 2014), 51, 62, 72, 116, 187, 208, 
230, 274; Griffin, God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theology, (Louisville, KN: Westminster John Knox Press, 
2004), 4-9.  
48 Norman Pittenger, The Lure of Divine Love: Human Experience and Christian Faith in a Process Perspective 
(Edinburgh: The Pilgrim Press, 1979), 97.  
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invasion from a foreign power; indeed, ‘military intervention’ is a powerful connotation for 
this verb.  
In contemporary scholarship, I suspect that the identification between intervention and 
violation arises not only from this military metaphor but also from another powerful metaphor; 
that is the association between nature and the female body. Eco-feminist theology has brought 
this association into the forefront of the contemporary imagination through the powerful 
linkage between ecological violation and the violation of female bodies.49 The gendering of 
God and nature, as spotlighted in eco-feminism, has clearly problematised the language of 
intervention. In his defence of miracles, and divine intervention in nature, C.S. Lewis writes 
“If Nature brings forth miracles then doubtless it is as ‘natural’ for her to do so when 
impregnated by the masculine force beyond her as it is for a woman to bear children to a 
man.”50 Lewis would never have intended to describe God as acting abusively or criminally, 
but the language of intervention has, nevertheless, been tainted with resonances of theological 
sexism. The legacy of androcentric depictions of God and gynocentric caricatures of nature has 
created an often unspoken, almost subconscious, concern that the language of intervention 
implies a male god violating a female world.51 As a result, language of divine action as the 
empowerment of creation through co-operation, and even the need for creation to consent to 
God’s action, has become a central part of theological rhetoric in recent discussions.52 
A second moral concern arises from the apparent occasionality of God’s intervening. This 
objection is distilled from the cry of suffering that asks, ‘how could God let this happen?’ Put 
more formally, why does a good and powerful God intervene to prevent some instances of 
                                                 
49 See the pioneering article, Sherry Ortner, “Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture?,” Woman, Culture and 
Society, eds. M.Z. Rosaldo and L. Lamphere (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), 67-87. For collections 
of ecofeminist writings see, Judith Plant, Healing the Wounds: The Promise of Ecofeminism (Philadelphia: New 
Society Publishers, 1989) and Irene Diamond and Gloria F. Orenstein, Reweaving the World: The Emergence of 
Ecofeminism (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1990). 
50 C.S. Lewis, Miracles: A Preliminary Studies (London: The Centenary Press, 1947), 75; cf. 33-35, 72. 
51 For the theological discussion of the female-nature association see, Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and 
God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (London: SCM Press, 1983),72-85, 259-267.  Ruether describes “the 
sin of intervention in nature” as a product of “male culture” (76).  
52 It is perhaps for this reason then that perhaps the strong component of contemporary Process thought is 
Process-feminism. See, Carol P. Christ, Rebirth of the Goodness: Finding Meaning in Feminist Spirituality 
(New York: Addison Wesley, 1997). Carol P. Christ, She Who Changes: Re-imagining the Divine in the World 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). Anne Case-Winters, God’s Power: Traditional Understandings and Contemporary 
Challenges (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990). Catherine Keller, From a Broken Web: 
Separation, Sexism and Self (Boston: Beacon Press, 1986). Catherine Keller, The Face of the Deep: A Theology 
of Becoming (New York: Routledge, 2003). Catherine Keller, On the Mystery: Discerning Divinity in Process 
(Fortress, 2008). Ann Pederson, God, Creation and All That Jazz: A Process of Composition and Improvisation 
(St Louis: Chalice Press, 2001). Marjorie Suchocki, God-Christ-Church: A Practical Guide to Process 
Theology, revised, (New York: Crossroad, 1989). 
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suffering and allow others? This seems the sharp pastoral edge of the larger philosophical 
question regarding the existence of evil.53 It has been argued that, if God is willing and able to 
intervene at certain points and places, then it is morally unacceptable that God has not acted 
more often to prevent instances of grievous and meaningless suffering.54 The point has been 
pushed further to argue that an interventionist God should be considered directly culpable for 
all the suffering in the history of the universe, because when God could have intervened to 
prevent it God chose to simply spectate.55 A God who only occasionally intervenes to prevent 
evil or heal suffering is seen to be arbitrarily cruel, unjust and prone to favouritism.56  
An exposition of Process metaphysics and the problematic doctrine of God in Process theology 
was given earlier in this thesis. It was argued that Process theology’s acceptance of the 
naturalistic principle, the decision to subsume God under an all-expansive metaphysic, was a 
fatal error.57 What has not yet been discussed is the motivation for adopting naturalism and the 
appeal that Process theology continues to have for many.58 The central attraction of Process 
theology is found in its provision of a constructive alternative to the two ethical concerns 
arising from interventionist accounts of divine action.  
 
Process theology makes two distinct moves in constructing an alternative account of divine 
action. First, rather than positing reasons that justify God’s permittance of suffering (such as 
John Hick’s Irenaean defence or Alvin Plantinga’s free-will defence) Process theology delimits 
the power of God. According to Process theology, God could not create a world without 
suffering and “God cannot unilaterally prevent all evil.”59 There is no divine favouritism or 
injustice because God is always doing everything in God’s power to prevent suffering and 
maximise flourishing, but often God’s efforts are not enough.60 This first-move responds to the 
                                                 
53 I suspect that, although issues of evil and suffering clearly overlap, they should not be collapsed into one 
another and may in the end require slightly different theological responses. 
54 Brain Hebblethwaite, Evil, Suffering, and Religion, rev. ed. (London: SPCK, 2000), 93. 97. 
55 Griffin, Reenchantment without Supernaturalism, 222-23.  
56 James A. Keller, Problems of Evil and the Power of God (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007), 57ff. George Ellis 
writes, intervention “suggest[s] a capriciousness in God’s action, in terms of sometimes deciding to ‘intervene’ 
but mostly deciding not to do so.” George Ellis, “Ordinary and Extraordinary Divine Action,” in Chaos and 
Complexity, 384.  
57 As David Ray Griffin writes it is the placing of God within an overarching metaphysics as one formative 
principle among others, “that makes this a naturalistic, as distinct from a supernaturalistic, theism.” Griffin, 
Reenchantment without Supernaturalism, 223.  
58 David Ray Griffin defines naturalistic theism, of which he sees Process theism as the best variant, as any 
theory of God that denies interventionism. Griffin, Reenchantment without Supernaturalism, 21.  
59 Griffin, Reenchantment without Supernaturalism, 224.  
60 “God does the best job he can in trying to persuade the recalcitrant matter to receive the impress of the divine 
forms.” Pittenger, The Lure of Divine Love, 97. 
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second ethical concern regarding the apparent occasionality of God’s intervention to prevent 
suffering. 
 
God’s efforts are not attempts to coerce, intervene or overpower evil, but to persuade creatures 
(actual occasions) to ‘act’ (or, rather to ‘become’) in a way that promotes individual 
flourishing, environmental harmony, and brings about greater levels of freedom and value in 
the universe overall.61 We see the importance of creaturely consent since it is creation that is 
the primary agent in the transformation of the universe, and God’s action is restricted to the 
repertoire of persuading, informing, guiding, luring, and inspiring. This second move is Process 
theology’s response to the first ethical concern regarding the manner of divine action; God’s 
action does not override the power of creatures but depends upon it.62 In this way, Process 
theology’s panexperientialism is fundamental to its account of divine, human, and other 
creaturely action. It is only because all things have the capacity of experience and spontaneity 
that they can feel the lure of God and allow God to impact the world. In what follows, I evaluate 
David Ray Griffin’s response to these moral concerns and argue for how the adoption of 
subject-panpsychism may aid Process theology in providing a stronger model.  
 
The Process model of divine action states that God’s perfect knowledge of all possibilities 
(Primordial Nature) offers or informs the subjective aim of each actual occasion with ideals. 
These ideals are the best available self-determination, the best version of itself, within the scope 
of novelty appropriate to each actual occasion. That is, the reality of an actual occasion is a 
self-determining choice, based equally on the constraints of its past-self and the novelty that 
God offers to it. This self-determining choice is, in fact, the only type of ‘action’ available to 
actual occasions, just as luring is the only action available to God. Panexperientialism, as 
opposed to panpsychism, gets Process theology into difficulty here. ‘Action’, in Process 
thought, cannot be predicated of agents, since there are no enduring subjects or agents but only 
streams of experience (or streams of action). The question remains open as to whether we can 
make sense of ‘action’ without any agents, not to mention the difficulties this creates for 
                                                 
61 Whitehead famously stated that Plato’s insight that “the divine element in the world is to be conceived as a 
persuasive agency and not as a coercive agency. This is one of the greatest intellectual discoveries in the history 
of religion.”  Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 166. 
62 As Lewis Ford summaries, “God proposes and the world disposes.” Lewis Ford, The Lure of God: A Biblical 
Background for Process Theism (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1978), 21. Griffin writes that “power is 
always shared power”, such that an increase of power in one place necessitates the decrease of power in another; 




notions of justice or moral responsibility.63 If Process theologians were, instead, to posit 
enduring subjects as fundamental then they would avail themselves of both action and 
relational predicates, which must be predicates of agents or subjects. 
 
It is also important to judge how successful Process theology is, when evaluated as a response 
to the evil and suffering in the world. Philip Hefner, in a review of David Ray Griffin’s 
monograph presenting Process theology’s response to the problem of evil, writes the following: 
Griffin’s explanation of evil amounts, at the end, to saying that evil is a 
consequence of the way the worldly machinery operates . . . Presumably 
because process metaphysics is descriptive it cannot answer [the question 
‘why does it have to be this way?’]; it can only accept what it is and 
describe it.64 
Hefner’s conclusion here is that the moral concern with intervention is expressed in a question 
that demands an agential, personal answer and to which Process theology provides an answer 
in terms of metaphysical necessity – thus nullifying the question rather than answering it. The 
only comfort that Process theology provides, in light of such metaphysical necessity, is that 
God (necessarily) suffers too. This is the Consequent Nature of God, where all the experiences 
of the world are received into God and inform the ongoing lure of God. Thus, the suffering of 
actual occasions is not lost, nor is it meaningless. However, it does seem hopeless. Process 
theology provides no guarantee that God’s desire for good will have victory over evil. Even if 
every actual occasion in the universe were, for an instant, to respond positively to the lure of 
God the threat of great evil not only remains in the next instance but actually increases. There 
can be no final rest from the threat of (ever increasing) suffering within Process theology.  
 
Process theology finds a place for suffering and evil within its metaphysical system; this is a 
task that traditional Christian theology continues to struggle with. However, as Ian McFarland, 
sagely warns, “the temptation to explain evil is the first step to empowering it.”65 This is the 
result in Process thought, where evil has (at least) equal power as God in influencing creatures 
                                                 
63 The deficiency of agential (and therefore person based) categories in Process thought was, to my knowledge, 
first critiqued in, William Hill O.P. “The Two Gods of Love: Aquinas and Whitehead,” Listening 14 (1976): 
262-63. See also, Abraham, Divine Agency and Divine Action, vol. 1, 139-40; J.P. Moreland, “An Enduring 
Self: The Achilles’ Heel of Process Philosophy,” Process Studies 17 (1988): 193-99.  
64 Philip Hefner, “Is Theodicy a Question of Power? Review of God, Power and Evil: A Process Theodicy by 
David Ray Griffin,” The Journal of Religion 59, no. 1 (Jan. 1979): 90. It is for this reason that Kathryn Tanner’s 
work, discussed below, argues that the transcendence of God is a necessary belief if theology is to criticise and 
act against the status quo, rather than simple describe it as a form of necessity. Kathryn Tanner, The Politics of 
God: Christian Theologies and Social Justice (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1992), 32, 67-68.  
65 McFarland, From Nothing, 131-32.  
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– who alone are the majority shareholders in determining the future. To explain suffering as a 
metaphysical necessity over which God has little or no power, is one way to respond to the 
injustice of suffering, but, of course, it gives no real explanation as to why suffering appears to 
be so unequally distributed and it takes away any grounds for hope for the future. Although the 
sensitivity of Process theology to the moral difficulties with interventionist language is to be 
admired, it serves no one to handicap God in response. 
 
The first move in the Process account of divine action, to limit the power of God, therefore 
appears counterproductive. A panpsychist theology does not necessarily, by virtue of its 
ontology, accept or reject the limitation of God’s power. This is an important part of the reason 
why this thesis has argued for the compatibility of panpsychism and the doctrine of creation  
ex nihilo, and so disentangled panpsychism from Process theology. The limitation of God’s 
power is a separate move to the Process theologian’s panexperientialist proposal that God acts 
through persuasion. It would be possible, and I argue advisable, to combine a persuasive 
account of divine action with an affirmation of God’s sovereignty and power. This is to leave 
unanswered the question as to why God allows suffering. Such reticence might be necessary in 
order to think again about what kind of answer is required from this injustice, and to affirm the 
hope that God’s justice will finally end all pain. 
 
 
3. Theological Dilemmas and Double-Agency: Kathryn Tanner 
 
The objections from science and the ethical concerns explored above both make what Kathryn 
Tanner might call a shared grammatical mistake. The mistake is that in seeking to overcome 
the threat of invoking interventionist language, they both fall prey to naturalistic logic; namely, 
the logic that created causes – natural regularities or the self-determination of actual occasions 
– can be contrasted with God’s agency. As such, God’s activity is constrained by the activity 
of creatures. This is seen clearly in that, for Russell, God must find indeterminist openings in 
creation where there is an absence of created causes. Or, if there are no such openings, as in 
Griffin’s Process ontology, God must attempt to influence creatures to use their own agency as 
intermediaries for good.66 In both cases, to suggest that God could do otherwise would be to 
                                                 
66 Tanner, God and Creation 164-65, cf. 45f.  
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depict a coercive, irrational or tyrannical intervention. The presenting issue in discussions of 
divine agency for Tanner is that this language of intervention and non-intervention is improper 
grammar for theological speech.67 For Tanner, the shadow of interventionist grammar is a 
threat to the coherency of theology’s claims about who God is as Creator and what God has 
done as Saviour.  
As seen in the evaluation offered above, I support much in Tanner’s critique of the grammar 
of interventionist and non-interventionist language. However, my concluding concern is that 
her proposal of total metaphysical discontinuity between God and creation leaves no room for 
an account of what God is doing as Sanctifier in interaction with creatures. That is, the model 
of divine action known as ‘double agency’ is an important part of the theologian’s repertoire 
in providing an account of God’s activity, but it cannot be the whole story; additional 
complementary models need to be woven together.  
It is worth probing further into the theological dilemma of interventionist language as Tanner 
conceives of it. The motivation behind Tanner’s exposition of the proper grammar of divine 
action is, to my mind, a soteriological dilemma.68 How can theologians make sense of the 
twofold claim that salvation is attributable wholly to God as an act of grace, and that salvation 
is performed, chosen or worked-out by the human as an act of freedom? There seem to be two 
agents, both of whom are described as being sufficient causes for one event; the problem is the 
over-determination of salvation.69 Tanner suggests that the in-church battles, emphasising 
either the sovereignty of God or the integrity of creatures, make Christian theology seem 
incoherent.70 Faced with the question of how to proclaim salvation as entirely a work of God’s 
                                                 
67 Tanner writes, “I am concentrating, not on what theologians are talking about, but on the way they say it.” 
God and Creation, 11. Whether Tanner’s proposal is truly a linguistic proposal is questioned by William 
Abraham who writes, “By making the issue one of grammar she can tell the student to go back to the class until 
she relearns her grammar. Again a substantial theological proposal – one about how to understand the attribute 
of divine transcendence – has been smuggled into the conversation under the guise of linguistic propriety.” 
Abraham, Divine Agency, vol. 1, 199. Tanner goes some way to admitting that her grammatical rules are 
grounded in material and referential beliefs, God and Creation, 50.  
68 Tanner’s choice of examples, one biblical and the other from the tradition, articulate the problem of 
expressing coherently the relation of divine agency to created agents reveal salvation as the driving issue. The 
first is Philippians 2:12-13: “Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, for God is at work in you, 
both to will and work for his good pleasure.” The second is the quote from Bernard of Clairvaux (d. 1274): 
“Free will accomplishes the entire work and grace performs the entire work; in such a way, however, that the 
entire work is in the will precisely because the entire work is from grace.” Tanner, God and Creation, 19, 92. 
Moreover, Tanner uses the ‘Pelagianism’ or ‘Pelagian structure’ as shorthand for when the proper grammar of 
theological discourse about God’s agency breaks down, again revealing the importance of the Augustine-
Pelagian debate for her proposal. Tanner, God and Creation, 18, 122ff, 136, 144, 146, 155, 157ff. 
69 Owen Thomas describes this as “the key issue in the general problem” of divine action. See, “Recent Thought 
on Divine Agency” in Divine Action: Studies Inspired by the Philosophical Theology of Austin Farrer, eds. 
Brian Hebblethwaite and Edward Henderson (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1983), 46.  
70 Tanner, God and Creation, 4.   
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power achieved in the freedom of the creaturely activity, Christian discourse about God’s 
action has begun to “splutter”.71 The employment and over-zealous avoidance of 
interventionist language are both forms of such spluttering. 
Tanner’s aim is not merely one of internal coherence and ecumenism, but she seeks to bring 
the grammar of the Christian faith to bear upon the political arena of the modern world.72 The 
historical transition from deriving political authority from direct divine appointment to the 
freedom of the democratic process remains an important part of the collective identity of 
Western (post-Christendom) societies. This modern political economy is part of the story of 
how the language of divine intervention became a kind of blasphemy. Since ‘intervention’ 
implies that God’s power is a rival political force to the freedoms of democracy, an intervening 
God is perceived to be a destabilising power operating without any checks and balances.73 In 
addition to the soteriological dilemma outlined above, the politics of theological language is of 
concern to Tanner.  
Tanner illuminates this history in terms of the bifurcation of language describing the activity 
of the Holy Spirit in sixteenth and seventeenth century England. The first view of the work of 
the Spirit, represented by non-conformist enthusiasm, claims that the Spirit works – God 
intervenes – with “immediacy, interiority, privacy, singularity, and the bypassing of the 
fallibility and sinful corruption of the human”.74 The Spirit is perceived to intervene, to 
overthrow ordinary natural processes and human institutions, to bypass the methods of 
reflective self-criticism in a self-evident manner. Tanner concludes that such spiritual fervour 
becomes “a simple recipe for ongoing bloodshed” between opposing viewpoints, as occurred 
in the English Civil War.75 This history casts a long shadow and continues to thwart many 
efforts for coherent (non-oppressive) theological speech in the public square.  
In the second view, members of the established church described the Spirit as making “do with 
the fallibility, corruption, and confusion of human life” by acting through “historical process, 
                                                 
71 Tanner, 17. 
72 Tanner, The Politics of God, vii. This is fitting since to speak of ‘grammar’ is to discuss the public rules of 
discourse, and to set the limits of what one is permitted to say, and therefore what one is able to imagine and do; 
grammar is never apolitical.  
73 This view was famously put forward by Richard Rorty, who described religious institutions as “dangerous to 
the health of democratic societies” because appeals to religious knowledge and divine authority are “a 
conversation-stopper”.  See, the discussion between Richard Rorty and Nicholas Wolterstorff; Richard Rorty, 
“Religion as Conversation-Stopper,” Common Knowledge 3, no.1 (1994): 1-6; Nicholas Wolterstorff, “An 
Engagement with Rorty,” Journal of Religious Ethics 31, no.1 (2003): 129-139; and Richard Rorty, “Religion in 
the Public Square: A Reconsideration,” Journal of Religious Ethics 31, no.1 (2003): 141-149. 
74 Tanner, Christ the Key, 274.  
75 Tanner, 288. 
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mediation, publicity, surprise within the course of the commonplace”.76 This second method is 
favoured by Tanner as the more aligned with contemporary science and the more suitable 
Christological model.77 The Spirit acts “in and through all human agencies and natural events”, 
not against them, nor in place of them, as the language of intervention and non-intervention 
have come to imply.78  
Tanner refers to this in-and-through model of divine action as, “God’s universal providential 
agency”, whereby God works directly and immediately in every part of creation.79  
Tanner writes,  
[a] created cause can be said to bring about a certain created effect by its 
own power, or a created agency can be talked about as freely intending the 
object of its rational volition, only if God is said to found that causality of 
agency directly and in toto— in power, exercise, manner of activity, and 
effect.80 
Tanner’s proposal can be summarised as the claim that God creates free human actions. God’s 
agency is manifest neither violently, nor intermittently, nor in some places and not others, nor 
persuasively, nor under limitation at all. Instead, Tanner asserts, God is as maximally involved 
with the world as it is possible to express, “in the form of a productive agency extending to 
everything [in] an equally direct manner . . . [as the] immediate source of being of every sort.”81 
Tanner follows ‘the Latin default’ position in Western theology and conceives of action on two 
levels, because ‘agency’ is predicated of God and creatures differently, or analogically.82 
Creatures act and are acted upon on a horizontal plane, and God creates this plane in every 
moment, vertically. This works in much the same manner as the (neo-)Thomistic framework 
of double agency, where God is the primary cause of all secondary causes; “Created beings are 
the executors of the order for the world that God ordains but only as God’s creative agency is 
at work every step of the way by which such an order is produced.”83 This is a compatibilist 
model of divine action where God and creatures both act to bring about the same events.  
 
How does Tanner’s proposal escape the challenge of over-determination? Over-determinism is 
                                                 
76 Tanner, 288.  
77 Tanner, 274-5, 296, 299. 
78 Tanner, Politics of God, 31, 99. 
79 Tanner, 100. 
80 Tanner, God and Creation, 86.  
81 Tanner, 46.  
82 David A.S. Fergusson, The Providence of God: A Polyphonic Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2018), 59-109, esp. 69.  
83 Tanner, God and Creation, 92. 
128 
 
the charge levelled against scholars who posit two sufficient and independent causes for the 
same event. This violates, what Jaegwon Kim has called, the causal exclusion principle: “two 
or more complete and independent explanations of the same event of phenomenon cannot 
coexist.”84 One can posit two (or more) partial causes both contributing to a single and 
sufficient set of causal conditions to bring about a single event – such as when two people push 
a broken-down car – but one cannot give multiple exhaustive explanations for a single event 
without making one explanation obsolete. The perceived danger in theology of this move is 
that one of these two causes becomes superfluous and epiphenomenal, such that either God’s 
power or creaturely freedom could be removed and the events in the world would remain 
unchanged.  
Tanner resists the threat posed by over-determinism by employing, what she calls, two rules of 
grammar. The first rule states that the agency of God and the agency of creatures exist in a 
“non-competitive relation”; that is, not in a relation of inverse proportionality such that for one 
to increase the other must decrease.85 This is made possible by the second rule, Tanner argues, 
“a radical interpretation of divine transcendence” such that there can be no comparison and no 
contrast between God and creatures.86 It is the “loss of such an account of transcendence . . . 
[that is] responsible in great part for the dualistic, mutually exclusive alternation between 
deistic, interventionist God and pan(en)theism so common in modern Christian thought.”87 It 
is by remembering who this divine agency belongs to, namely the Creator and Saviour of all 
things, that Tanner rejects both interventionist language and the constraints that this rejection 
might place on divine action discourse. 
Since the creature exists in utter dependence upon God, divine agency cannot be described as 
epiphenomenal; but since God creates freedom and genuine agency in creatures, creation’s 
agents cannot be regarded as illusions either.88 God’s agency is here primarily manifest in the 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo, God alone creates agents and their effects in actuality. It might 
seem that this means that God is the sole agent, but divine transcendence is also refracted 
through the incarnation where God takes one creature as God’s own, and thus reveals that the 
                                                 
84 Kim, Supervenience and the Mind, 250.  
85 Kathryn Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2001), 2.  
86 Tanner, 2.  
87 Tanner, “Creation ex nihilo as Mixed Metaphor,” 138. 
88 I am not claiming to fully understand double agency, only to give it the best hearing that I can. Fortunately, 
Austin Farrer, one of double agency’s chief proponents in the twentieth century, described the position as a 
“paradox” whereby we must “refuse the challenge” to speak further. Austin Farrer, Faith and Speculation: An 
Essay in Philosophical Theology, (New York: New York University Press, 1967), 62.  
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integrity of the creation stands in a non-competitive relationship to God. This model of divine 
action is theologically robust, and so whilst it stands incomplete it should not be abandoned.  
How far does Tanner’s emphasis on non-contrastive transcendence diffuse the shadow of 
interventionist language? Certainly, her emphasis on the radical transcendence of God should 
be affirmed against the tendency of naturalism to subsume transcendence into a natural or 
created category. God’s power to create ex nihilo is a necessary articulation of God’s patient 
and generous sustaining of all things, as well as an assurance of God’s final victory over 
darkness. Does this suffice for an articulation of God’s agency and actions? There are two 
points to make here. First, it seems odd to take creation ex nihilo as the paradigm for all God’s 
engagement with the world.89 The implication of this paradigm is that the only act that God is 
doing, on Tanner’s proposal, is creating; creating agents, creating creaturely actions, creating 
effects, creating circumstances.90 Secondly, and more importantly, what is missing from this 
account is any interaction between God and God’s creatures. In dispelling the murk of 
interventionism, the light of double-agency is blinding and we are left with a picture lacking in 
either shape or colour. 
Tanner states quite clearly that what the framework of double agency and the radicalisation of 
transcendence prohibits is “talk of God’s working with created causality in any way” because 
“God’s agency is not to be talked about as partial, or as composed or mixed with created 
causality.”91 It follows from this that God cannot interact with creatures at their level; God 
cannot choose to appear to creatures in and amongst them.92 This seems to present a challenge 
                                                 
89 Abraham describes how this move in contemporary neo-Thomism more widely traces back to the motivating 
question, ‘why is there something rather than nothing?’ If this philosophical question is the foundation of all 
theological reflection, then it is apparent why creation ex nihilo provides the cornerstone for reflection on divine 
agency. Abraham, Divine Agency, vol. 1, 165-187, 188, 199. However, as Austin Farrer writes, “Thought of 
God is a summary of a tale that narratives the actions of God”, and as such theology has to be more than a 
philosophy; “no personal knowledge without personal intercourse; no thought about any reality about which we 
can do nothing but think.” Farrer goes on to say that what is needed for any theology of divine action is “some 
notion of mutually engaged activity, or (for short) of interaction, applicable to the case of man and God and 
merely requiring more exact definition by the addition of specific marks.” I am unsure if Farrer’s integrated 
theory of double agency and an interactive existentialism is successful, but it shows the importance of the 
experience of God for theories of divine agency. Farrer, Faith and Speculation, 22, 37. 
90 “The rule in this case is just an instance of a more general one; predicates that diversify divine agency should 
be able to be ascribed to only the effects of divine agency. . . Qualifiers that seemed to diversify divine agency 
may indicate only a real difference in that agency’s effects: the operation of divine agency remains constant— 
simple and undifferentiated.” Tanner, God and Creation, 103. 
91 Tanner, 94.  
92 Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity, 3. Thus, Tanner’s account of the incarnation is one that emphasises 
the full humanity of Jesus which God creates immediately and directly like every other creature’s, but then is 
uniquely different because God claims this human life as God’s own life. “Jesus performs divine works in a 
human way”, but “the assumption of the human as a divine act does not take place on the human plane”. Tanner, 
21, 19.  
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to notions of inspiration, God’s speaking, and the experience of God’s Spirit as guiding, 
comforting, or convicting. It is telling that Tanner locates her concern for the political 
implications of theologies of divine action in pneumatology; for it is through the Spirit that 
God is commonly described as coming alongside, providing aid, and making God’s will known 
today. Instead, for Tanner, “where created happenings follow God’s will for them, they do so 
unconsciously, without knowingly and willingly doing so; this is a blind following.”93 God’s 
action is beneath the creature and so hidden from them. God cannot affect the operations of 
creatures, as creatures do amongst themselves, for God already and only effects everything.  
The concern is that, when all God’s action is grammatically structured in accordance with non-
contrastive transcendence, any experience of God’s presence to which a creature may testify 
to having felt must then undergo heavy “translation”.94 God may create experiences in the mind 
of the creature, which the creature interprets as created by God for the purpose of facilitating a 
relationship; but, strictly speaking, this is not an experience of God’s action in any different 
way to the experience of other created phenomena.95 For example, in her account of petitionary 
prayer, Tanner writes that we can affirm that God responds to prayer because God has decided 
to create certain situations only after God has also brought about certain prayers.96 When God 
and creatures relate on two different levels such that there is no “commonality of a field of 
agency”, then any notion of being brought closer to God or of falling further away, and any 
hope of distinguishing “different types of union between God and what is not God” is lost to 
the relation of total dependence.97 Tanner’s move to radical transcendence zooms out the 
picture of God’s action so far that the picture has flattened, and the dynamics of personal piety 
or relationship with God in the life of the believer seem hard to articulate. If double agency is 
taken as an exhaustive or sufficient account of divine action, then when we turn to narrate 
God’s interaction with God’s creatures, we are still left spluttering. 
How does positing a panpsychist universe aid Tanner’s project? After all, Tanner claims that 
her two rules of grammar apply regardless of the ontology of the creation.98 More critically, 
                                                 
93 Tanner, 44. 
94 Tanner God and Creation, 102-3.  
95 Similarly, there is nothing unique about miracles from God’s perspective, it is simply that God chooses not to 
also create the additional secondary causes sufficient for an event, only the primary causes. Tanner, 98-9. 
96 Tanner, 97-98. 
97 Frank G. Kirkpatrick talks of “a commonality of a field of agency” as necessary for interaction in The Mystery 
and Agency of God: Divine Being and Action in the World (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014), xiv. Tanner, 
Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity, 2, 35. As David Fergusson concludes, “In short, double agency, on the 
classical construction, either offers too much, or not enough, or not the sorts of things that Scripture and the life 
of faith attest.” Fergusson, The Providence of God, 228.  
98 Tanner, God and Creation, 89.  
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panpsychism cannot be used to imply that spirit or mind is a necessary intermediary between 
God and matter. A theologian should not adopt panpsychism out of the misguided concern that 
without ensouled creatures God could not interact with matter. This would be a mistake. The 
proposal developed below is not to contradict Tanner’s two ‘rules’ but is offered in conjunction 
with her non-contrastive understanding of Divine transcendence. The hope is that a panpsychist 
view of creation allows for greater interaction between God and creatures, and a more robust 
understanding of the work of the Spirit, than is currently offered by Tanner.  
First, it is clear that a panpsychist universe overlaps with Tanner’s proposal as an ontology 
aligned with a powers-based view of causation.99 As we have seen in previous chapters, the 
Christian panpsychist might say that God creates the indwelling powers of the universe.100 On 
panpsychism, as on Tanner’s model, every point of creation exists as a point of power, a point 
of something analogous to agency, radically dependent upon God. Creation is not a series of 
points of mere (empty) extension, but a network of points of secondary power created by God 
and distinct from God. Second, it might be felt that panpsychism, as a discourse that “fractures 
anew the language of the ordinary” by subverting the dualisms of mind and matter or human 
and non-human, is broadly in line with her vision of tolerance of all creatures before God.101 
The transcendence of God relativises all other differences in the universe, such that — as a 
panpsychist would affirm — there are no absolute divisions within creation, only contrasts; the 
only non-contrastive and absolute difference lies between God and creation. These two general 
points of congruence point towards a deeper thesis.  
If we express the following through metaphysics-as-grammar, as Tanner does, we might say 
that panpsychism teaches us to speak of God’s relation to all of creation as one of interior depth, 
not exterior force. This would be the first rule. Panpsychism does not only posit indwelling 
secondary powers throughout creation, but also view these powers as the seeds of mentality. 
Therefore, the second grammar of a panpsychist account of divine action is the gracious 
possibility of reciprocity between God and all creation, in a manner analogous to human-divine 
                                                 
99 Philip Goff defines the theory of causation, Power Realism, to mean that “For any law L which governs the 
universe, the fact that L governs the universe is, ultimately grounded in the causal powers of some fundamental 
entity or entities.” Goff, Consciousness and Fundamental Reality, 249. Power’s causality makes laws of nature a 
manifestation of the indwelling powers, which God may create or sanctify through the interactive, indwelling 
presence of the Holy Spirit. Although, there was insufficient space to develop a panpsychist interpretation of 
natural laws in this chapter, this points towards an interpretation of laws of nature that dispels much of the 
scientific objections to intervention discussed above.  
100 As Tanner writes, “One might say that God brings forth the operations of created causes by working 
interiorly, in their depths. . . God operates from within created causes, in the very place from which their 
operations arise.” Tanner, God and Creation, 95. 
101 Tanner, 169.   
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interaction. This rule might be that there can be no absolute contrast, but only a scalar 
difference, between how God relates to human beings and how God relates to other creatures. 
The interior depth in which God is intimately present to the creature is both a hidden source of 
being and the realm of experience.102 For the indwelling powers of the universe to be the 
seedlings of mentality or soul is to suggest that, whilst allowing for the distortive effects of sin 
and imperfection, every creature is given, as a gift, the capacity to experience God’s Spirit in 
their own way. God can interact with creation just because these creatures exist continually in 
radical dependence upon God. It may not be a rational knowledge of God as humans grapple 
for, but panpsychism can suggest that every creature may feel God’s presence as a pull towards 
God’s Kingdom. Here, the adoption of panpsychism significantly extends Tanner’s thesis 
further than she has been willing to go, but without abandoning the rules of transcendence and 
non-competitive agency she lays down.  
 
4. Panpsychism and The Indwelling of the Holy Spirit  
 
The shadow of interventionist language has been responded to in three very different ways by 
Robert J. Russell, David Ray Griffin, and Kathryn Tanner. In each of the sections above, brief 
suggestions were made as to how a panpsychist ontology of creation may strengthen each of 
these proposals. The goal of this section is to step back, gather these suggestions together, and 
discern the overarching contribution that panpsychism makes to discussions of divine action. 
In what follows, I will summarise the ways panpsychism was seen to aid the three proposals 
explored above. Thereafter, I will argue that panpsychism’s main benefit is that it enables 
theologians to extend discussions of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, as God’s active and 
transformative presence, to include all of creation.  
                                                 
102 Aquinas, in his consideration of how double agency was a vital but insufficient model for divine action, also 
turns to the experiential dimension of reality to compensate, but he limited it to the human being. He wrote: 
“Above and beyond this common mode [of divine action] however, there is one special mode belonging to the 
rational nature wherein God is said to be present as the object known is in the knower, and the beloved in the 
lover. And since the rational creature by its operation of knowledge and love attains to God himself, according 
to this special mode God is said not only to exist in the rational creature, but also to dwell therein as in his own 
temple.” This reference to the temple points, perhaps, to 1 Corinthians 3:16 where Paul writes that believers are 
temples of the Holy Spirit. Thus, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is Aquinas’ way of supplementing the model 
of double agency, which I will adopt not only for the believer but for the whole of creation. Aquinas, Summa 
Theologiae I, q.43, a.3.   
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The first section discussed the work of Robert J. Russell. In order to avoid depicting God as 
breaking natural laws, Russell restricts God’s direct action in the world to places where the 
natural sciences posit indeterminacy, most prominently in quantum mechanics. It was argued 
that Russell’s theory would benefit from adopting a panpsychist interpretation of quantum 
physics, since this would allow Russell to give a more compelling account of God acting co-
operatively ‘within’ quantum phenomena (and everything else in the universe). It would also 
facilitate Russell’s expressed desire to combine his quantum-based account with mind-based 
accounts that enable discussion of God acting at the level of personal interaction. Here, it is 
already clear that panpsychism’s contribution is a metaphysical space, a ‘within’ all things, an 
interiority of experience analogous to that which humans call the mind. An account of divine 
action in this ‘space’ corresponds to theological notions of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. 
The second section explored the ethical concerns regarding both the coercive manner and 
unjust occasionality of divine intervention, as voiced by Process representative David Ray 
Griffin. Process theology responds to these concerns by limiting, not the location of divine 
action since God already indwells every occasion in Process theology’s panexperientialist 
universe, but the range and effectiveness of actions predicated of God. God is said to influence, 
as a contributing factor, the self-determination of actual occasions. I argued, against Process 
theology, that limiting the power of God was counterproductive to their pastoral concern. 
Although the persuasive activity of God is an important, interactive way that a theology may 
wish to speak of God’s sanctifying presence within the universe, there is no reason to limit 
God’s action to this one mode. It was also argued that the event-based metaphysic, which 
denies the reality of enduring substances, agents or subjects, undermined the ability of Process 
metaphysics to employ action predicates in a meaningful way. As such, the adoption of a 
subject-panpsychism would aid Process theologians in articulating more fully the persuasive 
activity of God. 
The third section focused on the theological dilemma of affirming both creaturely freedom and 
divine sovereignty in both soteriology and the public square. Kathryn Tanner sought to dissolve 
this dichotomy by adopting a radical ‘grammar’ of divine transcendence, such that God’s 
power and creaturely freedom are not inversely proportionate. It was argued that whilst this 
non-contrastive account of God’s transcendence is a necessary component within discussions 
of divine action, it cannot alone be sufficient. This is because the non-competitive account of 
God acting solely through primary causation cannot articulate any interaction between God 
and creatures, which can only occur if God sometimes acts in metaphysical continuity with 
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creatures. This chapter will now go on to discuss the indwelling of the Holy Spirit as a mode 
of God’s engagement with creatures at the level of secondary causation. For the interactive 
presence of the Holy Spirit to reach beyond human subjects, subjectivity must be extended 
throughout the universe. Panpsychism, it is argued, thus provides a way to construe God’s 
omnipresence as not only a directly present creative force, but as an intimately relational and 
transformative Person.   
It is a central claim of the Christian faith that the Holy Spirit indwells individual human beings, 
the Church and even the natural world. It is often on the basis of the Spirit’s indwelling presence 
that claims of either special divine action or divine concursus are based.103 As Anthony 
Thiselton summarises, “The Spirit of God is clearly a mode of God’s activity, whose nature 
and identity are inseparable from God. Indeed, many begin to define or to explicate the Spirit 
as ‘God in action’.”104 ‘Spirit’ does not refer to the stuff God is made of and it is then not the 
divine substance in creatures. Instead, “discourse about Spirit is a way of being articulate about 
God’s initiating activity and our responsive activity”; when theologians are articulating models 
of divine action, they are operating within the doctrinal locus of pneumatology.105   
Historically, the relation of indwelling between God (the Holy Spirit) and humanity has 
received little philosophical and theological attention.106 In recent years, more serious 
consideration has been given to the relation of indwelling, due largely to the practical and 
pastoral importance of elucidating how indwelling facilitates personal sanctification in the life 
of the believer (which can be considered one example of divine action). By adopting 
                                                 
103 Eugene TeSelle, “Divine Action: The Doctrinal Tradition”, Divine Action: Studies Inspired by the 
Philosophical Theology of Austin Farrer, eds. Brian Hebblethwaite and Edward Henderson (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1990), 89-90. 
104 Antony C. Thiselton, The Holy Spirit – in Biblical Teaching, Through the Centuries, and Today (Grand 
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2013), 13. Other eminent scholars such as Ernst Käsemann state that the Spirit is 
simply “God in act”. Ernst Käsemann, “Geist und Geistesgaben im NT,” in Die Religion in Geschichte und 
Gegenwart, edited by H.F. von Campenhausen et al., 3rd edition (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1958). Hendrikus 
Berkhof phrases it, “the Spirit is the name of God in action”. Hendrikus Berkhof, The Doctrine of the Holy 
Spirit. The Annie Kinkead Warfield Lectures, 1963-1964 (Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1967), 14, 94. 
New Testament scholar Alan Richardson writes: “The [pneuma] of a man is his [dynamis], his person in action; 
and the same is true of God’s [pneuma]... God’s Spirit is God’s acting.” Alan Richardson, An Introduction to the 
Theology of the New Testament (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1958),104-105. 
105 Ramsey, Models For Divine Activity, 7. 
106 There are some notable exceptions to this oversight. Jürgen Moltmann strongly emphasises the role of the 
Spirit in nature and writes that “all divine activity is pneumatic in its efficacy”, Jürgen Moltmann, God in 
Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation, (London: SCM Press, 1985), 9. Sergius Bulgakov writes that 
“This natural grace of the Holy Spirit, which constitutes the very foundation of the being of creation, exist in the 
very flesh of the world, in the matter of the world” Sergius Bulgakov, The Comforter, (trans.) Boris Jakim 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2004), 220.  
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panpsychism one can extend these recent discussions of indwelling beyond the human being 
and give an account of God’s transformative, sanctifying presence throughout the universe.107  
William Alston’s essay “The Indwelling of the Holy Spirit” has defined recent discussions of 
this topic. Alston identified two issues of primary concern with regard to specifying indwelling 
as a mode of God’s action.108 The first issue regards the division of labour between the Holy 
Spirit and the created subject in bringing about transformation. For Alston, this particular type 
of special divine action requires that the two agents (Holy Spirit and created subject) both be 
involved and interacting in order to bring out the desired effect. This first issue highlights that 
the indwelling of the Holy Spirit articulates God’s interaction with creatures on the level of 
secondary causation. The second issue regards the internality of the Holy Spirit’s presence, 
which Alston argues should be contrasted with a general account of God’s omnipresence, or 
the general creative and sustaining activity of creation.109 Similar to how Nancey Murphy and 
Robert Russell depicted God as acting co-operatively within quantum events, indwelling 
specifies an internal and interactive mode of God’s action. 
Alston examines three models of indwelling, rejecting the first two and affirming the third. 
Alston’s first model is the fiat model, whereby God simply produces new dispositions within 
the human being or infuses the believer with specific virtues. Alston views this model as being 
both insufficiently interactive because nothing is required from the creature, and insufficiently 
distinct from God’s general creation and preservation of creation. Moreover, Alston suggests 
                                                 
107 Austin Farrer makes a passing indulgence into “a little mythology” to this effect. He writes: “Let us endow 
the ultimate component of natural force – the Whatever-it-is in Itself behind the electron – with a Christian soul. 
The minute creature may then be supposed to stand in the same relation to God’s action by way of nature, as 
does the Christian to God’s action by way of grace. It can throw itself on a creative purpose which carries it 
beyond itself; but has (presumably) as little concern as we have with the causal touch through which the divine 
action embraces, directs or extends that of the creature. Now let us cancel to the mythical supposition. The 
minute entity has neither mind nor will; yet the causal or quasi-causal relation between it and infinite purpose 
may be thought the same in principle as the causal dependence of our action upon the divine.” Farrer, Faith and 
Speculation, p.78. In this “mythic” thought experiment, Farrer considers electrons with Christian souls, and 
argues that in such an ontology they would have the same direct relation to God as a human being, such that any 
notion of a causal joint or mechanism of causal influence becomes irrelevant. With this understanding of how 
panpsychism may contribute to models of divine action, I entirely agree. However, I would disagree that when 
he cancels the mythical supposition and reverts back to a physicalist notion of electrons as entirely lacking in an 
ontological analogue to a human soul, the picture remains unchanged. The reason the thought experiment is 
useful is because it is immediately apparent to us, as ensouled human believers, that God’s action in the soul is 
direct and needs no further mechanism. To then suggest that the same God-creature interaction can work 
without any soul or subjectivity within the creature seems to contradict the basis of this thought experiment.  
108 Alston’s main concern for this relation is how it brings about sanctification. He refers to this as the 
transformation of the “motivational structure” of an individual; “That is, it has to do with changes in one’s 
tendencies, desires, values, attitudes, emotional proclivities, and the like . . .The issue is as to just what role the 
activity of the Holy Spirit has in such changes as these.” William P. Alston, Divine Nature and Human 
Language: Essays in Philosophical Theology (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989), 229. 
109 Alston, 227.  
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that the fiat model is morally problematic in the same way that accounts of interventionism 
were seen by some theologians as violations or coercive. The second model is the 
“interpersonal” model whereby God is “influencing the human being as one person influences 
another”.110 Although sufficiently interactive, this model is rejected by Alston for being 
insufficiently internal. It is based upon an analogy to the moral influence between human 
beings who always remain, he argues, separate and distinct persons. N.T. Wright has 
emphasised that “in biblical thought heaven and earth — God’s sphere and our sphere — are 
not thought of as detached or separate. They overlap and interlock.”111 Such overlapping and 
interlocking is what Alston takes from the biblical language of “filled, permeated, pervaded” 
by the Spirit to suggest the interweaving of subjectivities between the Spirit and the creature.  
He calls this “mutual inter-penetration of the life of the individual and the divine life” the 
“sharing” model.112  
The sharing model states that God transforms the creation from within by accessing the internal 
powers, dispositions and subjectivity of the creature and then sharing God’s own dispositions 
and desires within it.113 In the case of volitional subjects, it remains the responsibility of the 
creature to act in accordance with these dispositions and appropriate them as her own in order 
for the transformation to be wholly effectual.114 This is how the believer may “work out your 
salvation with fear and trembling” (Phil. 2:12)  and say with Paul that this was done by “I, yet 
not I, but the grace of God was within me.” (1 Cor. 15:10) As with Process theology, Alston’s 
“sharing model” depicts creatures as having an active role in building the Kingdom of God, 
but with neither the rejection of subjects as ontologically primitive, nor severe restrictions on 
God’s power. On panpsychism, there is no metaphysical reason why Alston’s sharing model 
might not be extended throughout the cosmos, such that indwelling is added to the arsenal of 
models of divine action possible at all times and places.115 
                                                 
110 Alston, 236.  
111 N. T. Wright, “Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body: All for One and One for All; Reflections on Paul’s 
Anthropology in His Complex Contexts”. URL: 
http://www.ntwrightpage.com/Wright_SCP_MindSpiritSoulBody.htm (26/11/2013) 
112 Alston, Divine Nature and Human Language, 242, 244.  
113 Eleonore Stump has developed a similar model, which depicts indwelling as a second-personal presence 
which the believer can experience through empathy and mind-reading. However, Stump strongly relies upon the 
neurological mechanisms which support empathy and mind-reading in the human brain, namely mirror-neurons, 
in her model of indwelling. As such, her model of indwelling is unable to be extended to other creatures, and 
even may exclude some humans (she explicitly discusses persons with autism) from being indwelt and 
sanctified by the Holy Spirit. Eleonore Stump, “Omnipresence, Indwelling, and the Second-Personal,” European 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5, no.4 (Winter 2013): 29-53. 
114 Alston, Divine Nature and Human Language, 246, 249-50.  
115 I emphasise that there is no metaphysical reason here, since there is theological discussion to be had around 
indwelling as “a new-birthright, not a creatureright”, which may limit the Holy Spirit presence to baptised 
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Marylin McCord Adams points in the direction of how such an extension to other creatures 
might be articulated. Adams uses the doctrine of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit to attack 
“any notion that ego-centred autonomy is normative” or “the final stage of personal 
development.”116 Adams goes on to suggest that, rather than viewing the Holy Spirit’s 
influence as a kind of information input of divine dispositions, or an infused capacity of virtues, 
we should view the indwelling of the Holy Spirit as “being built into the functional dynamics 
of the created person, so that it is no longer the individual’s ego that centres the personality but 
rather a lived partnership with the Godhead.”117 The presence of the Holy Spirit refers to a 
lived partnership with God, and such a lived partnership is simply what it means to be God’s 
creature.118 In so far as this partnership defines creaturehood, it seems a natural extension of 
contingency and the radical transcendence of God depicted in double agency, where God is 
intimately involved with creatures at their centre of their operation.   
The benefit of Adams model of indwelling is that, as well as avoiding the reduction of the 
divine presence to a kind of information, it provides a way for God to work interactively with 
creatures to bring about the transformation of the universe and, in the process, transform the 
agents and powers themselves. In dialogue with panpsychism, this model also prevents 
theologians from sneaking in a stronger form of consciousness and agency at the fundamental 
level than has been argued for in previous chapters. If the Holy Spirit works within the 
experiential processes themselves, rather than manifesting as an experiential quality that 
requires a high level of cognitive capacity to receive (such as rationality, self-consciousness, 
or volitional willing), then the idea that the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is a means of, and a 
type of, divine action can be extended to more basic subjectivities throughout creation.   
Subjects, Adams suggests, are meant to engage in intersubjective relationships. As discussed 
in chapter two, the success of panpsychism relies upon finding a solution to the combination 
problem. This solution will require a view of subjects that are at least partially or potentially 
open, rather than absolutely private and closed. As such, there seems to be an alliance of interest 
                                                 
humans only. Alston, Divine Nature and Human Language, 241. I would affirm with Marilyn McCord Adams 
that the gift of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit “is given prior to and whether or not the individual ever 
recognizes Divine presence as Divine presence.” Such recognition and co-operation may intensify this 
relationship between God and creature, but it is not a precondition. Marilyn McCord Adams, “The Indwelling of 
the Holy Spirit: Some Alternative Models,” in The Philosophy of Human Nature in Christian Perspective, eds. 
Peter J. Weigel and Joseph G. Prud’homme (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2005), 94-95. 
116 Adams, “The Indwelling of the Holy Spirit”, 97. This she notes is contrary to “the American political ideal 
and with autonomous self-government that is the Aristotelian and Kantian ethical norm.” We might also say that 
this is contrary to Leibniz’s ‘windowless monads’. 
117 Adams, 96.  
118 Adams, 96.  
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with regard to philosophical discussions of combination or the union of minds in panpsychism 
and theological discussions regarding indwelling and theological anthropology; the mind does 
not have high walls of isolation. 
The indwelling of the Holy Spirit is a model for divine-creature interaction, whereby God can 
act in the world to transform not only the events of the world, but the motivational structures 
of the agents that bring about these events. Oliver O’Donovan writes that the importance of the 
indwelling of the Holy Spirit is that  
the renewal of the universe touches me at the point where I am a moral 
agent, where I act and choose and experience myself as ‘I’. It means that 
in the redemption of the world I, and every other ‘I’, yield myself to God’s 
order and freely take my place within it.119 
The indwelling of the Holy Spirit means that “far from God’s intervention reducing the scope 
of [human] free will, it is the precondition for it” and the only way creatures can confront “the 
real challenge of the divinely created order.” 120 Again, the Spirit empowers, and does not 
coerce, creatures to act in new ways. If this is adopted as part of the repertoire of articulations 
of divine action, then God would be seen to transform the world not only by acting upon 
creation but acting with and within creatures. God is not acting in creation as yet another 
external factor in the life of a creature, but by indwelling the internal life of each mind, each 
created individual.  
In a statement, highly resonant of this panpsychist extension of the Spirit’s indwelling that I 
am proposing, Jürgen Moltmann writes, 
Through his Spirit God himself is present in his creation. The whole 
creation is a fabric woven and shot through by the efficacies of the Spirit. 
Through his Spirit God is also present in the very structures of matter. 
Creation contains neither spirit-less matter nor non-material spirit; there 
is only informed matter.121 
If the psychosomatic ontology of the human person is not radically discontinuous with the rest 
of creation, then the Spirit’s presence as felt by psychosomatic persons might not be either.122  
                                                 
119 Oliver O’Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: 
William B. Eerdmans, 1986/1994), 23.   
120 O’Donovan, 23.   
121 Moltmann, God in Creation, 212. Emphasis in original.  
122 To be clear, I am not suggesting that God is the Soul of the universe or that creation is the body of God, 
although these are both images that Moltmann readily employs. Not only would this imply a lack (rather than an 
abundance) of created subjectivities, but such a view would risk undermining the transcendence of God and 
leading theology into the rabbit warren of theological determinism. The presence of the Holy Spirit throughout 
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The Spirit can be conceived as informing the subjectivities in matter in a way analogous to how 
Alston and Adams have depicted the Spirit informing the psychic life of believers. That is, by 
dwelling within the panpsychist subjects the Spirit engages in a partnership with creatures and 
so sanctifies the creaturely dispositions and intrinsic powers to co-operatively bring about the 
kingdom of God.  
It would be a mistake to interpret this proposal as a return to theological subjectivism. God’s 
action is not reducible to our interpretation of ordinary events. On the contrary, mental action 
is as real and objective as material causation (if the two can even be separated, which in 
panpsychism they cannot).  Therefore, God can be said to make a genuine causal difference in 
the universe, whether we recognise it or not, through the mentality that is fundamental 
throughout the universe. This means that divine action is hidden from third person knowledge; 
God cannot be put under a telescope, pointed at, verified or falsified in repeated tests. However, 
divine action is not entirely hidden in the first-person form of knowledge but intermingled with 
our experience of ‘I’. This can be experienced, felt and responded to, although not with 
infallible certainty. And, importantly, this means that divine action can also be known in a 
second personal form of knowledge. It can be witnessed to, communicated and testified about, 




This chapter explored how the claim that God intervenes in creation has been met by scientific 
objections, ethical concerns and theological dilemmas. These challenges have cast a powerful 
shadow and have constrained theological accounts of God’s action in the world. Panpsychism, 
nor any other metaphysic, cannot answer all the puzzles regarding God’s action in the world. 
The panpsychist account of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit that I have given should not be 
taken as an exhaustive account of divine action. Most significantly, this account gives no aid 
to articulations of creation, incarnation, or resurrection, which are the three most central claims 
of God’s action in the Christian faith. Yet, neither are these three claims the total sum of God’s 
action within Christian theology. There is no reason to suppose that the variety of God’s effects 
                                                 
creation is an internal presence, not defined in terms of extension or embodiment, but testified to in terms of 
experience. The testimony of creatures is discussed more fully in the next chapter 
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in the world can be understood as the outcome of only one type of action, whether creating, 
persuading, or adjusting quantum probabilities.   
What panpsychism does offer is a way to extend discussions of the Holy Spirit’s presence and 
dwelling within the human person throughout the cosmos. As a location, a metaphysical ‘space’ 
for God’s action, this proposal can help to deflate the scientific objections discussed in section 
one without limiting God’s action to quantum indeterminacies. As one mode of divine action, 
and in response to the ethical concerns raised by the seeming external and violating 
connotations of ‘intervention’, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit emphasises the internal, 
interactive, and persuasive agency of God. This, then, complements God’s creative sustaining 
of creation and the unique act of assumption as the person of Jesus Christ. 
Although Christian panpsychism must reject Thales’ famous maxim, sometimes considered the 
first panpsychist statement in Western philosophy, that “all things are full of gods”, we might 
yet affirm that all things are indwelt by God.123 The shadow of interventionism arises, at least 
in part, when the light of God’s activity is perceived to shine from without. Panpsychism can 
help dispel this shadow with a reminder that, across every inch of time and space, God’s light 
indwells and shines from within. 
                                                 
123 For more on Thales and panpsychism in ancient Greek philosophy, see Historical Interlude, n.1. 
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Chapter 5: The Voices of Creation: Panpsychism and Ecology 
 
Contemporary articulations of the doctrine of creation face two main challenges. The first, 
tackled in the previous chapter, is to provide a realistic and flexible account of divine action. I 
concluded with a model of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit as calling all creatures into 
greater union with God. The antiphon, the response of creation, is the focus of the present 
chapter. This is the second challenge for contemporary theology, a doctrine of creation in a 
time of ecological crisis.  
Lynn White Jr.’s infamous judgement, that Christianity is “the most anthropocentric religion 
the world has ever seen”, arose from the analysis that Christian theology upholds “[m]an’s 
effective monopoly on spirit in this world”.1 White also noted that this monopoly is 
diametrically opposed to the “pan-psychism of all things, animate and inanimate, designed 
for the glorification of their transcendent Creator”; a view that White attributes to Francis of 
Assisi.2 Whilst the aetiology of the environmental crisis cannot be laid solely at the feet of 
Christianity, White’s article highlighted the importance of both panpsychism and the 
Christian imagination for contemporary ecology.3 In the fifty-years of debate that followed, it 
seems that only Process theologians took up White’s challenge to employ panpsychism in 
conjunction with Christian theology. This chapter constructs an alternative Christian 
panpsychism, which remythologises Scriptural texts and recalibrates the traditional 
metaphors of theological anthropology, in response to the ecological crisis.  
The first section of this chapter considers and offers a theological critique to the role that 
panpsychism already plays within eco-philosophy as the ground for intrinsic values. The 
                                                 
1 Lynn White Jr. “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,” Science 155, no. 3767 (10 March 1967): 1205.  
2 White “The Historical Roots,” 1207. Later White argued that the solution for Christianity was “to find a viable 
alternative to animism”, which is exactly what a theologically robust panpsychism can offer. Lynn White Jr. 
“Continuing the Conversation,” in Western Man and Environmental Ethics: Attitudes Toward Nature and 
Technology, ed. Ian G. Barbour (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1973), 55-64. 
3 Christian theology is not to blame for the ecological crisis, but it remains the case that the metaphysical models 
and paradigms of Christian thought have served as theological justifications for, and so been complicit in 
normalizing, the ecologically destructive greed of the human heart. Although an ecologically sensitive 
articulation of Christianity is necessary for pragmatic purposes and the survival of the planet, the Christian faith 
should not be utterly abandoned or reconstructed to fit specific practically ends, even one as severe as this. The 
practical urgency of this crisis does not define the truth-claims of theology, but it does raise awareness of the 
texts and ideas that have, historically, received insufficient attention. Although it is possible to adopt 
panpsychism solely on eco-pragmatic grounds this is not the thrust of this thesis, which has argued 
philosophically (chapter 2), historically (chapter 3), and theologically (chapter 4) for more careful consideration 
of a panpsychist doctrine of creation. The argument from pragmaticism and ethics should be understood in this 
wider context.  
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second section of this chapter argues that humanity’s monopoly on the mind has had the same 
distorting tendency across a variety of otherwise rich and elegant theological discussions. 
Traditional depictions of humanity’s place in creation require a panpsychist corrective to this 
distortive monopoly.4 After exploring the thickets in both eco-philosophy and theology, the 
third section of this chapter maps out a path that employs panpsychism within a robustly 
theological response to the ecological crisis. This entails defending a panpsychist 
hermeneutic for interpreting the Scriptural passages that depict non-human voices in creation. 
This is used as a basis to open up the boundaries of the church and to include the entire 
creation as a congregation of praise, a cosmic ecclesial-body of Christ, and a temple of the 
Holy Spirit.  
The conclusion of this investigation has additional methodological importance for this thesis 
as a whole. The investigation below allows for a view of Christian panpsychism as, not solely 
a rational philosophical position worthy of theological consideration, but as an ontology that 
arises out of the praxis of faith in a truly cosmic context. 
 
1. Panpsychism and Ecological Philosophy 
 
Whilst panpsychism has been cast as the understudy to physicalism in recent philosophy of 
mind, and to dualism in Christian theology, panpsychism is the leading lady of ecological 
philosophy. The prominence of panpsychism in the history of ecological thinking can be 
highlighted by pointing to figures such as Fredrich von Schelling, Henry Thoreau, John Muir, 
Aldo Leopold and Albert Schweitzer who, David Skrbina argues, were “panpsychists all of 
them.”5 The employment of panpsychism in ecological philosophy largely arises as a solution 
to what is perhaps the field defining problem; how to understand and ground intrinsic values. 
It is worth wandering down this well-trodden path in order to understand precisely the appeal 
of panpsychism in ecological philosophy, and thus its potential for a theological response to 
the ecological crisis. 
                                                 
4 ‘Anthropocentrism’ is the tendency to view humanity as ontologically and axiologically distinct from other 
creatures, conceptually facilitating the harmful utilization of other creatures for human benefit. 
5 Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West, 223-234. Cf. David Skrbina, “Ethics, Eco-Philosophy, and Universal 
Sympathy,” Dialogue and Universalism 4 (2013): 68.  
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Ethics, as an intellectual discipline, is the reflection upon values and upon the resulting 
duties, rights and appropriate behaviour of agents in recognition of values. Values can be 
categorised into two kinds; intrinsic values and instrumental values.6 Instrumental values are 
fairly easy to understand; they are the value that something has for something else. For 
example, I might value my house for the warmth and protection it provides, but if it failed to 
provide me those things it might no longer be of value to me and I might move. In 
environmental ethics, instrumental values seem to make nature nothing more than a resource 
for human comfort, thereby licensing a purely utilitarian relationship between our species and 
our environment. This does not necessarily lead to a view of the planet as disposable, since 
the instrumental value of our environment may be extended across the globe and to future 
generations, it might even extend to other life forms.7 Such an extension of instrumental 
values is often employed in public campaigns attempting to motivate ethical urgency for the 
protection and comfort of future human generations; a ‘sustain it, or lose it’ approach. Yet, 
for many, the idea that the universe possesses solely instrumental value for human beings, 
such that humans have no responsibilities or duties to other creatures or to the planet itself, is 
an unsustainable idea. It not only entails that nothing of value existed for billions of years on 
this planet or across the lightyears of space, but it also fails to account for the responsibilities 
that many people feel intuitively towards animals, plants and the landscape.   
Intrinsic values are a little harder to define. Any intrinsic property is a property “that can be 
had by something regardless of whether it is accompanied or unaccompanied by any other 
contingent being.”8 Therefore, intrinsic values are values that can be had by something, in 
and of itself, irrespective of its relationship to other contingent beings. By virtue of being a 
value, not merely any old property, intrinsic values give an ethical structure to relations 
between things. In truth, instrumental values are parasitic on intrinsic values.9 An object has 
instrumental value because there is an intrinsic value that it serves. To use the example again, 
I might value my house instrumentally, because I value my survival and comfort intrinsically. 
                                                 
6 There are, of course, other kinds of value; systemic value, aesthetic value, sentimental value, and sacramental 
value to name a few, but we can keep things simple for now.  
7 An interesting discussion on obligations to future generations is found in, Tim Mulgan, “What is good for the 
distant future? The challenge of climate change for utilitarianism,” in God, the Good, and Utilitarianism: 
Perspectives on Peter Singer, ed. John Perry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 141-159. 
8 Rae Langton and David Lewis, “Defining Intrinsic,” Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 
(1998): 333-45. 
9 Frederick Ferré, “Personalistic Organicism: Paradox or Paradigm?,” in Philosophy and the Natural 
Environment, eds. Robert Attfield and Andrew Belsey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 69. 
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We need to have some working understanding of intrinsic values if instrumental values, and 
the larger network of ethical relations, is to be properly grounded.  
The question then arises, what kinds of things have intrinsic values? Here, we might look 
around for an example of something with unassailable intrinsic value; ‘I’. I know, beyond 
reasonable doubt, that I have intrinsic value because I value myself, my survival and my own 
happiness. As a subject I value many things, but the one thing that I can value intrinsically 
without reference to other contingent beings, is myself. This well-worn track in ethical theory 
gives rise to two important presuppositions from which many have proceeded. First, value is 
the result of a valuing mind or a valuer; “value, like a tickle or remorse, must be felt to be 
there.”10 This need not collapse into full subjectivism, such that values are nothing but the 
projections onto objects by valuing minds. To the contrary, subjective values can have 
objective existence. It may only be that values have to be felt to be operative or actualised, 
and that minds are necessary for the discovery (rather than the creation) of objective values.11 
Second, intrinsic value only exists in things that have minds, that can be both valuer and 
valued simultaneously; to be “entirely devoid of significant subjectivity [is to be] therefore 
empty of intrinsic value.”12 We have, thus, relocated the problem of intrinsic values into the 
problem of other minds.  
If human beings are the only valuing agents, the only subjective minds in the universe, then 
this line of thinking creates a severe problem for environmental ethics.13 The implication 
would be that humans alone carry intrinsic value, and all else can be used as instruments for 
human benefit. It is in this way that mechanistic ontologies, the idea that the non-human 
world is a mindless mechanism lacking in any teleology or feeling, is seen as the swiftest 
path to anthropocentrism, all things are valued in reference to humanity. If humanity’s needs 
and desires are the sole measure of value, then nothing is to prevent us from remaking the 
world as best serves our species alone, paying no heed to the cost or damage this might have 
                                                 
10 Holmes Rolston III, “Values in Nature and the Nature of Value,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 36 
(1994): 29. Freya Mathews, The Ecological Self (London: Routledge, 1991/1994), 117. Ward More than 
Matter?, 89; Skrbina, “Ethics, Eco-Philosophy and Universal Sympathy,” 62. 
11 The objectivity of values has been defended by Holmes Rolston III, Philosophy Gone Wild: Essays in 
Environmental Ethics (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1986) and Holmes Rolston III, Environmental Ethics: 
Duties to and Value in the Natural World (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1988). 
12 Ferré “Personalistic Organicism,” 69. 
13 Thus, it has become common for ecofeminists in particular to trace the philosophical roots of the current 
ecological crisis to Cartesian dualism, although this is not an unchallenged genealogy. See, Genevieve Llyod, 
The Man of Reason; ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in Western Philosophy, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1993, Orgi. Pub. 
London: Methuen,1984) and Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific 
Revolution (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980/1989). This is challenged by Cecilia Wee, “Cartesian 
Environmental Ethics”, Environmental Ethics 23, no. 3 (2001): 275-286.  
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for other species or things; if there are no other values, there are no other costs to consider. 
This way of thinking is deeply ingrained in modern society and forms the assumption of 
many of our collective practices, institutions, scientific truth-making practices, and financial 
systems; it will take both hard work and time to change.14 The name of the game in 
environmental ethics, therefore, is “constructing an adequate theory of intrinsic value for 
nonhuman entities and for nature as a whole.”15  
One option is to accept that human beings, and perhaps a few other mammals, are the only 
experiencing subjects in the world and search for an alternative way to ground intrinsic 
values besides subjectivity. However, many argue that “this will not be easy, since intrinsic 
value that is not valuable for any experiencing valuer is a vacuous concept.”16 Or, at least, it 
appears at present that the burden of proof for non-experience based intrinsic values remains 
unmet. A second option, far simpler for the meta-ethicists but complicated for the 
philosophers of mind, is to extend the language of rights, which are grounded in intrinsic 
values, beyond the human sphere by expanding the bounds of subjectivity.17 This “expanding 
circle” approach to ethical inquiry was famously employed by Peter Singer’s argument for 
animal rights based upon the capacity to experience pain.18 Singer employed the so-called 
‘sentience criterion’ in order to expand the same moral reasoning employed against racism to 
argue against ‘speciesism’ as a form of discrimination.19 The question then becomes, what 
are the bounds of sentience and how can we tell?  
                                                 
14 Freya Mathews, “Why the West Failed to Embrace Panpsychism?,” in Mind That Abides: Panpsychism in the 
New Millennium, ed. David Skrbina (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2009), 341-360.  
15 J. Baird Callicott, “Intrinsic Value. Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics,” Environmental Ethics 7 
(1985): 257-75. Two voices, highlighting their minority position, who oppose the grounding of environmental 
ethics on the notion of intrinsic value are Tom Reagan, “Does Environmental Ethics Rest on a Mistake?,” The 
Monist, 75, no.2 (April 1992): 161-182, and Anthony Weston, “Beyond Intrinsic Values: Pragmatism in 
Environmental Ethics,” Environmental Ethics 7 (1985): 321-39. 
16 Ferré “Personalistic Organicism,” 73. Similarly, Alfred North Whitehead surmised that, “intrinsic value 
resides only in the experiencing of value.” Quoted in Susan Armstrong-Buck “Whitehead’s metaphysical system 
as a foundation for environmental ethics,” Environmental Ethics 8 (1986): 241-259. Timothy L.S. Sprigge 
claims that panpsychism is the “only basis” for intrinsic values in nature because “there cannot be intrinsic value 
where there is nothing at all akin to pleasure and pain, joy and suffering.” Timothy Sprigge, “Are there Intrinsic 
Values in Nature?,” in Applied Philosophy, eds. B. Almond and D. Hill (New York: Routledge, 1991), 41. 
17 Theological eco-feminist Sallie McFague’s book Super, Natural Christians has the thesis that “Christian 
practice, loving God and neighbour as subjects, as worthy of our loves in and for themselves, should be 
extended to nature.” There is a clear that it is the designation of ‘subject’ that gives intrinsic value for McFague. 
Sallie McFague, Super, Natural Christians: How we should love nature (London: SCM Press, 1997), 1ff.   
18 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 2nd ed. (London: Cape, 1990). Cf. Roderick Nash, The Rights of Nature: A 
History of Environmental Ethics (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989).  
19 Singer, Animal Liberation; Similarly, Tom Regan used the criterion of being “subjects of life” to ground 
animal rights. Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 245. 
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The appeal of panpsychism for environmental ethics can now come into focus. By positing 
subjectivity as fundamental to the universe, panpsychism allows intrinsic values to be a 
ubiquitous, objective feature of reality, without giving up the compelling logic that values 
require someone to value them (a valuer). Values can be, contra Kantianism, “anchored in the 
real”, and “the way the universe is determines how man ought to behave himself in it”, 
because the universe is flush with experience.20 This is not to say that the capacity for ‘pain’, 
as predicated of nervous systems, is found throughout the universe. Instead, one can find an 
array of terminology striving to speak of a sufficiently experiential property throughout 
nature, in a plausibly minimal way. Recent proposals include, the capacity of having 
interests,21 being a teleological centre of life or having a good of one’s own,22 the capacity for 
intentionality,23 being a systematic whole with a telos or object-with-will,24 “conativity” in 
the Spinozian sense of an endeavour to persist in its own being,25 or the capacity for feeling 
or “prehension”.26  
By grounding intrinsic values objectively, as a fundamental feature of the universe, 
panpsychism is the strongest metaphysical stance in opposition to the mechanistic 
utilitarianism of a materialistic culture. This opposition goes beyond solving the 
philosophical puzzle of how to ground intrinsic values. Panpsychism has also been celebrated 
for bridging the “great gulf” established by Cartesian metaphysics between “the conscious, 
mindful human sphere and the mindless, clockwork natural one” so that “nature can be 
recognized as akin to the human”.27 Through the shared quality of “being en-minded”, 
panpsychism is heralded for the potential to change humanity’s existential position, “to know 
the universe more intimately and find ourselves at home within it.”28 This is to extend 
                                                 
20 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: the making of the modern identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), 13, 56, quoted in Michael Northcott, The Environment & Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 70. Cf. Oliver O’Donovan, Resurrection and the Moral Order (Leicester: InterVarsity 
Press, 1986), 17. 
21 Joel Feinberg, “The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations,” in Philosophy and Environmental Crisis, 
ed. W.T. Blackstone (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1974), 43-68.  
22 Paul Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1986).  
23 Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London: Routledge, 1993). 
24 Rolston III, Environmental Ethics, 109ff.  
25 Mathews, The Ecological Self; Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, trans. R.H.M. Elwes (New York: Dover Press, 1951), 
Part III, Prop. IV, Proof.  
26 Charles Hartshorne, “The rights of the subhuman world,” Environmental Ethics 1 (1979): 49-60. Jay 
McDaniel, “Physical matter as creative and sentient,” Environmental Ethics 5 (1983): 291-317. 
27 Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 5, 137.  
28 Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West, 4. As John Haught has written, “as long as we fail to experience how 
intimately we belong to the earth and the universe as our appropriate habitat, we will probably not care deeply 
for our natural environment.” John F. Haught “Religious and cosmic homelessness: some environmental 
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personalist ethics to non-human creatures, as Rosemary Radford Ruether writes, to “respond 
to the ‘thou-ness’ in all beings.”29 The potential of panpsychism to widen the field in which 
humans can sympathise and even empathise has been emphasised by Process thinkers, who 
have been at the forefront of environmental scholarship.30  
This shared ontology and sympathy for other creatures need not flatten all differences, 
ontological or axiological, in the world. Value, like subjectivity, is not an all-or-nothing 
category. Although some, such as Aldo Leopold and Arne Naess argue for a total equality 
between all entities, most emphasise a gradient of values.31 This is because without such a 
gradient, or way of comparing and evaluating values, we would be paralysed in a sea of 
moral obligations, unable to make any ethical decision.32 However, by grounding intrinsic 
value in subjectivity, panpsychism need not face this problem since the complexity and 
intensity of the subject will quite naturally correspond to the quantity of intrinsic value. As 
we learnt in chapter two, panpsychists typically place an almost inexpressibly basic form of 
subjectivity as fundamental, and this corresponds to what might be called a “background 
value” permeating all things. Freya Mathews writes that, “while this background value 
evokes a generalized sense of reverence for the physical world . . . it does not prescribe one 
kind of action rather than another.”33 Above this background value, complex unified subjects 
(organisms) of higher intrinsic value, as well as instrumental values can be used to structure 
ethical reflection in a complex world interwoven with value.  
                                                 
implications,” in Liberating Life: contemporary approaches to ecological theology, eds. C. Birch and W. Eaken 
and J. B. McDaniel (Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1990), 160. 
29 She goes on, “This is no romanticism or an anthropomorphic animism that sees ‘dryads in trees’ although 
there is truth in the animist view. The spirit in plants or animals is not anthropomorphic but biomorphic to its 
own forms of life.” Rosemary Raford Ruether, Sexism and God-talk: towards a feminist theology (London: 
SCM Press, 1983), 87. 
30 Charles Birch and John B. Cobb write that “if in physical nature also there is experience, then there is a 
universal community for mutual participation in sympathy.” Charles Birch and John B. Cobb, Liberation of 
Life: from the cell to the community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 134. Cf. McDaniel, 
“Physical Matter”, 315. 
31 Aldo Leopold’s description of humanity’s place as “a plain member and citizen” of the land-community and 
Arne Naess’s suggestion that “the equal right to live and blossom is an intuitively clear and obvious value 
axiom”, seem to imply that all are of absolutely equal value. Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 219-220. Arne Naess, “The shadow of the deep, long-range ecology 
movement. A summary,” Inquiry 16 (1973): 96. Such, ecological egalitarianism means that degrees of sentience 
are irrelevant to the Deep Ecology movement. See, George Sessions, quoted in Ferré “Personalistic 
Organicism”, 60.  
32 Midgley astutely recognizes that people resist discussions of humanity’s moral duty to other animals not 
because of a total lack of feeling and not, on the popular level, because of misguided metaphysics, but “because 
they see this as likely to lay on them an infinite load of obligation, and they rightly think than infinite obligation 
would be meaningless. Ought implies can. Indefinite guilt is paralyzing.” Mary Midgley, Beast and Man: The 
Roots of Human Nature (Hassocks, Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1978), 222-223. 
33 Mathews, Ecological Self, 83. 
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It should be noted that a panpsychist eco-philosophy presents a significant challenge to 
Christian theology. This is not a challenge arising from blame or guilt (although, I am sure 
many panpsychist eco-philosophers would join that chorus), but the more serious challenge 
of offering a cogent alternative vision of values and of humanity’s relationship to the cosmos. 
Panpsychism, it might be argued, has no need of God, and with a panpsychist ontology, 
neither does ecological ethics. It is common for Christian theologians engaged in ecological 
ethics to assert that the mechanism, materialism, alienation and subsequent exploitation of the 
non-human world arose due to the loss of a sense of transcendence, a separation of grace 
from nature, an eclipse of the Creator and so of creation.34 This historical narrative serves an 
apologetic purpose; it grounds the argument that humanity must return to the Creator and 
rediscover creaturehood if we are to heal our relationship with non-human creation. It is a 
powerful plea for the relevance of theology in a culture where many people have never 
stepped inside a church or opened a Bible. I neither wish to critique the apologetic project, 
nor deconstruct the supporting historical narrative (which I find largely compelling), but only 
to highlight that panpsychism offers a secularist parallel or alternative. Christian theology 
must recognise the power of panpsychism and wrestle with it, if their own claims for 
relevance at this point are to be maintained. 
All is not lost, however, for a theological critique of the claim that a panpsychist eco-
philosophy is fully sufficient, is possible. The first weakness of the approach outlined above 
as a meta-ethical ontology is that it presents, what might be called, a maximally selfish 
universe. Each subjectivity in the universe, which grounds its own intrinsic value and orbiting 
instrumental values in itself, structures the world in a fundamentally egoist way. Whilst the 
recognition of the intrinsic value of another creates an interconnecting web of moral 
restrictions and obligations, values themselves are highly privatised, and thus relativized. 
There may be a collective society of minds, on this philosophy, but there is little scope for the 
community or fellowship that is sort, because there is no shared teleology, no shared values. 
Individual survival is the name of the game, beyond that horizon nothing remains.35  
                                                 
34 Louis Dupré, Passage to Modernity: An Essay on the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1993). Peter Scott, A Political Theology of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 3-29. Norman Wirzba, From Nature to Creation: A Christian Vision for Understanding and Loving Our 
World (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2015), 6-18, 39-59. Hans Boersma, Heavenly Participation: the 
weaving of a sacramental tapestry (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011), 30.  
35 A panpsychist ecological philosophy that strives to avoid this problem through an account of “rational value” 
or “instrumental intrinsic value” can be found in Phemister, Leibniz and the Environment, 104. Whilst Leibniz’s 
philosophy is clearly of interest to secular ecology, as Phemister shows, Leibniz’s rationale and particularly 
Leibniz’s account of values is incomplete if separated from its theistic point of reference.  
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This limits the scope of critique that a panpsychist eco-philosophy can place on the 
exploitative and abusive behaviour of human beings towards the non-human subjects and the 
level of hope that can be provided for change and healing. The sickness of the human heart, 
that theology calls sin, is reduced to the disordering of external relations which it falsely 
appears within our power to change; if only we got our eco-philosophy right! But how to do 
this appears impossible, for there is no Archimedean point of values and human beings 
remain on the throne of relative intrinsic values. There can be little hope of genuine 
transformation on this model, for if humanity, whose power to destroy seems to far outweigh 
our power to redeem, remains the leading edge of history then all is thrown back on to the 
image of man as the measure of all things, in an infinite world.  
It is in part for the reasons above, that many Christian theologians have resisted the 
temptation to speak too strongly of intrinsic values, or to search for a ground for such values 
within the cosmos. In the words of Karl Barth, “The creature is no more its own goal and 
purpose than it is its own ground and beginning”.36 Perhaps the most famous, if not notorious, 
discussion of the question of how to ground values when the universe is understood as 
creation, is given by Augustine of Hippo. In book one of On Christian Doctrine, Augustine 
distinguishes between uti, translated as “uses” or sometimes “means” referring to that which 
is pursued for (diligere propter) some higher thing, and fruitio, translated as “enjoyment” or 
“ends” referring to things that are pursued for themselves.37 Augustine’s distinction maps 
sufficiently onto the contemporary categories of instrumental and intrinsic values to warrant 
further reflection.  
Augustine’s ethical theory, contrary to the search within contemporary ecological philosophy, 
does not look for intrinsic values within the natural world; for things to be enjoyed in and for 
themselves. Instead, Augustine writes that within this temporal dispensation Christians 
should ‘use’ creation, and indeed our human friends, as a vehicle or as one might use an 
instrument. The only proper and final object of enjoyment and love is the Triune God; all else 
is loved instrumentally as a way to love God.38 Augustine insists that no one should resent 
being loved for the sake of God, since this is how we love ourselves.39 Thus, intrinsic values 
                                                 
36 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics [hereafter, CD] III/1, eds. and trans. G. W. Bromliey and T.F. Torrance 
(London: T&T Clark, 2009), §41.2, 93. 
37 ‘amore inhaerere alicui rei propter se ipsam’. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, 1.3-4, quoted in Oliver 
O’Donovan, “Usus and Fruito in Augustine De Doctrina Christiana I.,” Journal of Theological Studies 33, no.2 
(Oct. 1982): 361.   
38 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine,1.3.3, 1.5.5, 22.20-21, in O’Donovan “Uses and Fruito”, 384. 
39 Oliver O’Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in Augustine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 26.  
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are replaced, or perhaps reinterpreted, with sacramental value; things to be enjoyed in 
reference and participation of God.40 This counteracts the problems outlined above, since 
God provides a transcendent horizon and Archimedean point for value, in which all 
contingent values can participate and thus be opened up from their privatised survival tactics, 
to a shared vision and purpose. It is the sacramental nature of subjectively grounded intrinsic 
values that allows creatures to relate to one another in a common sphere of love and respect. 
In so far as this critique hits its mark, it can be claimed that a panpsychist eco-philosophy is 
not sufficient in and of itself to provide the metaphysical framework for ecological ethics. 
When the claim of sufficiency is dropped, then panpsychism and Christian theology need not 
stand in competition to one another, but the deficiencies of each might be offset by the other. 
This is the hypothesis explored in this chapter, that whilst panpsychism offers significant 
ontological resources to ecological philosophy, the naturalist or immanentist frame in which 
it claims sufficiency undermines its efforts. Conversely, Christian theology offers a 
transcendental horizon, where creation can be understood as gift, not only of being but the 
gift of fellowship with both God and other creatures. If this fellowship is to find a sufficient 
place for non-human creatures, however, then a theologically contextualised panpsychism 
may still need to be in play; it is to this argument that we now turn.  
 
2. How a Mental Monopoly Distorts Doctrine 
 
It was seen above that although panpsychism plays a leading role in ecological philosophy, it 
requires a transcendent ground beyond that offered by the naturalistic frame. In a reciprocal 
fashion, the following section argues that Christian proposals would benefit from a 
panpsychist ontology, as the complementary immanent expression of values. This serves to 
counteract the persistent anthropocentric distortion that forms part of our intellectual 
inheritance. This argument proceeds by considering four prominent metaphors within 
Christian theology that characterise the relationship between God, humanity and creation. 
The four metaphors are: (a) Humanity as a microcosm, as mediators and as priests of the 
universe, which is then the material for human worship. (b) Humanity as bearers of the image 
of God, and stewards of God’s cosmic household. (c) Humanity as conversation partners 
                                                 
40 Boersma, Heavenly Participation, 24. 
151 
 
invited into the Trinitarian dialogue or even protagonists within the Divine drama on the 
stage of creation. (d) Humanity as the recipients of salvation in Jesus Christ, towards which 
creation serves a pedagogical purpose. These are all theologically powerful constructions and 
should not be rashly jettisoned. The argument below is intended to be restorative. There is 
only one rotten thread running through these four intellectual trajectories, which allows them 
each to be distorted into providing theological justification of the mistreatment of creation by 
human beings. That distortive thread is the monopoly that humanity has over mind and spirit. 
If we can unweave this thread and replace it with the democratisation of mind that 
panpsychism offers, then theologians may find a promising way in building an ecologically 
sensitive Christianity, without discarding these precious heirlooms of Christianity’s 
theological imagination.  
 
Humanity as Microcosm, Mediator and Priest  
 
The concept of humanity, soul and body, as microcosm of heaven and earth has been fairly 
pervasive in the history of Christian thought.41 In the words of Kallistos Ware, “Heavenly yet 
earthly, spiritual yet material, we human persons are each a microcosm”.42 As the sole 
creatures of both mind and body, humanity alone reflects the nature of reality. In the theology 
of Nemesius of Emeasa and Maximus the Confessor, the confluence between humanity as 
microcosm and as made in God’s image took on a vocational meaning; the task of humanity 
was not just to reflect, but also to reconcile, the divisions within the universe.43 As 
microcosm humanity can be characterized as “the laboratory in which everything is 
concentrated and in itself naturally mediates between the extremities of each division” within 
the created order. 44 Humanity, in this theological imagination, is the lynchpin of creation, the 
keystone in the arch; the doctrine of creation is incorporated into theological anthropology, 
rather than the opposite.45 The risk of this anthropology, although it is not an entailment, lies 
                                                 
41 This idea is not uniquely Christian but can be traced back to pre-Socratic philosophy and a central tenet within 
Stoic and Platonic philosophy. See, Lars Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator. The Theological Anthropology of 
Maximus the Confessor (Lund, Sweden: Håkan Ohlssons Boktrycheri, 1965), 141.  
42 Metropolitan Kallistos, “Through Creation to the Creator,” in Toward an Ecology of Transfiguration: 
Orthodox Christian Perspectives on Environment, Nature, and Creation, eds. John Chryssavgis and Bruce V. 
Foltz (Fordham University Press, 2013), 98. 
43 Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 144-145. 
44 Andrew Louth, ed., Maximus the Confessor (New York: Routledge, 1996), 157; Ambigua 41 1305A-B.  
45 McFarland, From Nothing, 80. Cf. Maximus Confessor, Ambiguum 41 (PG 91:1305B); The Church’s 
Mystagogy 7 (PG 91:684D-685A).  
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with humanity being the normative pivot of the world. It is not a long jump from humanity’s 
vocation as microcosm to a theological justification for the expansion of human civilisation 
to remake creation in ‘his’ own image and for ‘his’ own articulation of praise. 
This human vocation is emphasised in many Eastern Orthodox theologies that stress the 
priesthood of humanity. This logic from microcosm to mediator or priest is captured in the 
following quote:  
Through man alone the material becomes articulate in praise of God. 
Because man is body he shares in the material world around him, which 
passes within him through his sense perceptions. Because man is mind he 
belongs to the world of higher reality and pure spirit. Because he is both, 
he is, in Cyril of Alexandria’s phrase, ‘God’s crowned image’; he can 
mould and manipulate the material and render it articulate.46 
In this account, the creation appears mute, soulless and even bereft of God’s Spirit, until it is 
utilised to express the praises of humanity. John Zizioulas describes humans as “the only 
possible link between God and creation” who therefore have the power to “either bring nature 
in communion with God and thus sanctify it; or condemn it to the state of a ‘thing’, the 
meaning and purpose of which are exhausted with the satisfaction of man.”47 Zizioulas’ 
intention is that this tremendous responsibility will motivate ethical behaviour. However, the 
monopoly that humanity has upon mind and spirituality distorts this intention into a 
motivation towards instrumentalising nature to serve humanity’s spiritual needs.  
The concept of humanity acting as priests of creation has been critiqued by Michael Northcott 
and Richard Bauckham. Bauckham describes this as an “arrogant assertion”, antithetical to 
Scripture’s repeated depiction of God’s direct relationship with non-human creatures and the 
voices of creation raised to God.48 Similarly, Northcott critiques the priesthood of humanity 
as,   
deeply humanocentric and seems to encourage the remaking and 
hominisation of the whole biosphere in the human image and for the 
                                                 
46 Gervase Mathew, “The Material Becomes Articulate,” from Byzantine Aesthetics, in The Creation Spirit: An 
Anthropology, eds. Robet van de Weyter and Pat Saunders (London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1990), 18. 
47 John Zizioulas, “Priest of Creation,” in Environmental Stewardship: Critical Perspectives- Past and Present, 
ed. R.J. Berry (London: T&T Clark, 2006), 290.  
48 Richard Bauckham “Joining Nature’s Praise of God,” Ecotheology 7 (2002): 50. 
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needs of the human body. Nature and creation by this metaphor is denied 
any independent or intrinsic values.49 
At the heart of Bauckham’s and Northcott’s critiques is the idea that humanity, as priests, 
provide the exclusive mediation between God and creation; humanity should not have a 
monopoly on a living relationship with the Creator. Neither Bauckham and Northcott unpick 
the ontological underpinnings of the microcosm idea, whereby humanity holds a monopoly on 
spirit within the material world, but it is this monopoly that generates the felt need for human 
mediators. Moreover, the championing of a cosmic priesthood by Orthodox theology is tied to 
the hierarchical and patriarchal theology of priesthood operative within these 
denominations.50 The possibility of reimagining the priestly vocation of humanity (as 
deacons, ministers, pastors, or worship leaders, if you prefer), as expressed within recent 
Protestant theologies of priesthood is explored in the final section of this chapter, but it 
requires the extension of mind to include all creatures who together praise God.  
 
Humanity as Steward, Creation as Household 
 
The crux of much theological anthropology, especially in dialogue with ecology, has been the 
determination in Genesis 1:26-28: 
Then God said, ‘Let us make humanity in our image, according to our 
likeness. And let them rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the 
air. Let them rule over the livestock, over all the earth, and over 
everything that moves upon the earth.’ So God created humanity in his 
image. In the image of God he created him. Male and female he created 
them. And God blessed them and said to them, ‘Be fruitful and increase, 
fill, the earth and subdue it. And rule over the fish of the sea and the birds 
of the air, and over every living thing that moves upon the earth.’ 
(Genesis 1:26-28) 
It is hard to overstate either the importance or the controversy of these verses. Most 
pertinently, ecological ethicists have criticised the way this passage has provided “intellectual 
                                                 
49 Northcott, The Environment, 133-134. 
50 Stephen R. L. Clark has suggested that Christian environmentalists who “speak of man [sic] as ‘the world’s 
high priest’ should likewise remember what priests, in Greece and Israel, actually did.” Clark, “Global 
Religion,” in Philosophy and the Natural Environment, eds. Robin Attfield and Andrew Belsey (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 124.  
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lubrication for the exploitation of nature.”51 Despite the ethical and interpretative baggage, 
the imago Dei remains an “indestructible symbol” which every generation must re-interpret 
and wrestle with, and indeed redeem, for their own context.52  
A substance or structural based interpretation, which defines the imago Dei as a human 
capacity or ontological constitution, has dominated the Christian tradition, most commonly 
focusing on the rational soul. A representative quote can be taken from Thomas Aquinas, 
who is quoting John of Damascus, as saying that “being after God’s image signifies his 
capacity for understanding, and for making free decisions and his mastery of himself.”53 Even 
relational and vocational interpretations of the imago Dei presuppose this ontological 
uniqueness as the ground of a unique relationship with God or calling from God. It is this 
underlying ontological assumption, therefore, in addition to the proposed manifestation of the 
image, that needs careful handling.  
Biblical scholarship has tended to favour functional interpretations; the image symbolises 
humanity’s stewardship over creation on God’s behalf.54 From the perspective of eco-
theology, this vocational interpretation can do either tremendous harm or tremendous good, 
as it places humanity’s relationship to non-human creatures at the centre of what it means to 
be distinctively human. Yet, much depends on what humanity are seen to be stewards over 
and what future our stewardship is orientated towards. As part of a response to the ecological 
crisis it is often emphasised that humanity are not the proprietors of creation, which belongs 
solely to God. As a method for cultivating sustainable behaviours within Christian 
communities, this has not been a wholly unsuccessful strategy. Yet, as Michael Northcott 
writes, “[t]he fundamental problem with this metaphor is the implication that humans are 
effectively in control of nature, its managers or, as Heidegger prefers, its guardians.”55 This is 
                                                 
51 Nash, The Rights of Nature, 90. 
52 Paul Ricoeur, “The Image of God and the Epic of Mart,” in History and Truth, trans. Charles A. Kelby 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965), 110. See also, John Douglas Hall, Imaging God. Dominion as 
Stewardship (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 1986).  
53 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a, 93.5. 
54 Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary trans. John H. Marks, The Old Testament Library, (Philadelphia: 
Westminster, 1961), 56 and Hans Walter Wolff, Anthropology of the Old Testament, ed. and trans. Maragaret 
Kohl (London: SCM Press,1974). 
55 Northcott, The Environment, 129. John Zizioulas, “Proprietors or Priests of Creation?,” in Toward an Ecology 
of Transfiguration: Orthodox Christian Perspectives on Environment, Nature and Creation, eds. John 
Chryssavgis and Bruce V. Foltz (Fordham Scholarship Online, 2014), 164.  
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an illusion, since “so much of recent environmental history teaches us that we are not in fact 
in control of the biosphere.”56 Northcott goes on to argues that stewardship 
has become associated with instrumentalist attitudes . . .  with absolute 
property rights and land ownership patterns in Western civilisation 
result[ing] in its mutation into a metaphor of human control and mastery 
over nature.57 
Despite its usefulness, then, Northcott concludes that the idea of human stewardship “has 
become a misleading and potentially harmful metaphor.”58 
The central reason that the metaphor of stewardship is vulnerable to this distortion is because 
of the assumption that non-human creation is purely material; a steward cares for his master’s 
property.59 As property, albeit God’s property, the created world has no rights or values of its 
own. Moreover, this metaphor can too easily portray the divine proprietor as more like an 
absentee landlord than a loving and present Creator. Instead, the call to stewardship should be 
combined with the idea of the cosmos as the home of both humanity and God (Rev. 21:3). 
Larry Rasmussen, amongst others, has constructed an oikos theology, using the etymological 
root of economics, ecumenics and ecology to unite various aspect of eco-theology together. 
Here, “Creation is pictured as a vast public household.” 60 This connotes a sacred space that 
resists utilitarian views of the earth (and universe) and emphasises a sense of human 
belonging in creation against escapist spiritualities or eschatologies. The creation is a place, a 
sacred space, of the divine presence. If all creatures share this home together, then a retrieval 
of the stewardship metaphor has great potential. However, if creation remains an empty space 
and the background for shared life of God and humanity, then it is valued as nothing more 
than the context of the Divine-human drama. 
                                                 
56 Northcott, The Environment, 129. 
57 Northcott, 180. 
58Northcott, 180. Paul Santmire argues that, whilst not intrinsically flawed, the notion of stewardship is “too 
fraught with the heavy images of management, control, and exploitation of persons and resources.” H. Paul 
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Humanity as Dialogue Partner, Creation as Theatre 
 
The imago Dei has also been used as an organising principle in more relational approaches to 
Christian theology. Karl Barth exemplifies this model when he emphasised the phrase in 
Genesis; “male and female he created them” in order to draw a parallel between heterosexual 
relationships, the love between the Father and the Son in the Godhead, and the encounter 
between God and creatures (humans).61 This view has been criticised for both its binitarian 
view of God (leaving out the Holy Spirit), and Barth’s tendency to underplay the role of non-
human creatures in the covenant.62 Thus, we find Barth argue that all Christian theology and 
thought “has to be exclusively and conclusively the doctrine of Jesus Christ as the living 
Word of God spoken to us men.”63 Humanity alone stands in an “I-Thou” relationship to God 
and is conceived of as “the partner in the covenant of grace which is the whole basis and aim 
of creation.”64 Barth’s relational interpretation of the imago Dei and definition of humanity as 
persons-in-relation corresponds to a wider turn towards personalism within Christian 
theology in the twentieth century.   
The idea of humanity as dialogue partners with God corresponds to a view of creation as a 
“beautiful theatre”.65 We see Barth, for example, describing creation as “the theatre and 
setting, the location and background” for the drama of the history of Christ.66  Calvin’s idea 
of a creation as a theatre was intended to suggest that creation proclaims and reflects God’s 
                                                 
61 Barth, CD III/1, §41.2, 188-206. 
62 Colin E. Gunton, “Trinity, Ontology and Anthropology,” in Persons Divine and Human, eds. Christoph 
Schwöbel and Colin E. Gunton (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 57-58. Andrew Linzey, “The Neglect of the 
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below. Santmire, Nature Reborn, 142, n.21. 
65 Jean Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 1.14.20, trans. Henry Beveridge (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson 
Publishers, 2008), 101.  
66 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/3.1, eds. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2009), 
§69.2, 131, 137.  
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glory and power, and in that sense witnesses God to humanity.67 Yet, without any non-human 
subjects, only objects, it is hard to avoid the more negative implication, articulated by Emil 
Brunner whereby “the cosmic element in the Bible is never anything more than the ‘scenery’ 
in which the history of mankind takes place”68  
As a framework of Christian theology personalism is extremely compelling but has the effect 
of excluding non-personal creatures, typically defined as those without the capacity for 
speech, from theological consideration. Kevin Vanhoozer defines humans as the “creatures to 
whom God relates personally (Gen. 1:28-30), creatures with whom God can speak.”69 
Similarly, Robert Jenson defines humanity essentially and uniquely as “praying animals”; the 
animals capable of a communicative personal relationship with the Creator.70 The turn 
towards personalism has sought to build Christian theology upon the axis of a (private) 
conversation between God and humans. For the rest of creation to stand in an analogous 
relationship to God, it follows that creation would require an analogous subjectivity and to be 
extended the right to speak; this is where panpsychism can aid theologians in expanding the 
dialogical axis of theology to include all creatures. 
Mary Midgley highlights that language, as the signification of subjectivity, has been “the 
keys to the castle” of human superiority.71  However, she argues that this is “simply a piece 
of bad metaphysics, namely, Descartes’ dualistic view that the world is divided sharply, 
without remainder, into lifeless objects on the one hand and human, fully rational, subjects on 
the other.”72 Panpsychism rightly threatens our own self-importance, because it bestows a 
moral status to other creatures as subjects. Importantly, panpsychism, therefore, implies that 
language and consciousness are “not, any more than reason, a yes-or-no business, [they are 
not] a hammer that you are holding or not holding, a single, indivisible, sacred heirloom 
guaranteeing supremacy.”73  
Whether humanity is conceived of as microcosmic priests, as stewards, or God’s dialogue 
partners, it is humanity’s monopoly on consciousness and subjectivity that distorts each of 
                                                 
67 Cornelis van der Kooi, “Calvin’s Theology of Creation and Providence: God’s Care and Human Fragility,” 
International Journal of Systematic Theology, 18, no. 1 (January 2016): 47-65.  
68 Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1946), 33n.  
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73 Midgley, 226. 
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these models into excessive anthropocentricism. Without some subjectivity dispersed 
throughout the creation, it is hard to avoid the implication that the non-human creation has no 
purpose, intrinsic value, or relationship with the Creator apart from its utility for human 
beings. A theological response to the ecological crisis need not reject the metaphors and the 
heritage that they represent, but only employ panpsychism as a guard against such distortion.  
 
The Centrality of the Incarnate Saviour, The Periphery of Creation 
 
Christian discourse must return again and again to one name, and with that name to the claim 
that God saves the world by becoming incarnate, living, dying and being resurrected as a 
particular human being. Christian theology cannot properly speak of creation, humanity, or 
God without speaking of Jesus Christ as “the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all 
creation” (Col. 1:15). As such, this chapter cannot avoid consideration of the centrality of 
both Christology and soteriology. Animal theologian, David Clough captures the challenge 
presented by the incarnation of Christ for the doctrine of creation:  
Here, it seems, is the final and decisive evidence that God is 
concerned with one species, rather than the multitude of creatures   
. . .  and that Christianity will never be able to escape a blinkered 
preoccupation with only one kind of animal.74 
The humanity of God presents a distinct challenge for theological engagement with wider 
ecological (and animal) concerns. The question is, how does a Christological foundation 
relate to the doctrine of creation; how do we relate the centre to the periphery?75 In the case of 
human beings, Christian theology has traditionally claimed that the effects of salvation are 
manifest either through a common human nature or through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit 
in the soul of the believer. However, if non-human creatures do not have souls, then both 
                                                 
74 David L. Clough, On Animals. Volume One: Systematic Theology (London: T&T Clark International, 2012), 
81-82.  
75 A parallel might be drawn, in epistemological method only, between the focus on Jesus Christ in theological 
anthropology and on the individual human self in panpsychism. In both instances, the basis of their respective 
truths claims (the reality of salvation or reality of consciousness) arises from one, single human centre; we are 
necessarily “self-centred” and there is a positive sense to this term.  From here, the investigator has a choice; 
limit the truth claim to the specific individual (Jesus/the self), limit the claim to those who stand in some 
apparent physiological continuity with the individual (Jews, males, or all humanity), or expand this discovery 
out to include the widest possible collective on the basis of a universal monism or universal creaturehood. In 
panpsychism, and in theologies that emphasis the cosmic scope of salvation, the latter option is adopted. See, 
Mary Midgely, “The End of Anthropocentricism?,” in Philosophy and the Natural Environment, eds. Robin 
Attfield and Andrew Belsey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 103-112. 
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these solutions exclude non-human creatures. Again, the human monopoly on mind, soul, or 
spirit lies at the heart of the problem. This monopoly has led to some recent theological 
gymnastics over the issue of Christology and creation. Whilst some over-particularise the 
effects of the incarnation and discuss the possibility of multiple incarnations for different 
species, others underplay the particularity of Jesus of Nazareth in order to speak of a “deep 
incarnation” of the whole universe, or the incarnation as the taking of non-specific “flesh”.76 
Both the theory of multiple (species-specific) incarnations and the idea of one cosmic 
incarnation, relate the doctrine of the incarnation to the wider creation through the medium of 
a common nature. Neither, however, seems suitable for articulating the cosmic importance of 
this particular God-human person, Jesus Christ. As such, it may be wise to return to the 
communication of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit to solve this riddle.  
Whilst I do not wish to develop a panpsychist deep incarnation, but instead offer a cosmic or 
‘deep’ view of the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ (see chapter four), Niels Henrik 
Gregersen’s argument is correct in emphasising the universal and immediate relation of union 
between Jesus Christ and all creation.77 The salvific impact of Jesus’ life arises from neither a 
common nature nor biological interconnection, but from the divine character of this life as the 
                                                 
76 Oliver Crisp, “Multiple Incarnations,” in Reason, Faith, and History: Philosophical Essays for Paul Helm, ed. 
Martin Stone (Aldershot; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), 219-38. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 2, 
Existence and The Christ (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 95-96. Brian Hebblethwaite, ‘The 
Impossibility of Multiple Incarnations,” Theology 104 (2001): 323-334. Clough, On Animals, 82-83. Niels 
Henrik Gregersen, “Cur deus caro: Jesus and the Cosmos Story,” Theology & Science 11, no. 4 (2013): 370-
393. Niels Henrik Gregersen, “The Cross of Christ in an Evolutionary World,” Dialog: A Journal of Theology 
40, no.3 (2001): 192-207; Niels Henrik Gregersen, “Deep Incarnation and Kenosis: In, With, Under, and As: A 
Response to Ted Peters,” Dialog: A Journal of Theology 52, no.3 (2013): 251-262. Although it is not always 
clear, I interpret Gregersen’s stress on the interconnectedness of embodied existence as offering something 
stronger than a traditional denial of Docetism, although it is certainly possible to interpret him in the weaker 
sense. The danger with presenting the Son as hypostatically connected to the whole universe through the 
humanity of Jesus of Nazareth is that it seems to weaken the claim that this particular human life reveals and 
saves and to which Christianity must again return in worship. The description of the incarnation as the 
assumption of a non-specific flesh is favoured by animal theologians, Andrew Linzey, Denis Edwards, and 
Process theologian John Cobb Jr. See, Andrew Linzey, “Is Christianity Irredeemably Speciesist?,” in Animals 
on the Agenda: Questions about Animals for Theology and Ethics, eds. Andrew Linzey and Dorothy Yamamoto 
(London: SCM Press, 1998), xvi. Denis Edwards, “The Redemption of Animals in an Incarnational Theology,” 
in Creaturely Theology: On God, Humans, and Other Animals, eds. David Clough and Celica Deane-
Drummond (London: SCM Press, 2009), 81-99. John Cobb Jr., “All Things in Christ,” in Animals on the 
Agenda: Questions about Animals for Theology and Ethics, eds. Andrew Linzey and Dorothy Yamamoto 
(London: SCM Press, 1998) 173-80.  
77 Holmes Rolston III has criticised the theology of deep incarnation on the grounds that it requires a 
panpsychist ontology to underpin it, although Gregersen does not discuss the implicit metaphysical ontology of 
his position. This may follow if a two-minds Christology is presupposed. Rolston gestures in this direction by 
implying that only subjects can possibility be considered candidates for incarnation, although he does not 
develop the point. Holmes Rolston III, “Divine Presence – Causal, Cybernetic, Caring, Cruciform: From 
information to incarnation,” in Incarnation: On the Scope and Depth of Christology, ed. Niels Henrik Gregersen 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015), 256. 
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life of the second Person of the Trinity.78 On the panpsychist ontology I am proposing, all are 
included into this divine life because all can receive Christ’s indwelling Spirit, who as an 
equal member of the Godhead shares in that same life. The effects of salvation are universal 
in scope because of the universal range of the indwelling of Christ’s Spirit, not a single 
common nature that we all share. Panpsychism facilitates a clear articulation of the 
omnipresent, indwelling Spirit who is active in the deep fundamental nature of reality. This 
prevents distorting Christology, either by undermining the cosmic significance of Christ as a 
species-specific Saviour, or by underemphasising the particularity of the incarnate life of 
Jesus of Nazareth.  
The beating heart of the Christian faith is the promise of salvation, and even Christology 
might be characterised as reflection upon the One who saves. The tunnelling effect of a 
human Saviour who only saves other humans is captured by the idea that “Saving trees and 
wetlands is a distraction from saving souls, building the church, and shoring up the approved 
moral issues.”79 In matters of salvation the human monopoly on the mind has led, not 
primarily to the active negation of creation’s good, but to its neglect as not an issue of 
ultimate concern.80  
One traditional way to incorporate creation into soteriology is through perceiving the 
providence of God as a school or training ground for human development. Early church 
father, Basil of Caesarea, wrote,  
You will finally discover that the world was not conceived by chance and 
without reason, but for a useful end and for the great advantage of all 
beings, since it is really the school where reasonable souls exercise 
themselves, the training ground where they learn to know God.81 
Beneath the metaphor of creation as school is a soteriology of ascent, which became 
particularly popular in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.82 Humanity’s vocation and hope 
                                                 
78 Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity, 54.  
79 Steven M. Studebaker, “Spirit in Creation: A Unified Theology of Grace and Creation Care,” Zygon: Journal 
of Religion and Science 43, no.4 (2008): 948.  
80 The prioritization for souls over bodies in soteriology arises from the hope for a post-mortem endurance of the 
soul, in contrast or prior to the resurrection of the body. However, it is only if humans alone are perceived as 
ensouled creatures that the differing mechanisms of salvation becomes a tendency towards instrumentalism 
within Christian theology. 
81 Basil, Hexaemeron I.6 in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, eds. Philip Schaff and Henry Wallace, 2nd series, 
vol. 8 (Peabody, MA: Cosimo, 1995), 55.   
82 Bonaventura, The Soul’s Journey to God, The Tree of Life, The Life of St. Francis, Classics of Western 
Spirituality (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1978), esp., 59. 
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lay in employing the rationality of the mind to contemplate the meaning within other 
creatures and (implicitly) to graduate from this worldly classroom.83 Creation, in this view, 
may either be an empty sign, disposable after its pedagogical role is complete, or an active 
and living witness speaking of and to God; the latter is close to the panpsychist view 
developed below. 
In early modern Protestantism, the pedagogical role of creation was maintained but the 
hermeneutic for reading the book of nature changed. The maximisation of the doctrine of 
providence drained creation of power and agency in exchange for the assurance that natural 
processes were all direct signs for God’s people and of God’s sovereign control.84 In the 
words of Christian Wolff:  
The world is accordingly a machine . . . Consequently, the world 
and all things in it are God’s instruments by means of which, since 
they are machines, he executes his intentions. From which it 
becomes evidence that they become a work of God’s wisdom 
through the very fact that they are indeed machines.85 
This is an argument for divine sovereignty, wisdom and providence on the basis of 
mechanistic philosophy. Here, the view of creation as a mindless and valueless machine is 
not an unintended distortion, but an apologetic strategy within Christian theology. Norman C. 
Habel, a leading figure within ecological hermeneutics, astutely writes that Western 
theologians have “generally read the text to hear the voice of God not the voice of the Earth, 
God speaking through the whirlwind, not the whirlwind itself.”86 As we shall see below, one 
need not deny God’s speech through creatures in order to affirm creation’s own speech, and 
to do so is to employ a panpsychist hermeneutic to hear and to join the voices of creation. 
This section has argued that a human monopoly of spirit or mind distorts a wide spectrum of 
theological articulations of the relationship between God, humanity and creation. This 
monopoly is not an exhaustive account of the challenges facing eco-theology, but it is 
powerful enough to cripple other noble efforts to build a theology that will counteract the 
                                                 
83 Santmire, The Travail of Nature, 182.  
84 As seen in chapter four’s discussion of natural laws. Rupert Sheldrake, The Rebirth of Nature: The Greening 
of the Science of God (London: Rider, 1990), 20-21. 
85 Christian Wolff (1719), ‘Reasonable Thoughts about God, the World, and the Human Soul’, quoted in 
Moltmann, God in Creation, 314.  
86 Norman C. Habel, “The Challenge of Ecojustice Readings for Christian Theology,” Pacifica 12 (2000): 133.  
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sinful tendency to exploit creation for our own benefit. If this monopoly is a common toxic 
thread through these theologies, then democratising mentality by adopting panpsychism is 
one clear and powerful way to correct this distortion. The remainder of this chapter employs 
panpsychism to remythologise various biblical texts and to retrieve the theologically rich 
metaphors of the Christian tradition outline above. The result is a panpsychist account of 
creation that can form the basis of a Christian environmental ethics. 
 
3. Panpsychism and Theological Imagination: A Proposal  
 
The first section of this chapter outlined the benefit of a panpsychist ontology in the field of 
ecological philosophy but concluded that a naturalistically framed panpsychism is insufficient 
as a basis for environmental ethics. The second section then focused on ways that Christian 
theologians have depicted the relationship between God, humanity and the wider creation and 
argued that when human beings are the sole creatures endowed with subjectivity the picture is 
distorted. It remains the task of this final section to draw the pieces together and construct a 
proposal for how panpsychism may remythologise creation in the theo-dramatics of the 
Christian imagination. To speak of “remythologizing theology” is to follow Kevin Vanhoozer 
in “rendering explicit the implicit ‘metaphysics’ of the biblical mythos.”87 As such, the first 
stage of this proposal is a panpsychist interpretation of Scriptural passages that depict nature 
as speaking. The second stage is to recast non-human creatures, not as the theatrical scenery 
on humanity’s stage, but as the active chorus of God’s theo-drama, a created congregation of 
praise. This lends itself to, in the third stage, an attempt to rehabilitate the priestly and 
stewarding roles of humanity into a more egalitarian model of priesthood or interpersonal 
model of stewardship, better referred to as a minister or worship leader. 
 
Metaphysics and the Biblical Mythos: Nature’s Voices  
 
How Scripture is read and interpreted is always and already influenced by theological 
commitments and dispositions, even as Scripture then informs theological content and 
                                                 
87 Kevin Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology: Divine Action, Passion and Authorship (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 183.  
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articulation as both source and norm. Given this symbiotic relationship, it is unsurprising that 
the tendencies to eschew and objectify creation examined above are accompanied by a 
hermeneutic that focuses almost exclusively upon the divine-human drama. This hermeneutic 
lens has left the interpretative question raised by Scriptural depictions of nature’s voices 
“woefully-neglected”.88 The interpretative question raised by these texts is the possibility that 
nature is “a theological reality in its own right”.89 When these passages are dismissed as 
“poetic fancy”, revealing an attitude of “hasty anthropocentrism”, the possibility of a richer 
theology of nature arising from these texts is ruled out a priori.90 
Terrence Fretheim essay “Nature’s Praise of God in the Psalms” opened the, what is now 
lively, debate of interpreting nature as a theological subject within the Hebrew Scriptures.91 
Fretheim’s article makes clear a panpsychist interpretation of these passages (particularly Ps. 
148) has not been entirely absent from biblical scholarship.92 These passages are certainly 
                                                 
88 Mark Harris, “‘The trees of the field shall clap their hands’ (Isaiah 55:12) What does it mean to say that a tree 
praises God?,” in Knowing Creation: Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy and Science, ed. Andrew B. 
Torrance and Thomas H. McCall (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2018), 288. Santmire describes creation’s 
praise of God as “one of the least understood themes in the Old Testament.” Santmire, The Travail of Nature, 
198-99. The most common verb is “praise” (ḥll; Pss. 69:34; 148:7, 8, 9, 10; 150:6) and “singing” or “shouting” 
(rnn) is also frequently used (Pss.65:8; 66:4; 89:12; 96:12; 98:8, and 1 Chr. 16:31-33, Job 38:7, Isa. 35:2; 44:23; 
49:13; Jer. 51:48). A wide variety of other verbs are used, if less frequently, to describe the worship of the 
natural world: “proclaim” (ngd; Pss. 19:1; 50:6; 97:6 and Isa. 42:12), “tell glory” (spr; Ps.19:1), “pours forth 
speech” (nb’; Ps. 19:2), “girded for joy” (gîl; Ps. 65:12), “shout for joy” (šîr; Ps. 65:13), “praise wonders” (ydh; 
Pss. 89:5; 145:10), “being glad”, (śmḥ; Ps. 96:11. Joel. 2:21, or śûś in the case of the dry land in Isa. 35:1), 
“rejoice” (gîl; Ps. 96.11. Is. 35:1; 49:13; Joel 2:21), “exult” (‘lz; Ps. 96.12), floods and trees “clap hands” (mḥ’; 
Ps. 98:8, Is. 55:12), and “bless the Lord” (brk; Ps. 103:22). The variety of verbs used across the Old Testament 
in this regard suggest that there is not one way in which non-human creatures respond to God, but different 
verbs are attributed even to the same natural feature (mountains, lands or the heavens) in different instances. 
89 Harris, “ ‘The trees of the field...’,” 287. 
90 Terence E. Fretheim, “Nature’s Praise of God in The Psalms,” Ex Auditu 3 (1987): 21. Fretheim, “Nature’s 
Praise,” 21. Harris, “ ‘The trees of the field...’,” 304. 
91 Fretheim, “Nature’s Praise,” 16. For example, Bauckham “Joining Nature’s Praise,” 45-59; Dominic Coad, 
“Creation’s praise of God: A proposal for a theology of the non-human creation,” Theology (May/June 2009): 
181-189;  Harris, “ ‘The trees of the field’,”; David Horrell, The Bible and the Enviroment: Towards a Critical 
Ecological Biblical Theology (London: Oakville: Equinox, 2010); David Horrell and Dominic Coad, “‘The 
stones would cry out’ (Luke 19:40): a Lukan contribution to a hermeneutics of creation’s praise,” Scottish 
Journal of Theology 64 (2011): 29-44; Rachel Muers “The Holy Spirit, the voices of nature and environmental 
prophecy,” Scottish Journal of Theology 67 (2014): 323-339; Duane Warden, “All Things Praise Him (Psalm 
149),” Restoration Quarterly 2 (1993): 101-108. Brendan Byrne, “An Ecological Reading of Romans 8:19–22: 
Problems and Possibilities,” in Horrell et al., Ecological Hermeneutics: Biblical, Historical and Theological 
Perspectives (London: T&T Clark, 2010), 83–93; Cherryl Hunt, David G. Horrell and Christopher Southgate, 
“An Environmental Mantra? Ecological Interest in Romans 8.19–23 and a Modest Proposal for its Narrative 
Interpretation,” Journal of Theological Studies 59, no.2 (2008):546–79. 
92 Fretheim cites (“Nature’s Praise”, 20) Hermann Gunkel, as writing “Such exhortation of creatures to praise of 
God was not simply a ‘poetic figure’ in Israel; the concept of nature as animate still was lodged” in the human 
imagination at that time. Hermann Gunkel, Die Psalmen (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1926).  
Following him, L.I.J. Stadelmann describes the Hebrew worldview as one where the natural order and the 
human are incorporated in a “psychic whole” whereby all of nature is permeated by a diffused awareness and 
some natural entities such as stars (cf. Job 38:7) are “beings provided with consciousness” and “Certainly we 
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Stadelmann, The Hebrew Conception of the World (Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1970), 94, 7. H.W. 
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poetic, but they are not merely poetic; they are not without referent in the real world. Psalm 
19:1-4, in particular, shows that the Psalmist recognised the interpretative problem of 
describing the very real praises of non-human creatures in anthropomorphic language: 
The heavens are telling the (spr) glory of God; 
and the firmament proclaims (ngd) his handiwork. 
Day to day pours forth speech (nb’),  
and night to night declares (ḥwh) knowledge.  
There is no speech, nor are there words;  
their voice is not heard;  
yet their voice goes out through all the earth, 
 and their words to the end of the world (NRSV). 
 
This passage implies that the psalmist understood the theme of nature’s praise both 
metaphorically and realistically.93 Metaphor and realism are not mutually exclusive (indeed, 
theologians employ the two in conjunction all the time to speak of God). These passages 
realistically depict aspects of the natural world as subjects and describe the worship of these 
non-human creatures through metaphorical comparison to human worship.  
It is unsurprising, therefore, that some of nature’s illocution is depicted through non-
anthropomorphic verbs such as “quake” (nût; Ps. 99:1) for the earth and “roar” (r’m; Ps. 98:7; 
Is. 42:10) for the seas and coastlands. Jeremiah 12:4 may be helpful here: “How long will the 
land mourn, and the grass of every field wither?” Not only is mourning, the responsive active 
of a subject, parallel to a physical withering in this passage, but the verbal root of “mourn” 
can imply “dry up”, although mourn is more common and it is paralleled with “grown black”. 
It may be that drying up or growing black is the ‘voice’ of mourning. These descriptions are 
more in keeping with responses we would expect from these features of the natural world, but 
that is not to suggest that they do not constitute speech-acts. 
                                                 
Robinson gives the most explicitly panpsychist interpretation when he writes that “objects of nature were 
conceived as having a psychical life of their own... a diffused consciousness with [their] own psychical.” H.W. 
Robinson, Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testament (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1946), 12, 15-16, 47. 
Finally, H. and H.A. Frankfort employ Buber’s philosophy when they describe the difference between the 
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and in the ancient case, as “Thou”. H. and H.A. Frankfort, et al. The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man: An 
Essay of Speculative Thought in Ancient Near East (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), 4. 
93 Howard N. Wallace writes, “the acceptance of the words of the psalmist as a metaphor does not allow us to 
dismiss them too quickly as simply a feature of the poetry . . . The metaphor points to a reality embodied within 
the physical world, one that our contemporary Western minds are not usually trained to comprehend.” Howard 
N. Wallace, “Jubilate Deo omnis terra”: God and Earth in Psalm 65,” in The Earth Story in the Psalms and the 
Prophets, ed. Norman C. Habel (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001), 62, 63. 
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One of the most strikingly panpsychist discussions of the illocution of the non-human world 
is found in Rowan Williams’ Gifford Lectures. Williams affirms that “the bare fact is that the 
material world speaks.”94 William’s extends the evolutionary grounds of human language 
deep into our embodied connection to the material world because, “[m]aterial objects and the 
material world as such as always already ‘saturated’ with the works of mind.” 95 The symbolic 
exchange that underpins causation in the natural world is, Williams suggests, more closely 
analogous to the cognition of human language than to the cogs of an inanimate machine. If 
the communication of the natural world, witnessed to in the Scriptural mythos, is to be 
realistically interpreted then the implied ‘metaphysic’ is a panpsychist ontology. Non-human 
creatures are communicating subjects, although the methods of communication are expected 
to be unique and appropriate to each creature. Rachel Muers has recently affirmed,   
Stones and trees cannot actually speak. It is not, however, very 
controversial to say that stones and trees can and do make sense, in all 
sorts of publically available ways (including ecological and theological 
ways) . . . Specific natural phenomena, as we observe and interact with 
them, tell us things . . . it is neither reasonable nor useful to reduce this 
‘telling’ entirely to an act of meaning-making on the part of the 
observer.96 
Muers argues that the contemporary environmental crisis can be interpreted as a new 
narrative of prophecy; that the Spirit is gifting nonhuman nature with “the miraculous 
extension of gifts of speech and hearing”.97 This miracle need not be the creation of non-
human subjects ex nihilo where there were none previously in the natural world. Instead, the 
miracle may take place, in accordance with the account of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit 
given in chapter four, as a transformation of humanity’s recognition of the normative 
standing of the natural world, so that we can ‘hear’ the voices of creation that God has heard 
and loved since time began; “Creation voices. It has never been silent.”98  
The importance of speech, auditory or otherwise, for animal rights is explored in Nicholas 
Wolterstorff’s article, “Why Animals Don’t Speak”. Building on his earlier work on Divine 
Discourse, Wolterstorff argues that “To perform a speech action is to acquire a certain 
normative standing in one’s society, a standing constituted in part by a certain complex of 
                                                 
94 Rowan Williams, The Edge of Words: God and the Habits of Language (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 123.  
95 Williams, 101-103. 
96 Muers, “The Holy Spirit.”, 332.  
97 Muers, 323.  
98 Graham Ward, Cities of God (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 9.  
166 
 
rights and/or responsibilities.”99 It is not just that speech-acts create or give moral standing to 
a speaker, but that noises or movements become speech-acts only when the creature in 
question has moral standing in a community.100 In order to hear a voice, we must first 
consider an owner a speaker; that is, figure of normative standing in a community. This is 
because “[s]peaking is a normative interaction” that includes the subject within a shared field 
of ethical consideration.101    
Wolterstorff’s argument serves to highlight how radical it is that the biblical authors 
frequently attribute illocutionary action to various non-human aspects of creation. Bauckham 
is right to refer to the Scriptural witness of creation’s praise to God as “the strongest antidote 
to anthropocentrism in the biblical and Christian tradition”.102 Similarly, Northcott writes that 
“humanity and the cosmos have moral significance, [because] both are required to make a 
moral response to the creator”.103 The link between subject-to-subject illocutionary action and 
ethical standing underlines the significance of panpsychism for recovering a robustly biblical 
ecological ethic and remythologizing the Christian imagination.104 Tying nature’s voices, as 
depicted in Scripture, to a Christian ecology does not fall foul of the theological problem of 
                                                 
99 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Why Animals Don’t Speak,” Faith and Philosophy, 4, no. 4. (October 1987): 471. 
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102 Bauckham, “Joining Nature’s Praise,” 48. Bauckham rejects the panpsychist interpretation of these passages 
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103 Northcott, The Enviroment, 181. See, Richard Cartwright Austin, Hope for the Land: Nature in the Bible 
(Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1988), 49. 
104 Moreover, the biblical instances of speech acts or symbolic utterance among non-human creatures can be 
taken as a minimal sort of evidence (but certainly not a proof) that panpsychism is compatible with a biblically 
shaped theology, influenced as much by Hebraic worship as Hellenistic philosophy. 
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intrinsic values, discussed at the end of section one, which sees the intrinsic value of creation 
as autonomous of God. Fretheim affirms that non-human voices function as metaphors “in 
terms of their intrinsic value rather than their instrumental value”, but this intrinsic value is 
orientated towards God as its proper end.105 Thus, the voices of creation — in so far as they 
witness to the Creator — are of sacramental value; a valuing of God through the signification, 
the ‘voices’ of creation.  
Creation as Community: One Body, One Spirit, and One Church  
 
To speak of intrinsic values as sacramentally anchored, such that creation is a congregation 
that expresses praise and lament and groans in petition to God, is to speak of an ecclesia of 
creatures.106 In a typically disorientating style, Simone Weil asks, “How can the church call 
itself Catholic if the universe itself is left out?”107 In this question catholicity connotes a 
universal breadth and inclusivity as wide as the indwelling action of God’s Spirit. This is to 
imply that a Christian response to the ecological crisis is not only an important teaching of the 
church, but it must also be a teaching about the church, as a community of creatures existing 
in response to the Triune God. 108  
The idea of creation as a community, the “earth community”, is frequently spoken of as 
central to ecological theology, and yet the metaphysical implications of this metaphor are 
rarely examined.109 Only subjects can form communities, for objects only form collections. 
Thus, to speak of creation as a community is to speak of creation as a diversity of subjects 
and for subjectivity to be a fundamental aspect of the universe. To speak of creation as a 
                                                 
105 Fretheim, “Nature’s Praise”, 22, 26. 
106 Margaret Baker has developed a rich exegetical reading of the priestly texts of the Hebrew Scriptures to 
argue that the temple and the creation mirror one another. The worship of the people of God in the temple is 
directly concerns with a theology of creation where God is in the midst of the created order and Adam (all 
humanity) plays a priestly role in the natural order. Margaret Barker, Creation: A Biblical Vision for the 
Environment (London: T&T Clark, 2010), 18, 22, 122, 228. 
107 Simone Weil, Waiting for God (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1951), 101. 
108 Judith Gruber, “Ec(o)clesiology: Ecology as Ecclesiology in Laudato Si’,” Theological Studies 78, no.4  
(2017): 808. 
109 Thomas Berry writes that “The universe itself is the most basic expression of community. The universe is the 
ultimate sacred community.” Thomas Berry, Befriending the earth: A theology of reconciliation between 
humans and the earth (Mystic: Twentythird Publications, 1991), 13. Paul Santmire writes that, “One of the most 
important tasks of an ecological anthropology is to resist such alienation of human beings from the rest of the 
earth community.” Santmire, Nature Reborn, 116. Ernst Conradie summarizes that “The environmental crisis 
calls for urgent reflection. . .  on the place of humanity within the earth community.” (Italics in original). Ernst 
M. Conradie, An Ecological Christian Anthropology: At Home on Earth? (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2005), 
2. Aldo Leopold writes that, “When we see land as a community to which we belong, we may begin to use it 
with love and respect . . . That land is community is the basis concept of ecology, but that land is to be respected 
is an extension of ethics.” Leopold, A Sand County Almanac, xix.  
168 
 
community is to invoke a panpsychist vision of the universe. If creation is a chorus, a 
community responding to and standing in relationship with God, then the creation may be 
properly considered a congregation, an ecclesia before the Creator.  
The church is more than just a community of worshipers, however, for it has a Christological 
foundation. Here the humanity of Christ may appear to drive a wedge between the church as 
a human institution and the church as a cosmic chorus of praise. Yet, to posit any such wedge 
would be to forget the cosmic implications of the incarnation, death and resurrection realised 
by the presence of the Spirit. A cosmic Christology should neither be a cosmic (deep) 
incarnation such that the Logos is directly incarnate in all material existence, nor should it 
follow Teilhard de Chardin in anticipating a supra-human consciousness engulfing and 
absorbing the subjects of creation. Instead, the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ, as examined 
in chapter four, that stretches across the whole of the panpsychist universe communicates 
Christ and transforms the universe into his ecclesial body; “for in one Spirit we were all 
baptized into one body” (1 Cor. 12:13 NRSV). The indwelling of the Spirit, within even the 
most fundamental subjects of creation, is the Spirit of the risen Christ connecting creation to 
the One who sits at the right hand of the Father as the Great High Priest. This same, one, 
Spirit cries “Abba, Father!” and intercedes in the depths of creation with sighs to deep for 
human words (Rom. 8:15, 23-26).110 Orthodox theologian John Chryssavgis expresses 
something of the implication that this theology has for humanity’s relationship to the 
environment when he writes,  
If one can visualize the activity of the Spirit in nature, then one can also 
perceive the consubstantiality between humanity and the created order; 
then one will no longer envisage humanity as the crown of a creation 
which it is able or called to subdue.111  
To emphasise the work of the Holy Spirit within the interiority of the non-human world is to 
posit a continuity between human and other creatures, and to relinquish any claim that 
creation needs humanity as a mediator before God, to save it, to control or cultivate it. The 
boundaries of the church, as the body of Christ, are not limited by the incarnation of God to 
share a common nature with one species but are determined by the scope of the work of the 
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Holy Spirit to transform the material subjects of this world into a Eucharistic extension of the 
Lamb who was slain. In a panpsychist creation, the boundaries of the church are cosmic.  
The concept of a “cosmic Eucharist” or “cosmic liturgy” forms a central tenet of the response 
by Orthodox theologians to the ecological crisis.112 This cosmic theological vision where the 
boundaries of the church encompass the entire universe is often expressed in panpsychist or 
quasi-panpsychist sentiments. The Metropolitan of Sourozh, Anthony Bloom, writes that, 
there is not an atom in this world, from the meanest speck of dust to the 
greatest star, which does not hold in its core . . . the thrill, the tremor of 
its first movement of existence, of its coming to being, of its possessing 
infinite possibilities and of entering into the divine realm, so that it 
knows God, and rejoices in Him.113  
Similarly, Bishop Kallistos Ware describes the Orthodox contribution to environmental ethics 
to lie in a sacramental, and subject-laden, view of the cosmos such that, “The environment 
consists not in dead matter but in living relationship [with God].”114 
The substantial continuity between all things, which resonates with the panpsychist argument 
from continuity, is expressed in the Eucharistic theology of the Orthodox church. Olivier 
Clément describes the “great cosmic Eucharist” whereby we transform the universe “from 
this dot of matter brought into the incandescence of the glorious Body, the fire spreads even 
to the rocks and the stars whose substance is present in the bread and wine”.115 This 
sacramental view of the creation has the power to make every Sunday Eucharist an ecological 
parable, and a reflection of the importance of non-human matter within God’s redemptive 
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economy.116 This is to reject any strong separation of the church as wholly sacred and the 
secular world as wholly profane, such that the promise of redemption only apply to the 
former at the expense of the latter.  Instead, there is one reality, one comprehensive order, 
over which Christ is Lord, and although all things are not yet as they should be, we trust and 
hope that they will be when Christ returns.  
What then is the role of humanity within a panpsychist universe whereby all creatures share 
in the dialogue between Creator and creation as an assembly of praise? Panpsychism, by 
counteracting the objectification of non-human creation from dead material to a community 
of subjects, offers a way to rehabilitate the various roles of leadership and responsibility 
discussed above. In particular, the Orthodox view of humanity as priests who mediate 
between God and creation can be transformed into a view of humanity as ministers, pastors or 
worship leaders, who join with non-human creatures leading them into closer relationship 
with God.117 A comparative shift may also be possible in the depiction of human stewardship, 
where humanity does not manage or control a material holding but is given temporary 
guardianship over God’s non-human children, to care and raise them to flourish. Whichever 
metaphor is chosen the importance of panpsychism’s contribution is the recognition of 




This chapter explored the potential for panpsychism as an ontological resource for articulating 
the intrinsic and sacramental value of creation. The benefit of a panpsychist ontology for 
ecology is not as an alternative to Christian theology, but as a way to recover the richness 
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within the Christian tradition for articulating humanity’s shared creaturehood with the non-
human world. It was argued that without panpsychism the objectification of creation — as the 
material for human worship, the empty household to be managed, or the backdrop to the God-
human drama — distorted the Christian imagination. A panpsychist metaphysic allows 
creation to be viewed as a congregation, a family, and a chorus of praise in relationship with 
God. It was suggested that a cosmic Christology could be engaged at this point, with a 
pneumatic and ecclesial understanding of the Body of Christ, extending throughout the 
subjects of creation by the indwelling Spirit. Humanity’s vocation in the community may still 
be one of leadership (priesthood or guardianship) since this is congruent with the higher-order 
complexity of mind that humans possess, but this is a difference of degree and not an absolute 
difference in kind. Panpsychism may be counter-intuitive for many, but its benefits for 
constructing a Christian response to the ecological crisis are profound. 
The articulation of an ecological doctrine of creation is one of the most significant challenges 
for the doctrine of creation today; as such the resource of panpsychism to this area, in addition 
to discussions of divine action, should not be dismissed lightly. Yet, what this investigation 
into ecological theology has uncovered is the Scriptural and liturgical basis to which 
panpsychism may also lay claim. Panpsychism is the metaphysic that is presupposed in the 
Scriptural depiction of the voices of nature, and these passages are prolific in the liturgies and 
hymns of many churches. Earlier chapters introduced panpsychism in a purely philosophical 
context and argued for an integration into Christian theology on this basis. What this chapter 
has shown is that this integration is not an imposition of dry rationalism, but already resounds 
within the context of worship.  In response to the God who speaks creation into being from 
nothing and who continues the dialogue amongst and within all creatures, let the voices of 





Far from providing final statements or definitive answers, this thesis has opened a line of 
enquiry into what I have called theological panpsychism. As an ontological hypothesis, the 
implications of panpsychism for Christian theology have been examined in the context of the 
doctrine of creation. Yet, if this line of enquiry is to be pursued further, the consequences of a 
panpsychist philosophy of mind for theological anthropology will require careful evaluation. 
Similarly, this thesis has resisted explicit consideration of panpsychism’s relationship to 
pantheism or panentheism, although it could be employed within either model. As this thesis 
has argued, as an ontological position regarding mind and matter within creation, 
panpsychism cannot solely determine theological content and could be combined with any 
number of models of God.  
This methodological principle has been a central pillar of this thesis in both its constructive 
and critical argumentation. Constructively, the distinction of panpsychism as a philosophy 
from more theological proposals has allowed this thesis to consider the fecundity of 
panpsychism when the traditional affirmation of the doctrine ex nihilo is maintained. If this 
methodological principle or theological doctrine were compromised, then mentality would 
wrongly stand in metaphysical continuity with divinity, and we would have naturalised God. 
This was the critique levelled against both Process theology in the introduction and 
emergence theologies in chapter one. It was seen that whilst emergence theory does not 
necessitate such naturalisation, the interdisciplinary aims of emergence – as an overarching 
worldview used to unite all academic disciplines and all reality – made such an extension into 
theology difficult to avoid. If a theologian employing emergence theory were to avoid such 
an error, however, she would still encounter the philosophical difficulties facing the 
emergence of mind as a repeated instance of anima ex nihilo for every new mind. Whilst a 
theologian can certainly maintain that God inputs souls into the universe for every new 
ensouled creature (the traditional theory of creationism) in conjunction with material 
complexity, this is perhaps not the most elegant story for the origin of souls. Traditional 
debates in theological anthropology over the origin of the soul, creationism and traducianism 
may well be parallel to some forms of emergent dualism and theological panpsychism. This 
antiquated question over how souls are created and how they relate to the body seem in need 
of updating if dualistic positions in anthropology are to continue to regain prominence in 
academia and become successful paradigms for future research. It is not enough to assert the 
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existence of the soul, theologians must also attempt to provide a compelling story regarding 
the soul’s relationship to the body and the wider cosmos, and this is something panpsychism 
and emergence theory both try to do.  
Following in the wake of leading philosophers who have become disgruntled with the theory 
of emergence, this thesis turned to consider the recent revival of panpsychism as a serious 
philosophical articulation of the place of mind within our universe. Contemporary 
panpsychism can be characterised as the product of three commitments. The first is the 
rejection of emergence theory. Since emergence theory and panpsychism both fight for the 
sacred middle ground between reductive physicalism and Cartesian dualism, they stand as 
natural competitors. The second is the return to emphasising the reality of mind and qualia in 
light of the so-called ‘hard problem’ of consciousness. The third is an extension of the 
continuity between all things emphasised in evolutionary science. In light of these three 
commitments, panpsychism has returned to the academic stage as an attractive ontology. Of 
the problems currently facing panpsychism, the combination problem is by far the most 
serious. Whilst more work needs to be done in this area, the current proposals indicate that, 
so far, this is not sufficient reason to abandon the panpsychist research project. Panpsychism, 
not a complete or finished theory, is as least a cogent as its main philosophical competitors.  
Further reflection on the combination problem will be essential if research into theological 
panpsychism is to be continued in the area of anthropology. Questions of personal identity, 
unity, and continuity over time, both in this life and in the intermediate state or resurrected 
body will need to be addressed. For example, since panpsychism is committed to a view of 
subjects that are not closed off from one another, but can combine or unite, exploration into 
how this relational notion of subjectivity might parallel theological discussion of the ecclesial 
body of Christ could be a profitable line of investigation. This, in turn, could draw upon a 
panpsychist understanding of the Eucharist, which was very briefly touched upon in chapter 
three, to suggest a real unity with Christ as the ground for a Christological anthropology. 
Whilst the combination problem remains a puzzle for panpsychist philosophers, it may yet 
contain great potential for theological anthropology.   
After assessing the coherency of panpsychism as a philosophical position, this thesis turned 
to consider the relationship between panpsychism and Christian theology. It was first argued 
that if panpsychist philosophers were to consistently apply their argumentation to the 
universe as a whole, rather than just to individual creatures, then it would point them towards 
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theism. Whilst panpsychism does not strictly entail theism, it carries commitments and 
arguments that are strongly congruent with belief in a transcendent Creator. Further 
investigation into the apologetic advantages of panpsychism is an avenue of enquiry yet to be 
fully explored. If this argument rings alarm bells in the mind of secular panpsychists, it 
should be an encouragement to theistic philosophers and theologians to consider a future 
alliance between Christian theism and panpsychism.  
A brief historical interlude considered the relationship between panpsychism and theology in 
the thought of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz. The primary purpose of this interlude was to 
show something of the pedigree of panpsychism, such that theological interest in the 
contemporary shifts in philosophy of mind is not merely chasing the winds of fashion. This 
historical investigation also served as a reconnaissance mission, to discover how 
panpsychism has been employed to serve theological ends previously, and so to learn what 
distinctive contributions panpsychism might make today. First, it was seen that panpsychism 
both arose out of and served to defend Leibniz’s affirmation of the doctrine of creation ex 
nihilo. This was an important discovery for this thesis, since the doctrine of creation ex nihilo 
is the theological commitment that underpins the methodological principle discussed above. 
The consequence of placing mentality firmly on the side of creation is that the initial act of 
creation becomes radically unique, such that no ontological additions or radically new 
features of the world need to be created at a later date. Second, therefore, the created order is 
to be considered comprehensive and complete, in the sense of being pregnant with all future 
developments. This does not lead to a cosmos that is closed off or emptied of divine presence 
and activity. Rather, the interior depth that panpsychism posits within all of creation provides 
a kind of ontological ‘space’ for God’s indwelling Spirit. Thus, third, a panpsychist creation 
is sacramentally construed as open to the interactive experience of the Creator. As such, 
panpsychism offers Christian theology a truly distinctive way of articulating both the 
transcendence and immanence of God from the side of creation.   
In many ways, this balance between transcendence and immanence has been the central 
problem for recent theologies of creation. The difficulty of holding together these two aspects 
of God’s relationship with the world have been most keenly felt in discussions regarding 
divine action and eco-theology. As such, these two areas of debate were employed as testing 
grounds for theological panpsychism. Chapter four examined how a shadow, characterised 
through the language of divine intervention, has been cast over theological claims for special 
divine action. This shadow has arisen in light of scientific assumptions, ethical concerns and 
175 
 
theo-political tensions. Each of these issues have been separately responded to, with 
increasing degrees of success, in the work of Robert J. Russell, David Ray Griffin and 
Kathryn Tanner. This chapter furthered the idea that panpsychism is a flexible ontology by 
arguing that it would benefit each theological project separately. Overall, panpsychism 
provides an ontological space for articulating the indwelling of the Holy Spirit without 
interrupting or injecting new entities into the comprehensive created order. It was argued that 
if the model of double agency, with which panpsychism is largely congruent, is to account for 
the variety and interactive nature of Christianity’s central claims regarding divine action, an 
account of the indwelling Spirit is also required. Panpsychism’s main contribution is to 
combine secondary powers with the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, by positing indwelling 
powers in continuity with consciousness within all things.  
After exploring and critiquing the role that panpsychism already plays within eco-philosophy, 
chapter five argued that panpsychism provides an ontological framework for realistically 
interpreting the voices and response of creation. This chapter draws upon the idea of 
panpsychism as a sacramental ontology and offered a view of creation as a community of 
praise. Whilst it is already clear that panpsychism excludes ontological depictions of human 
uniqueness, it may still be that human beings have a distinctive role to play as leaders, priests 
and stewards of this created community.   
It was noted in the beginning of this thesis that panpsychism suffers from a cumbersome 
name, counterintuitive content, and its fair share of historical baggage. Yet, I have argued that 
if contemporary theologians can overlook these hindrances, then panpsychism has the 
potential to be of great benefit to Christian theology. A world in which mind is a fundamental 
property found throughout creation is a cosmos full of experience, open to God’s presence, 
and responsive in giving God glory. A more enchanted and theologically rich ontology would 
be hard to come by. At the very least, the revival of panpsychism within philosophy of mind 
is not a development that theologians should fear and resist, but welcome and may profitably 
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